tion to this treaty, will form the subject of a separate message.

But our circumscribed limits prevent us from touching, with any thing like justice, on this able state paper. We can only say, that nothing seems to have escaped his capacious mind, of very general and national importance.

By the report of the treasurer this session, it appears he had a balance of more than five millions in his hands. During this session a question was agitated relating to the holding of any office under the government of the United States, by a senator or representative to congress. Mr. Benton, from the selected committee, reported

That, having had recourse to the history of the times, in which the constitution was formed, the committee find, that the proposition now referred to them had engaged the deliberations of the federal convention which framed the constitution, and of several of the state conventions which ratified it.

In an early stage of the session of the federal convention, it was resolved as follows:

"Art. 6, sec. 9. The members of each house (of congress) shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected; and the members of the senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of, holding any such office for one year afterwards." (Journal of the Federal Convention, page 219.)

It further appears from the journal, that this clause in the first draft of the constitution, was adopted with great unanimity, and that afterwards, in the concluding days of the session, it was altered, and its intention defeated, by a majority of a single vote, in the absence of one of the states by which it had been supported.

Following the constitution into the state conventions which ratified it, the committee find, that, by the NewYork convention, it was recommended, as follows:

"That no senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any office under the authority of the United States."

By the Virginia convention, as follows:

"That the members of the senate and house of repre

sentatives shall be ineligible to, and incapable of, holding any civil office under the authority of the United States, during the term for which they shall respectively be elected."

By the North Carolina convention the same amendment was recommended, in the same words.

In the first session of the first congress, which was held under the constitution, a member of the house of representatives submitted a similar proposition of amendment; and, in the third session of the eleventh congress, James Madison being president, a like proposition was again submitted, and being referred to a committee of the house, was reported by them in the following words:

"No senator or representative shall be appointed to any civil office, place, or emolument, under the authority of the United States, until the expiration of the presidenfial term in which such person shall have served as a senator or representative."

Upon the question to adopt this resolution, the vote stood 71 yeas, 40 nays, wanting but three votes of the constitutional number for the referring it to the decision of the states.

Having thus shown, by a reference to the venerable evidence of our early history, that the principle of the amendment now under consideration, has had the support and approbation of the first friends of the constitution, the committee will now declare their own opinion in favour of its correctness, and express its belief that the ruling principle in the organization of the federal government demands its adoption.

That ruling principle demands that the three great branches of the federal government, the executive, legislative and judiciary, should be separate and distinct from each other, not only in contemplation of law, but in point of fact; and, for this end, that each should not only have its independent organization, but that the individuals administering each, should be wholly free from the control and influence of the individuals who administered the others.

To secure this independence on the part of the president, and to prevent the executive from starving him into

a compliance with their will, by withholding his necessary support, or seducing him into an acquiescence in their views, by tempting his avarice with an augmented salary, (Fed. No. 77.) it is provided in the constitution, that he shall receive a fixed compensation for his services, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the term for which he was elected.

To secure the independence of the legislative department, and to prevent the executive from influencing its deliberations, by retaining a set of dependants in the senate and house of representatives, always ready, like the placemen in the British parliament, to support the measures of administration, it was provided, in the same constitution, that persons holding offices under the authority of the United States, should be wholly excluded from the floor of congress.

The committee believe that this provision for the independence of the senate and house of representatives though wise and proper as far as it goes, does not go far enough to accomplish the object it had in view. They admit that the presence of office holders in the legislative department, would be the bane of honest and independent legislation; and they believe that the presence of office hunters would be equally fatal. The danger to be apprehended from each, is, in effect, the same. The office holder would support the measures of administration, for the purpose of saving the office which he had in possession; the office hunter would support the same measures for the purpose of securing the office which he had in expectation.

By either party, the interest of the country would be sacrificed to the views of the executive; and the appropriate means for preventing this mischief, was first to exclude office holders from seats in congress, and this the constitution has done; and, secondly, to prevent senators and representatives from taking appointments from the president, under whose administration they had served; and this it has omitted to do. The omission was too material to escape the observation of those who were not blind to the defects of the constitution; and their animadversions were too loud and vehement to pass unno

ticed by the great advocates for the ratification of that instrument. The authors of the Federalist, in their No. 55. felt it to be their duty to meet the objection which grew out of this omission. But even these great men, with their superior abilities, and ardent zeal in the best of causes, could do no more than to diminish the quantum of a danger which could not be denied to exist, and to cover, with a brilliant declamation, a part of their beloved constitution which could not be defended. They said:

"Sometimes we are told, that this fund of corruption, (executive appointments,) is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the senate. Now, the fidelity of the other house is to be the victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of the government, standing on as different foundations as its republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortunately, the constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices, therefore, can be dealt out to the existing members, but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties; and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain."

They doubted the validity of these arguments, and concluded the report as follows: Considering all which, the committee have come to the unanimous resolution to submit to the senate a proposition of amendment to the constitution of the United States, embracing the principle of this report.

Resolved, by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of America in congress assembled, two thirds of both houses concurring, that the follow

ing amendment to the constitution of the United States be proposed to the legislatures of the several states; which, when ratified by three fourths of said legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of said

constitution:

No senator or representative shall be appointed to any civil office, place or emolument, under the authority of the United States, until the expiration of the presidential term in which such person shall have served as a senator or a representative.

During the session, and on the fourth of July, just half a century from the time when Adams and Jefferson signed the Declaration of Independence, they both departed this life, within a few hours of each other. They had both been presidents of the United States, and both vice presidents. This is certainly an extraordinary coincidence, and worthy to be perpetuated in the archives of the nation. Nor is it a little remarkable, that on this day, after its observance by the national legislature, certain members of congress addressed the legislature on the pecuniary embarrassments of Mr. Jefferson, with a view to his relief. The following extracts, we believe, will be acceptable.

If I am asked why Jefferson is singled out amid his compatriots-my answer is, he stands pre-eminent alike for his services and his misfortunes. God forbid that I should diminish the just claims of that illustrious band, who, guided by the polarity of their superior genius, and by a courage that was above circumstances, to whom the blessing of Providence became a pillar of light-by which we were conducted through the wilderness of the land of promise. But as one star' differeth from another star in glory, so also is the lot of man. It was his good fortune to occupy the front rank among the illustrious. He is one of three survivors, signers of the Declaration of Independence. His associates are comfortable, and need no aid.

If it be inquired how it has happened that he has become impoverished? I answer, the delicacy of the subject forbids the inquiry. I may ask, however, what public institution is there in the United States that has not pro