Further light is thrown on this conception of imitation. in the Third Book,1 where it is defined as the assimilation of oneself to another, whose character is assumed. Precisely because any such assumption of the character of another is undignified, unnatural, and insincere, because, for example, the poet, not being a cobbler, can never really act the cobbler, all imitative artists were to leave the Republic, even though the banishment included the much loved Homer. All art, however, was not excluded, for Plato implies a distinction between imitative art and true art. The best art is the sincere and direct expression of a courageous and harmonious life, not the product of the fancy of some 'pantomimically-versatile' imitator. The Republic is a return to simplicity, and that poetry alone is permissible which expresses the simplicity of a mind so nobly ordered that, whether in action or repose, it expresses the highest moral energy. The temper of this, the true artist-soul, gives character to the words, and through the words to the rhythm and harmony. Rhythm and harmony, then, become formal expressions of the great virtues, bravery and temperance; they give to the senses graceful and beautiful expression of true beauty and grace, for, in Plato's very words, 'grace and harmony are the sisters and images of goodness and virtue." Such rhythm and harmony find their way into the inmost part of the soul of the listener, and render right the form of his soul through their rightness of form. Such art is one with the music of the spheres; it is divine beauty and loveliness.1

3

In the Poetics of Aristotle imitation is used in two senses. In an early chapter, where Aristotle simply wishes to show that the instinct of imitation is universal, occurs the follow

2 401.

1393. 3 402. 4 In Laws vii. 817, in a less severe vein Plato is more generous to tragedy, speaking of it as above of ideal art: Our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' Likewise, in Laws ii. 667-669, imitative art is defined as good when it truthfully reproduces the original as to proportions, etc., and is beautiful.

ing statement: 'Poetry in general seems to have sprung from two causes, each of them lying deep in our nature. First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is the most imitative of living creatures; and through imitation he learns his earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated. We have evidence of this in the facts of experience. Objects which in themselves we view with pain, we delight to contemplate when reproduced with minute fidelity, such as the forms of the most ignoble animals and of dead bodies. The cause of this again is, that to learn gives the liveliest pleasure, not only to philosophers, but to men in general, whose capacity of learning, however, is more limited. Thus the reason why men enjoy seeing a likeness is that in contemplating it they find themselves learning or inferring, and saying perhaps, "Ah, that is he." For if you happen not to have seen the original, the pleasure will be due not to the imitation as such, but to the execution, the coloring, or some such thing."

That Aristotle is speaking of imitation in general, and not of artistic imitation, is at once apparent when one reads in other chapters that 'Poetry imitates men as they ought to be;" that it 'is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history," for the 'one relates what has happened, the other what may happen;" that 'poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular." In essence Aristotle says that poetry is not limited to the actual deeds of men who have lived, but that, freeing itself from the trammels of the accidental, the temporary, and the local, it portrays men nobler than nature, though such men as nature's tendencies toward the ideal would produce. The poet sees through and

1iv. 1-5.

2 Poet. i. 5; see also xxv. 6: Further, if it be objected that the description is not true to fact, the poet may perhaps reply, “But the objects are as they ought to be;" just as Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be drawn; Euripides as they are.' 5 Ibid. ix. 3.

3 Ibid. ix. 3.

4 Ibid. ix. 2.

beyond nature to the models of her workmanship. Thus, good portrait-painters, 'while reproducing the distinctive form of the original, make a likeness which is true to life, and yet more beautiful. So, too, the poet, in representing men quick or slow to anger, or with other defects of character, should preserve the type and yet ennoble it. In this way Achilles is portrayed by Agathon and Homer.'1

Further, artistic imitation does not include the portrayal of animals and of still life. The objects of aesthetic imitation are ἤθη, πάθη, and πράξεις, which Butcher defines as 'the characteristic moral qualities, transient emotions, and actions in their proper and inward sense," meaning by the last, actions which are the inevitable expression of intellectual and emotional activity. Men acting, therefore, Aristotle defines as the objects imitated by the fine arts, because such actions as the artist makes use of spring from a deep source, and are but the outward manifestations of the movements of the soul.

