prisoners. He had taken eleven hundred prisoners, twelve guns, and five stands of colors.

We have already noticed the strength of Hooker's position. Finding it vain to assail it, and hoping that the annihilation of Sedgwick's corps, which he confidently anticipated, would be a more satisfactory undertaking, General Lee attempted nothing more on Monday than to place a battery at Scott's dam on Scott's creek, which commanded the United States ford, and commenced shelling that position. This battery was driven away, and the position it occupied held, though not without some difficulty, by the Union troops. Toward night on Monday, May 4th, a heavy rain commenced falling, and it was ascertained that it had been raining all day in the mountains. On Monday night, General Hooker held a council of his officers. Stoneman had not been heard from, and it was not known whether his expedition had been successful or not. Lee had evidently all the troops he needed, and holding Fredericksburg, was not likely to want for supplies. Meantime, Hooker's supplies and ammunition were nearly exhausted, and the Rappahannock, always sensitive to rains in the mountains, was rapidly rising, and might soon become impassable. Sedgwick, while he had fought with the most undaunted bravery and skill, had failed to take and hold Fredericksburg, and the campaign, from several causes, had lost its chances for success. Such was the condition of affairs; and the council, entertaining the same views in regard to it with the commander, advised that the army should recross the next morning at the ford, and returning to its old quarters await another and more favorable opportunity to strike a decisive blow. Accordingly, on Tuesday evening, May 5th, General Hooker commenced moving his troops noiselessly across the Rappahannock, at United States ford; and though the river had risen so much that he was obliged to use the pontoons for three bridges to make two, he brought his entire force and train across in safety, and returned to Falmouth, with his forces in perfect order.

The losses of the Union army in this series of battles have never been officially reported. Including General Sedgwick's losses at Fredericksburg, and Salem Heights, they were probably not far from eleven thousand, of whom four thousand two hundred were prisoners, many of them wounded. Of this number about one thousand six hundred were killed. It is a matter of great difficulty to ascertain, even approximately, the losses of the Rebels. The number taken prisoners by the Union troops exceeded three thousand six hundred; and officers of great experience belonging to both armies were confident that the numbers of killed and wounded considerably exceeded that of the Union troops. It was stated by some of the Rebel papers at nine thousand two hundred. Whether this was intended to include prisoners also is not stated; if so, it was unquestionably far below the truth. The loss of General T. J. Jackson, better known as "Stonewall "Jackson, was a severer blow to them than

REVIEW OF HOOKER'S CAMPAIGN.

531

the slaughter of twenty thousand troops, for with the exception, perhaps, of General Lee, they had no commander of equal ability with him.

In the review of this battle, forming as it did the fourth unsuccessful attempt to open the way to the capture of Richmond, we find that there were certain errors apparent in the movement, which prevented its success, although they do not tarnish the reputation of General Hooker as an able and skilful commander of a great army. These were, 1st. That Stoneman was sent too late upon his expedition. To have sent him a week earlier would have prevented the reinforcement of Lee by Longstreet's division of the South Carolina troops, and would have enabled General Hooker to have moved with more certainty and confidence. 2d. A cavalry force should have been placed on duty to guard the approaches to the right wing of the army (the eleventh corps), and thus have prevented the surprise and panic which proved so disastrous. It is the testimony of the officers of that corps that there were but thirty-five cavalrymen detailed for service on the flank of the right wing. 3d. It was a mistake to have attempted the capture of Fredericksburg by an assault in front, as was done by Sedgwick's corps. The possession of that city, in that way, was of no consequence to the Union army, while it cost six thousand men, and drew off twenty-two thousand of the best troops in the army, whose services were needed in striking a heavy blow upon the Rebel force. Had Lee been defeated, Fredericksburg would have fallen into Hooker's hands as a part of the victory. As it was, it was in the possession of the Union troops less than twenty-four hours.

Aside from these errors, the plan of the campaign seems to have been judicious, and displayed a high order of strategic ability; while the undaunted courage, readiness of resource, and skilful management of his troops, showed conclusively that General Hooker possessed many, if not all, of the qualities of a great general.

