(B.) STATUTES OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.

CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1911.

SECOND EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY CASES.

MONDOU v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT.

NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. v. BABCOCK.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.

NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO. v. WALSH.

WALSH v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD RAILROAD CO.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

Nos. 120, 170, 289, 290. Argued February 20, 21, 1911.-Decided January 15, 1912.

The Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149, as amended April 5, 1910, 36 Stat. 291, c. 143, regulating the liability of common carriers by railroad to their employés, is constitutional. -Congress may, in the execution of its power over interstate commerce, regulate the relations of common carriers by railroad and their employés while both are engaged in such commerce.

VOL. CCXXIII—1 ·

(1)

Congress has not exceeded its power in that regard by prescribing the regulations embodied in the Employers' Liability Act.

Those regulations have superseded the laws of the several States in so far as the latter cover the same field.

Rights arising under the regulations prescribed by the act may be enforced, as of right, in the courts of the States, when their jurisdiction, as fixed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion.

Congress, in the exertion of its power over interstate commerce, and subject to the limitations prescribed in the Constitution, may regulate those relations of common carriers by railroad and their employés which have a substantial connection with interstate commerce and while both carrier and employé are engaged therein.

A person has no property-no vested interest-in any rule of the common law. While rights of property created by the common law cannot be taken without due process, the law as a rule of conduct may, subject to constitutional limitations, be changed at will by the legislature.

Under the power to regulate relations of employers and employés while engaged in interstate commerce, Congress may establish new rules of law in place of common-law rules including those in regard to fellow-servants, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and right of action by personal representatives for death caused by wrongful neglect of another.

In regulating the relations of employers and employés engaged in interstate commerce, Congress may regulate the liability of employers to employés for injuries caused by other employés even though the latter be engaged in intrastate commerce.

The power of Congress to insure the efficiency of regulations ordained by it is equal to the power to impose the regulations; and prohibiting the making of agreements by those engaged in interstate commerce which in any way limit a liability imposed by Congress on interstate carriers does not deprive any person of property without due process of law, or abridge liberty of contract in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

Quare: Whether an element of the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment is the equivalent of the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A classification of railroad employés, even if including all employés, whether subjected to peculiar hazards incident to operation of trains or not, is not so arbitrary or unequal as to amount to denial of equal protection of the laws. Such a classification does not vio

223 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

late the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment even if equal protection is an element of due process.

State legislation, even if in pursuance of a reserved power, must give way to an act of Congress over a subject within the exclusive control of Congress.

Until Congress acted on the subject, the laws of the several States determined the liability of interstate carriers for injuries to their employés while engaged in such commerce; but Congress having acted, its action supersedes that of the States, so far as it covers the same subject. That which is not supreme must yield to that which is. The inaction of Congress on a subject within its power does not affect that power.

Rights arising under an act of Congress may be enforced, as of right,

in the courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occasion.

When Congress, in the exertion of a power confided to it by the Constitution, adopts an act, it speaks for all the people and all the States, and thereby establishes a policy for all, and the courts of a State cannot refuse to enforce the act on ground that it is not in harmony with the policy of that State. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130. A state court cannot refuse to enforce the remedy given by an act of Congress in regard to a subject within the domain of Congress on the ground of inconvenience or confusion.

The systems of jurisprudence of the State and of the United States together form one system which constitutes the law of the land for the State.

The United States is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States but is a concurrent and, within its jurisdiction, a paramount sovereign. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130.

Existence of jurisdiction in a court implies the duty to exercise it notwithstanding such duty may be onerous.

82 Connecticut, 373, reversed; 173 Fed. Rep. 494, affirmed.

No. 120 (Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co.).

THIS was an action by a citizen of Connecticut against a railroad corporation of that State to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while in the defendant's service. The injuries occurred in Connecticut August 5, 1908, the action was commenced in one of the Superior Courts of that State in October following, and the right