Here we find the cause of conjugal and maternal love. When that cause can be removed its effect will cease and not till then. How idle then are the vain predictions of silly declaimers, who prate about dividing man and wife without ever thinking of the cause of their union. How void of all logical consistency! How destitute of every vestige of correct reasoning! Man must reverse the decrees of the Almighty to make their assertion good; and yet they ask to be believed.

Mr. Strong's objection to the organization of the legislature is that it is too numerous. How does it compare with other states? Massachusetts, Vermont, and, I believe, all of the New England states send a representative from every town. The house of representatives in New York is over one hundred, Ohio seventy-two, and other states, it is believed, proportionably large. All experience has shown that large bodies are less liable to be operated upon by improper motives than small ones. When there are a few men to approach the object is more easily accomplished and with less hazard of detection than when there are many. The difference in expense is compensated for by reduced compensation and shoter sessions. The people are more generally represented, the representative rendered more directly responsible to his constituents. Local interests are better cared for. The voice of the people is more clearly expressed. Let it be borne in mind that in our struggle with the United States Bank the Senate fell while the House of Representatives stood firm.

The next and last objection of Mr. Strong is the elective judiciary. It may be deemed a work of supererogation to discuss this article. It has become a fixed idea with the people of Wisconsin. Nothing will induce them to relinquish this right. They have seen one judge appointed over us, giving barroom opinions to prejudice the constitution, that he may enjoy his place and salary a little longer. They have seen that opinion retailed in the council chamber for like purposes, though it was so silly that even the retailer was ashamed to indorse it. And they perceive that though judges elected may partake of the infirmities of human nature judges appointed are not free from improper and personal motives.

We will briefly notice the several modes of appointing judges and submit the question to the people and have no fears for the result. These are three: First, appointment by the governor, with the confirmation of the senate; second, election by the legislature; third, election by the people.

These are the only modes suggested. The vitality of popular government consists in rendering officers responsible to the people by placing the tenure of their office upon popular suffrage. A representative democracy secures its efficacy by holding its representatives accountable to the people through the ballot box. Accountability is secured by frequent elections and short terms. If the public officer is approved, the people may reëlect him. If he prove incompetent, corrupt, or otherwise unfit, his place is supplied by another. This is the only democratic doctrine, and every departure from the principle is aristocratic in its character and tendency and ought not to be permitted without the most cogent

reasons.

To the first mode of appointment there are many and overwhelming objections. Appointments by the governor are made of particular favorites, to reward personal service or accommodate personal friends. We all know how this works. A few wireworkers in different parts of the state begin the game by correspondence. It is agreed that Mr. C. shall be judge, Mr. S. United States senator, Mr. H. attorney-general, etc. Then the governor is beset by those whom he considers men of influence, the appointment is made, the decree of the clique is carried out, and the voice of the people is entirely suppressed as though the people were gagged. Now the appointment of judge is a perfect piece of bargain and sale from beginning to end. However odious the appointee may be to the people he is fastened upon them without their consent, and fastened for life or till he can make a better bargain.

To the election of judges by the legislature the same objections apply with greater force, because the bargain and intrigue are more open and notorious and hence more corrupting and disgusting. Both in the appointment of judges by the governor and in their election by the legislature party trammels are drawn to their utmost tension. The system of logrolling begins with the session, is frequently advanced to bribery, and the farce closes by the election. of a judge who has purchased his office at the expense of his integrity. A few members in the west have a particular candidate for state printer. Another few in the north have a candidate for attorney-general. Others in the east have their favorite candidates. Then begins the game

Tickle me, Neddy, do, do, do,

And in my turn, I'll tickle you.

"You go for my man, and I'll go for yours" is the prevailing proposition, and then officers are thus bought and sold with shame

less impunity, while the wishes of the people or the qualifications of the candidate are never taken into consideration. This is the mode of operation of the two first plans.

Is the third liable to the same objections? I contend that it is not. Mr. Strong insists that the people do not know enough to elect a judge. The same objection applies with equal and more force to an elective governor. Very few of the people can be personally acquainted with the candidate; he is elected by the people of the whole state, while a judge is only elected by one-fifth.

I am willing to submit the question to the people whether they are as competent to elect a judge for themselves, as a Milwaukee or Racine clique is to appoint one over them. And upon this issue I rest this branch of the objection.

But it is contended that judges will be elected solely upon party considerations. Let us submit this to the test of logical argument. In a democratic government the public will legally expressed is the law. As men differ in opinion as to the measures calculated to promote the public good, they divide into parties; opposite measures are advocated, and each party submits its measures to the public judgment in the persons they respectively nominate to carry out the measures advocated by each. As the majority determine, the questions are settled as to measures. The measures divide the people, not the men.

