Opinion of the Court.

223 U.S.

both of one or two considerations-(a) the necessary operation and effect of the opinion in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, just announced, or (b) the conclusive effect on questions of a local and state character resulting from the action of the court below, and hence that none of them have a foundation sufficiently substantial to support the exertion of jurisdiction.

In saying this we are not unmindful that one of the assignments is based upon the contention that as the Willamette River was navigable, there was no power to build a bridge over it without the consent of the Government of the United States. But in the first place, we are unable to perceive upon what theory the complainant possessed the right to raise such a question, and in the second place, the ordinance which empowered the bridge expressly ex

Supreme Court of Oregon attempted to legislate and authorize the taxation of plaintiff in error and deprived him of the law of the land.

6. The Supreme Court of Oregon committed error in deciding that the granting of a franchise and building a bridge across the Willamette river, owned by the State of Oregon and controlled jointly by the United States of America and the State of Oregon, is a municipal purpose instead of a state purpose and can be granted by the electors of the City of Portland in amending the charter of the City of Portland under the said "Oregon system," as said decision denied to plaintiff in error the law of the land.

7. The Supreme Court of Oregon committed error in deciding that the Council and electors of the City of Portland can enact a charter amendment to the charter of the City of Portland, under said "Oregon system," by which the city could issue bonds in a large amount and tax the property of plaintiff in error for the payment of the bonds as a municipal purpose, when it is a state purpose, and it is not within the constitutional power of the people of the State of Oregon to delegate the power to tax without limitation and exercise state powers to the electors of a municipality, and the attempt to do so is in violation of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; also in violation of sections 3 and 4 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States of America, as such grant of power would be for the State of Oregon to commit state suicide and dissolve the State of Oregon into as many smaller States as there are munici

223 U.S.

Opinion of the Court.

acted that it should be built in conformity to the requirements of the authorities of the United States. It is to be observed that both sides refer to and insert in their printed arguments an act of the legislature of Oregon passed since this writ of error was sued out (Jany. 18, 1911, Gen. Laws, 1911, c. 6, p. 23). Nothing could be more complete and comprehensive in the manifestation of a purpose, so far as there was power to do so, to cure any and every possible defect. Its title is an indication of its purpose and Scope:

"An act to authorize the construction of a bridge known as the Broadway bridge, to be built across the Willamette River in the city of Portland in the State of Oregon and to cure any errors or irregularities in the passage of the amendment to the charter of the city of Portland authorpalities within the State and to change the republican government of the State of Oregon into a confederacy of cities within the State of Oregon, and tends to destroy our system of government created and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States of America.

8. The Supreme Court of Oregon erred in holding and deciding that plaintiff, a citizen of the United States, must conform his conduct and hold his property in state matters and tax matters, to a rule of conduct or law enacted by mere numbers of people and assemblages of people within the borders of a municipality because it is not in accordance with due process of law and is in violation of the law of the land to require any citizen of the United States to conform his conduct, and hold his property in state matters and in tax matters, to a rule of conduct or law, enacted directly by mere numbers of people or assemblages of people within a municipal corporation, and is contrary to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, sections 3 and 4 of article IV of the Constitution of the United States of America; and also is contrary to the implied provisions of the Constitution of the United States that government of the several States shall be representative in form and that the several States shall create and maintain representative legislative assemblies, and that the citizens of the United States shall be protected in their rights of enjoyment of life, liberty and property by the law of the land which is an inherent attribute of citizenship of the United States, which no State or its people may impair.

izing such bridge and to validate and confirm the bonds issued or to be issued for the construction therefor."

We have not deemed it necessary to take into consideration the act of Congress-36 Stat., c. 253, p. 1348-expressly approving the authority granted to build the bridge so far as the United States was concerned, and ratifying any infirmity which might otherwise have arisen in that regard.

It follows that the writ of error must be, and it is, Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

THE ABBY DODGE.i

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA.

No. 41. Argued November 6, 7, 1911.-Decided February 19, 1912.

Each State owns the beds of all tide waters within its jurisdiction unless they have been granted away; also the tide waters themselves and the fish in them so far as they are capable of ownership while running. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391.

Congress has no control over sponges growing on the land beneath tide water within the jurisdiction of a State.

Where two interpretations of a statute are admissible, one of which makes the statute constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the former must be adopted. United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407.

The act of June 20, 1906, 34 Stat. 313, c. 3442, regulating the landing of sponges at ports of the United States, relates only to sponges taken outside of the territory of any State..

The power of Congress over foreign commerce is complete; no one has a vested right to carry on foreign commerce with the United States. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470.

Congress can, by exertion of its power to regulate foreign commerce,

The docket title of this case is The vessel "Abby Dodge," A. Kalimeris, Claimant, Appellant, v. The United States.

223 U.S.

Argument for Appellant.

forbid the importation of sponges gathered under conditions expressed in the act of June 20, 1906.

Where the act of Congress, under which forfeiture is sought, does not apply to territorial waters, the libel must aver that the acts were done outside of the territorial limits of any State.

When Congress, under its power to regulate foreign commerce, prohibits the importation of certain merchandise, it may cast on the one seeking to bring merchandise in the burden of establishing that it is exempt from the operation of the statute.

Under the circumstances of this case it is proper to allow the Government to amend the libel to present a case within the statute as construed in this opinion. The Mary Ann, 8 Wheat. 389.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction of the act of Congress of June 20, 1906, relating to landing of sponges in ports of the United States, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Edward R. Gunby, for appellant:

Congress had no power under the Federal Constitution to pass the act of June 20, 1906. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.

Under the wording of the act, sponges are prohibited from being landed at any port of the United States, even if taken within the waters of a State, and no element whatever of interstate or foreign commerce is required to enter into the act in order to make it a violation of law.

If the landing of an ordinary article of commerce is commerce within the meaning of the law when commerce is confined within the limits of a single State, Congress has no power to regulate or control it. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; The Bright Star, Fed. Cases, No. 1880; King v. The Am. Trans. Co., Fed. Cases, No. 7787; United States v. New Bedford Bridge, Fed. Cases, No. 15,867; United States v. Morrison, Fed. Cases, No. 15,465; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227.

Even if the acts controlled and regulated by the act of Congress are matters of interstate commerce, if the same

Argument for Appellant.

223 U.S.

are so blended with intrastate commerce that the two are inseparable, the act of Congress would be unconstitutional. Howard v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 463; Sears v. Warren, 36 Indiana, 267.

The people of the United States, as distinguished from the people of the several States, have no common property in wild animals, oysters, fish, etc., within the boundaries of the several States, which will give them as citizens of the United States the right to legislate for the preservation of such property within the limits of the several States. The right to legislate on this subject being based upon the common ownership of the property, the several States have this authority when they are erected; but neither the States nor the United States have this authority over the waters of the high seas outside the limits of the several States.

While there are no decisions in relation to the control of the sponge industry and the catching of sponges, decisions upon the right of the States to legislate in regard to oysters are so nearly parallel as to practically control the same rights in regard to sponges. The right of the State to absolutely regulate the oyster industry has been clearly recognized. Lee v. State of New Jersey, 207 U. S. 67; McReady v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Louisiana v. Mississippi, 202 U. S. 1; Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71.

As to the ownership, sovereignty and control of the tide water and the right to control the fishing therein, see Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367; Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212; Illinois v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 146 U. S. 387; Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155; Mann v. De Coma Land Co., 153 U. S. 273; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371; Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1.

By the act of March 3, 1845, Florida was admitted into the Union on equal footing with the original States in all