In the narrative of this series of battles, we have alluded more than once to the expedition of General Stoneman, as forming an important part of General Hooker's plan of the campaign, but we must reserve for another chapter the account of that ably-conducted and successful expedition.

CHAPTER XLVI.

STONEMAN'S EXPEDITION-THE PLAN OF IT SUBSTANTIALLY THAT OF GENERAL BURNSIDE-BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GENERAL STONEMAN-STARTING OF THE EXPEDITION-ITS ADVENTURES-DETACHMENTS SENT IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS FROM THOMPSON'S CROSS ROADS COLONEL WYNDHAM'S RAID TO COLUMBIA-COLONEL KILPATRICK'S ADVENTURES -LIEUTENANT-COLONEL DAVIS'S EXPEDITION TO CUT THE TWO RAILROADS-RESULTS OF THE EXPEDITION-THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC AFTER THE BATTLE-LEE'S DETERMINATION TO INVADE PENNSYLVANIA-PLEASONTON SENT TO ATTACK STUART'S CAVALRYBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GENERAL PLEASONTON-SUCCESS OF HIS ATTACK-HIS SUBSE

QUENT SKIRMISHES AND FIGHTS WITH STUART'S CAVALRY-LEE'S POSITION DISCOVERED -MOVEMENT OF HOOKER'S ARMY-THE REBEL ARMY CROSS THE POTOMAC-HOOKER'S FOLLOW-HOOKER RELIEVED OF THE COMMAND OF THE ARMY-MEADE APPOINTED HIS SUCCESSOR-POSITION OF THE TWO ARMIES-ONLY TWO UNION CORPS NEAR GETTYSBURG A BATTLE IMPENDING.

THE expedition, or raid, of General Stoneman, properly comes under the history of the expeditions of that class given in Chapter XLIV., but from its forming a part of General Hooker's campaign it was deemed necessary to give it a place in connection with that campaign. In its boldness, the amount of damage it inflicted upon the enemy, and the success which attended it, from its inception to its close, it may well rank as one of the most remarkable expeditions into the enemy's country ever undertaken.

Without desiring to detract any thing from the merits of General Hooker's well-considered plan of operations for the turning of Lee's flank and crippling his army, we must admit that the idea of a raid like Stoneman's was not original with him. It was conceived, and would have been carried out, by General Burnside in January, but for the interference of some of his subordinate generals. Indeed, Burnside's plan, though not exactly identical, contemplated a still bolder movement-the extending his raid in the rear of Richmond, and reaching the Union lines at Suffolk.

It is to the credit of General Hooker that he saw clearly the advantages of such an expedition, and arranged its details so skilfully as to insure its success. Could it have been undertaken a week earlier, as it would have been but for severe storms and floods, it would in all human probability have made the battles of Chancellorsville successful, instead of disastrous, as Lee would have had from forty thousand to fifty thousand less men with whom to defend his position, and attack the Union troops.

Major-General George Stoneman, the chief of the cavalry corps of the army of the Potomac, under General Hooker, and now (February, 1864) chief of cavalry in the grand military division of the Mississippi, was the

STARTING OF THE EXPEDITION UNDER STONEMAN.

