queath unto my loving wife M.,
all the rest of my lands and tene-
ments whatsoever, whereof Ishall
die seised in possession, reversion,
or remainder, provided she has
no lawful issue. Item, I give and
bequeath unto M., my beloved
wife, whom I likewise constitute,
make, and ordain, my sole execu-
trix of this my last will and testa-
ment, all and singular my lands,
messuages and tenements, by her
freely to be possessed and enjoy-
ed,” &c. “ and I make my loving
friend, H. J., executor of this my
will, to take care, and see the
same performer, according to my
true intent and meaning,” &c.
The testator died seised without
issue, and, after the death of the
testator, his wife M. married one
G. W., by whom she had lawful
issue. Held, that she took an es-
tate for life only under the will of
her husband, J. P. Wright v.
Denn, 204. 225

not attach itself to a subsequent
devising clause, so as to enlarge
the latter to a fee. Ib. 228
6. The word “tenements” does not
carry a see independent of other
circumstances. Ib. 238

DUTIES.
See ADMIRALTY, 23.

E.
EVIDENCE.

See ADMIRALTY, 5.
Chancery, 8.
Insurance.
Lex Loci, 6.
Usuay, 6.

F.
FORFEITURE.

See ADMIRALTY, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
20, 21.23.

I.
INSURANCE.

1. Under a policy containing the
following clause: “It is declared
and understood, that if the above
mentioned brig, after a regular
survey, should be condemned for
being unsound or rotten, the in-
surers shall not be bound to pay
the sum hereby insured, nor any
rt thereof.” A survey by the
aster and Wardens of the port
of New-Orleans, which was ob-
tained at the instance of the mas-
ter, who was also a part owner,
and was transmitted by him to
the other part owner, and by the
latter laid before the underwriters

as proof of the loss, stated, that
the Wardens “ordered one streak
of plank fore and aft to be taken
out, about three feet below the
bends on the starboard side: and
found the timber and bottom
plank so much decayed, that we
were unanimously of opinion her
repairs would cost more than she
would be worth afterwards, and
that it would be for the interest of
all concerned she should be con-
demned as unworthy of repair on
that ground. We did, therefore,
condemn her as not seaworthy,
and as unworthy of repair; and,
therefore, according to the pow-
ers vested by law in the Master
and Wardens of this port, we do
hereby order and direct the afore-
said damaged brig to be sold at
public auction for the account of
the insurers thereof, or whomso-
ever the same may concern.” It
was held, that the survey was con-
clusive evidence, under the clause,
to discharge the insurers from
their liability for the loss. Jan-
ney v. Columbian Ins. Co. 411.
416
2. Quaere, How far the State legisla-
tures may authorize the condem-
nation of vessels as unseaworthy,
by tribunals or boards constituted
under State authority, in the ab-
sence of any general regulation
made by Congress, under its pow-
er of regulating commerce, or as
a branch of the admiralty juris-
diction? Ib. 418
3. However this may be, the above
condemnation not being specially
authorized by any law of the
State of Louisiana, it would not
have been considered as conclu-
sive evidence within the clause,
had not the condemnation been
obtained by the master, as the

loci raei sitae. M'Cormick v.
Sullivant, 192.202

4. The title to lands can only pass by

devise, according to the laws of
the State or country where the
lands lie. The probate in one
State, or country, is of no validity
as affecting the title to lands in
another. Ib. Darby v. Mayer,

469

5. Quaere, How far this general prin-

ciple is modified by the provisions
of the constitution, and laws of
the United States, in respect to
the faith and credit, &c. to be
given to the public acts, records,
and judicial proceedings of each
State in every other State?
Darby v. Mayer, 469

6. A duly certified copy of a will of

lands, and the probate thereof, in
the Orphan’s Court of Maryland,
is not evidence, in an action of
ejectment, of a devise of lands in
Tennessee. Ib.

See Usury, 1, 2.

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

1. Although the statutes of limitation

do not apply, in terms, to Courts
of equity, yet the period of limi-
tation which takes away a right
of entry, or an action of eject-
ment, has been held by analogy
to bar relief in equity, even where
the period of limitation for a writ
of right, or other real action, had
not expired. Elmendorf v. Tay-
lor 152. 168

. Where an adverse possession has

ters 10,000 acres of land, on part
of a treasury warrant, No. 9,739,
to be laid off in one or more sur-
veys, lying between Stoner's fork
and Hingston's fork, about six or
seven miles nearly northeast of
Harrod's lick, at two white-ash
saplings from one root, with the
letter K marked on each of them,
standing at the forks of a west
branch of Hingston's fork, on the
east side of the branch, then run-
ning a line from said ash saplings,
south 45 degrees east, 1,600 poles,
thence extending from each end
of this line north 45 degrees east,
down the branch, until a line
nearly parallel to the beginning line

See Usury.

LOTTERY.

1. The scheme of a lottery contain-

ed a stationary prize for the first
drawn number on each of twelve
days, during which the drawing
was to continue, and the first
drawn number on the tenth day
was to be entitled to 30,000 dol-
lars, payable in part by three
hundred tickets, from Nos. 501 to
800, inclusive. No. 623, one of
the 300 tickets to be given in
part payment of the said prize,
was drawn first on that day, and

to wit, a machine for making
watch chains, brought an action,
under the 3d section of the Pa-
tent Act of 1800, c. 179. [xxvi.]
for a violation of his patent right,
against B.; and on the trial, an
agreement was proved, made by
the defendant with C., to pur-
chase of him all the watch chains,
not exceeding five gross a week,
which he might be able to manu-
facture withiu six months, and an
agreement on the part of C. to
devote his whole time and atten-
tion to the manufacture of the
watch chains, and not to sell or
dispose of any of them, so as to
interfere with the exclusive pri-
vilege secured to the defendant of
purchasing the whole quantity
which it might be practicable for
C. to make : And it was proved,
that the machine used by C., with
the knowledge and consent of the
defendant, in the manufacture,was
the same with that invented by
the plaintiff, and that all the
watch chains thus made by C.
were delivered to the defendant
according to the contract. Held,
that if the contract was real, and
not colourable, and if the defend-
ant had no other connexion with
C. than that which grew out of
the contract, it did not amount to
a breach by the defendant of the
plaintiff's patent right. Keplin-
ger v. De Young, 358

2. Such a contract, connected with

evidence from which the jury
might legally infer, either that the
machine which was to be employ-
ed in the manufacture of the pa-
tented article was owned wholly
or in part by the defendant, or
that it was hired to the defendant
for six months, under colour of a
sale of the articles to be manufac-
tured with it, and with intent to