But in the election of judges the question is not one of measures, but essentially one of men. The object is to obtain an honest and due administration of the law and to select the man best qualified for that object. Hence the cause of party division is removed, and the effect must cease. No other officers being elected at the same time, there can be no logrolling among a multitude of candidates.

The short term of office is no objection. The reason is short and conclusive. If the judge elected proves worthy of his trust, the people can reëlect him. If he proves unworthy, they certainly ought to have the means of getting rid of him. It is comfortable for a judge with a good salary to hold for life, but it is a comfort to no one but him.

It is contended that the judge seeking popularity will be swerved from integrity to court popular favor. This is another fling at the honesty of the people, for it presupposes that the practice of dishonesty and corruption is the direct road to their favor. The most effectual and certain mode for the judge to be popular will be to discharge his duty with fidelity. The people love the laws of their own creation and desire to see them administered in purity.

That judge therefore who faithfully administers the people's laws will find favor in the hearts of the people.

Mr. Strong tells us that a new convention will certainly give us a better constitution than the present one; and his reason is "that it will have a clear indication of public opinion." How so? Upon what point? One votes against the constitution on account of boundary but is in favor of exemption. One is opposed to exemption but in favor of banks. One opposes the married woman article but is a zealous advocate of the elective judiciary. And thus opinions are as various as you can combine the several articles of the constitution. The consequence will be, if the constitution is rejected, that the next convention will quarrel from January till December as to what each is instructed to do in relation to these various provisions. One will say the constitution was rejected because it contained the exemption article; another will attribute it to the elective judiciary; a member from the east will declare to a member from the west that the bank article is condemned by the people; the western member will reply that the bank article is not condemned, but the elective judiciary, and so on to the end of the chapter and the bottom of the people's pockets. Contention will rise upon contention, strife upon strife, till it will be impossible to agree upon anything.

Or if by chance or in despair a convention does agree upon a constitution, when it is again submitted to the people some will vote against it because the bank article is stricken out. Some because the exemption article is retained. Some because the governor or legislature is to appoint the judges. Some because the boundaries are changed. Some because the exemption article is stricken out, or the married woman article is retained. And how amidst all this confusion and variety of opinion will it be possible to harmonize the minds of a majority of the people upon another constitution? In the course of the canvass upon this every voter will have his feelings strongly enlisted in favor of his favorite provisions or against obnoxious ones. If a new constitution shall be presented, wanting the one or containing the other, it is rejected. Besides, a continued submission of exciting questions of this kind tends to excite and distract communities, to introduce discord among neighborhoods, and put off farther and farther the day of compromise and conciliation that must come before we can enter the Union.

Is it not then better that we try to compromise now? Is it not better to adopt this constitution, democratic in every respect, than to begin the process of voting down which will end no one knows

where or when? We have incurred a heavy expense to get this one. If we reject it, another bill of $40,000 is added to this one, and so on from year to year, till a large public debt has accumulated, loading us down with taxation.

I have now attempted to answer the prominent objections to this constitution, urged by Mr. Strong. There are others mentioned by him, but too frivolous for serious comment. Nor shall the effort be made to review his answers to the pretended arguments of the friends of the constitution. Anyone may set up a man of straw and exhibit his skill and valor in beating him down. The gentleman has supposed many arguments for the friends of the constitution which suit himself and has no doubt derived much amusement in trying to demolish them. It would be hard to deprive him of this remaining crumb of comfort. When Othello had discovered the infamous treachery of Iago, he merely said, "If thou be'st a Devil, I will not kill thee."

If this constitution be not adopted, our admission into the Union must be delayed at least two years. We shall be entitled on admission to 500,000 acres of land. In two years more the most valuable of the public land will be sold, leaving only the poorest quality. We lose our distributive share of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands. We continue the old form of territorial government with all its vices, plunging the territory into debt from year to year. It is true the gentleman will be enabled to retain his seat in the Council another year. The old territorial officers will be enabled to hold on to the spoils two years more. But this is a poor equivalent for the right of the people to govern themselves.

On bringing this subject to a close it may be proper for the writer to say a word in explanation of the reasons which induced him to attempt this reply. It was the effort of Mr. Strong during the entire session of the legislature to procure from that body some expression denunciatory of the constitution. Everything might be sacrificed to that grand object. It was with him the throw of a die, and he foolishly staked his all upon it. He forgot even his hostility to Milwaukee in his ardent zeal for his favorite project. Failing in his attempt to wheedle or drive the legislature into his mad schemes, he takes the field alone and makes his three-hour speech, prints thousands of copies, procures its publication in the Whig papers, circulates them in vast numbers and variety of form all over the territory, vainly supposing that his own personal influence could ride down the public judgment and that the people would admit themselves fools because he had thus pronounced them.