533

leader of this expedition. He was born in Busti, New York, in August, 1822, was educated at West Point, where he graduated in 1846, and was appointed on the 1st of July of that year brevet second-lieutenant of the first dragoons, but did not obtain his full commission till July 12, 1847. In July, 1854, he was promoted to a first lieutenantcy, and the next year acted as aide-de-camp to General Wool. On the 3d of March, 1858, he was made captain in the second cavalry, and for the next two or three years served in the southwest. In 1859, 1860, and the winter of 1861, he was stationed at Palo Alto, Texas. At the outbreak of the Rebellion he returned north, and on the 9th of May, 1861, was promoted to the rank of major in the fourth cavalry, and on the 13th of August was appointed brigadiergeneral of volunteers. He reported to General McClellan, and when the army of the Potomac moved, was placed in command of the cavalry. When the Rebels evacuated Yorktown, he pursued them closely; and for his gallantry at the battle of Williamsburg was brevetted lieutenantcolonel in the regular army. He was engaged in active operations during the whole campaign of the peninsula, and for his brilliant movements at the battle of Gaines' mill, June 27, 1862, was further brevetted colonel of cavalry in the regular army. He served under General Pope, in the several engagements before Washington, and also under McClellan in the Maryland campaign. At the battle of Fredericksburg he commanded the third army corps, and with his corps exhibited great bravery and resolution. General Hooker made him chief of his cavalry corps on the 5th of February, 1863; and on the twelfth of the same month, he was promoted to a major-generalship of volunteers. In March, he made several successful reconnoissances along the upper Rappahannock, and undertook with great heartiness the expedition we are about to describe. After that expedition he was placed by the Government at the head of the new cavalry bureau, organized in connection with the War Department, and rendered valuable aid in bringing that department of the service up to a high degree of perfection.

The plan of the expedition, and the object to be accomplished by it, having been laid down by General Hooker, and instructions furnished, which still gave a large discretion to General Stoneman, he left Falmouth on the 27th of April, and on the morning of Wednesday, the 29th, crossed his entire force, of about two thousand seven hundred men, over the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford, with the exception of a small division under General Averill, which was sent still further up the river, and crossed near the Orange and Alexandria railroad. This division encountered a small body of Rebel cavalry, soon after crossing, which it repulsed, after a brave contest. General Averill's orders were to proceed along the road toward Culpepper and Gordonsville, and by a dashing flank movement, keep the Rebel troops, which were known to be in that vicinity, employed, while detachments from the main column of cavalry

were engaged in the important work of cutting off the Rebel army on the Rappahannock from its base of operations-Richmond. General Averill was not successful in his attempt to accomplish this. He encountered on Thursday, April 30th, a considerable force of Rebel cavalry at Rapidan station, on the Orange and Alexandria railroad, and after a short fight retreated and returned to the Union camp at Chancellorsville. When General Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's ford he bad entered the enemy's country, and he ordered at once the most careful precautions to be taken, to avoid surprise from the enemy, and to prevent such intelligence of his movements from preceding him as would thwart his purposes. After crossing, he sent General Buford with a small force to the left, where he had a skirmish with the enemy, whom he repulsed, and before they could advance again he had constructed an abatis of trees, and as they charged again, he received them with a volley which sent them back with some loss.

General Stoneman, with the bulk of his command, remained near Kelly's ford, till nightfall, when the order to march was given, and the whole force crossed and bivouacked a short distance beyond a little rivulet, then much swollen by the recent rains, known as Fleischman's river, in an open ploughed field, with no other protection from the heavy rain then falling than their blankets and rubber coats. All fires were prohibited, all bugle-calls suspended, and orders delivered sotto voce, so that the enemy might have no opportunity of judging of the number and position of their force. At dawn the following morning, the force was carefully inspected, and all weak horses, all sick or weak-kneed troops, and all the pack animals except about twenty, were sent back across the river. Having brought his command thus into light marching order, General Stoneman proceeded cautiously for several miles through the woods, till a large open space of rolling ground was reached, when the whole district was patrolled to ascertain the position of the enemy. The same precautions were adopted every day. When the advance of General Buford's column arrived near Minot's ford, on the Rapidan, Lieutenant Gaskill, with a squadron of the fifth cavalry, crossed, and dashing up the river, caused a force of about sixteen hundred Rebel cavalry, who had been stationed there to prevent the crossing of Union troops, to retreat in haste. They had one piece of artillery, which, however, they took with them. He pursued them nearly five miles on the road to Orange Court House, and captured ten prisoners. General Gregg's column, meantime, crossed Raccoon ford without opposition. At night the whole force encamped on a hill commanding the ford. The march was commenced on the morning of Friday, soon after daylight, and the force proceeded to Orange Spring, pressing a column of Rebel cavalry so closely that they were forced to throw away several wagon-loads of provisions and abandon their jaded horses. A few prisoners were captured. Several hundred of the