Plutarch treats the subject of imitation as follows: 'We shall still more thoroughly ground the young man, if, on introducing him to poetry, we explain to him that it is an imitative art and agent, analogous to painting. Not only must he be made acquainted with the common saying that poetry is vocal painting, and painting silent poetry, but we must teach him also that when we see a painting of a lizard, an ape, or the face of Thersites, our pleasure and surprise are occasioned, not by the beauty of the object, but by its likeness. For it is naturally impossible for the ugly to be beautiful, but it is the imitation which is praised if it reproduce to the life either an ugly or a beautiful object. On the other hand, if an ugly object is represented as beautiful, we deny the truthfulness or the consistency of the picture. Now there are some artists who paint uncomely actions; thus Timotheus pictured Medea killing her children; Theon showed Orestes murdering his mother; Parr

1 Ibid. xv. 8.

2 Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art c. ii.

hasius, Odysseus counterfeiting madness; and Chaerephanes, the unchaste converse of women with men. In such instances it is especially important that the young man come to understand that we do not praise the action which is imitated, but the art, provided the subject is treated accurately. Since now poetry also frequently describes base actions and depraved emotions and character, the youth must not confound their artistic admirableness and success with truth, nor rank them as beautiful, but he is to praise them only as accurate and natural likenesses of the things treated. For as we are annoyed when we hear the grunting of a hog, the noise of pulleys, the whistling of the wind, and the roaring of the seas, but are pleased if any one imitates them with naturalness, as Parmenio did the hog,1 and Theodorus the pulleys; and as we avoid the unpleasant sight of an unhealthy man with festering sores, but take pleasure in witnessing the Philoctetes of Aristophon and the Jocasta of Silanion-which are realistic likenesses of wasting and dying

1 See Symposiacs v. 1: 'For upon what account, for God's sake, from what external impression upon our organ, should men be moved to admire Parmenio's sow so much as to pass it into a proverb? Yet it is reported, that Parmenio being very famous for imitating the grunting of a pig, some endeavored to rival and outdo him. And when the hearers, being prejudiced, cried out, "Very well indeed, but nothing comparable to Parmenio's sow;" one took a pig under his arm and came upon the stage. And when, though they heard the very pig, they still continued, "This is nothing comparable to Parmenio's sow ;" he threw his pig amongst them, to show that they judged according to opinion and not truth.' [This translation is taken from the Goodwin edition.] See Rep. iii. 397, for Plato's condemnation of this kind of imitation: 'But another sort of character will narrate anything, and the worse he is the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be beneath him : moreover he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good earnest, and before a large audience. As I was just now saying, he will attempt to represent the roll of thunder, the rattle of wind and hail, or the various sounds of pulleys, of pipes, of flutes, and all sorts of instruments: also he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, and crow like a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and there will be very little narration.'

2 Ibid.

And therefore, because he that is really affected with grief or anger presents us with nothing but the common bare passion, but in

persons- -so when the youth reads what Thersites the buffoon, or Sisyphus the debaucher, or Batrachus the brothelkeeper says or does, he must be taught to praise the genius and the art which imitates them, but to censure the subjects and actions with opprobrium. For the excellence of a thing and the excellence of its imitation are not the same. Fitness and naturalness constitute excellence, but to things base, the base is natural and fit."

To this passage two questions address themselves: What are the subjects of aesthetic imitation, and what is its nature? The first may be answered without trouble: clearly all forms of life are legitimate for artistic treatment-inferior types of animal life, such as a lizard or an ape, as well as heroic men like Achilles and Hector; and in human conduct, immorality and obscenity, as well as self-control and heroism.

In making all objects proper for artistic reproduction, Plutarch showed that, in theory at least, he was far from assigning poetry the exalted place which Aristotle had given it. Not only did Aristotle exclude all but human the imitation some dexterity and persuasiveness appears, we are naturally inclined to be disturbed at the former, whilst the latter delights us. It is unpleasant to see a sick man, or one that is at his last gasp; yet with content we can look upon the picture of Philoctetes, or the statue of Jocasta, in whose face it is commonly said that the workmen mixed silver, so that the brass might represent the face and color of one ready to faint and yield up the ghost. And this, said I, the Cyreniacs may use as a strong argument against you Epicureans, that all the sense of pleasure which arises from the working of any object on the ear or eye is not in those organs, but in the intellect itself. Thus the continued cackling of a hen or cawing of a crow is very ungrateful and disturbing; yet he that imitates those noises well pleases the hearers. Thus to behold a consumptive man is no delightful spectacle; yet with pleasure we can view the pictures and statues of such persons, because the very imitating hath something in it very agreeable to the mind, which allures and captivates its faculties.' [Goodwin ed.] 1 See pp. 58-60. See also the Symposiacs i. 1, where is discussed the question of why we take delight in hearing those that represent the passions of men angry or sorrowful, and yet cannot without concern behold those who are really so affected.