and directing the negroes import- ed contrary to the act to be sold, and the proceeds to be paid, "one moiety for the use of the com- manding officer of the capturing vessel, and the other moiety to the 'Treasurer of the Charity Hospi- tal of New-Orleans, for the use and benefit of the said hospital;" no other person is entitled to the first moiety than the commanding officer of the armed vessels of the navy, or revenue cutter, who may have made the seizure, un- der the 7th section of the act of Congress. Ib.
22. Quære, How far the State legisla- tures may authorize the condemna- tion of vessels as unseaworthy, by tribunals or boards constituted by State authority, in the absence of any general regulation made by Congress under its power of re- gulating commerce, or as a branch of the admiralty jurisdiction? Janney v. Columbian Ins. Co.
418 23. Under the Duty Act of 1799, c. 126. [cxxvi.] s. 43. it is no cause of forfeiture, that the casks, which are marked and accompanied with the certificates required by the act, contain distilled spirits which have not been imported into the United States, or a mix- ture of domestic with foreign spi- rits; the object of the act being the security of the revenue, with- out interfering with those mer- cantile devices which look only to individual profit, without de- frauding the government. Sixty Pipes of Brandy, 24. The District Court has not juris- diction of a suit for wages earned on a voyage, in a steam vessel, from Shippingport, in the State of Kentucky, up the river Missouri, and back again to the port of de-
parture, as a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The Thomas Jefferson,
The admiralty has no jurisdiction over contracts for the hire of sea- men, except in cases where the service is substantially perform- ed upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. Ib.
But the jurisdiction exists, although the commencement or termina- tion of the voyage is at some place beyond the reach of the tide. It is sufficient, if the ser- vice is essentially a maritime ser- vice. Ib.
Quære, Whether, under the pow- er to regulate commerce among the several States, Congress may not extend the remedy, by the summary process of the Admiral- ty, to the case of voyages on the western waters? Ib.
However this may be, the act of 1790, c. 29. for the government and regulation of seamen in the merchant service, confines the re- medy in the District Courts to such cases as ordinarily belong to the admiralty jurisdiction. Ib. 29. Upon an appeal from a mandate
to carry into effect a former de- cree of the Court, nothing is be- fore the Court but the proceed- ings subsequent to the mandate. The Santa Maria, 431. 442 But the original proceedings are always before the Court, so far as is necessary to determine any new points in controversy between the parties, which are not terminated by the original decree. Ib. After a general decree of restitu- tion in this Court, the captors, or purchasers under them, cannot set up in the Court below new claims for equitable deductions, meliora- tions, and charges, even if such
claims might have been allowed, had they been asserted before the original decree. Ib. 32. Nor can the claimants, or original owners, in such a case, set up a claim for interest upon the stipu- lation taken in the usual form, for the appraised value of the goods, interest not being mentioned in the stipulation itself. Ib. 445 33. Nor can interest be decreed against the captors personally, by way of damages for the detention and delay, no such claim having been set up,upon the original hear- ing in the Court below, or upon the original appeal to this Court. Ib. 34. The case of Rose v. Himely, (5 Cranch, 313.) reviewed, explain- ed, and confirmed. 1b. 446 35. Upon a mandate to the Circuit Court, to carry into effect a gene- ral decree of restitution by this Court, where the property has been delivered upon a stipulation for the appraised value, and the duties paid upon it by the party to whom it is delivered, the amount of the duties is to be deducted from the appraised value. Ib. 36. The Courts of the United States, proceeding as Courts of admiral- ty and maritime jurisdiction, have jurisdiction in cases of ma- ritime torts, in personam, as well as in rem. Manro v. Almeida,
473 37. The Courts of the United States, proceeding as Courts of admiral- ty and maritime jurisdiction, may issue the process of attachment to compel appearance, both in cases of maritime torts and contracts. Ib. 38. Under the Process Act of 1792, c. 137. [xxxvi.] s. 2. the proceed- ings in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the Courts of the United States, are to be according to the modified
admiralty practice in our own. country engrafted upon the Bri- tish practice; and it is not a suf- ficient reason for rejecting a parti- cular process, which has been constantly used in the Admiralty Courts of this country, that it has fallen into desuetude in England. Ib.
The process by attachment may issue, wherever the defendant has concealed himself or absconded from the country, and the goods to be attached are within the ju- risdiction of the admiralty. Ib. It may issue against his goods and chattels, and against his credits and effects in the hands of third persons. Ib.
The remedy by attachment in the admiralty, in maritime cases, ap- plies even where the same goods are liable to the process of foreign attachment, issuing from the Courts of common law. Ib. It applies to the case of a pirati- cal capture, and the civil remedy is not merged in the criminal of- fence. 1b.
43. In case of default, the property attached may be condemned to answer the demand of the libel- lant. Ib.
1. Although bills of review are not strictly within the statute of limi- tations, yet Courts of equity will adopt the analogy of the statute in prescribing the time within which they shall be brought. Thomas v. Harvie, 146. 149 2. Appeals in equity causes being limited by the Judiciary Acts of 1789, c. 20. s. 22. and of 1803, c. 353. [xciii.] s. 2. to five years after the decree, the same period of limitation is applied to bills of review Ib. 150 3. Quære, Whether a bill of review, founded upon matter discovered since the decree, is also barred by the lapse of five years?
gy to bar relief in equity, even where the period of limitation for a writ of right, or other real ac- tion, has not expired. Elmendorf v. Taylor, 6. The rule which requires all the parties in interest to be brought before the Court, does not affect the jurisdiction, but is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, and may be modified according to cir- lb. 166 7. The joinder of improper parties, as citizens of the same State, &c. will not affect the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in equity, as between the parties who are pro- perly before the Court, if a decree may be pronounced as between the parties who are citizens of the same State. Carneal v. Banks,
181. 188 8. A decree must be sustained by the allegations of the parties, as well as by the proofs in the cause, and cannot be founded upon a fact not put in issue by the pleadings. lb. 9. In the Courts of the United States, wherever the case may be com- pletely decided as between the litigant parties, an interest exist- ing in some other person, whom the process of the Court cannot reach, as if such a party be a re- sident of another State, will not prevent a decree upon the merits. Elmendorf v. Taylor,
167 10. Bill to rescind a contract for the exchange of lands dismissed un- der the special circumstances of the case. Carneal v. Banks,
See ADMIRALTY, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15. 20, 21. 23. 28. 38. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4. 7. 9, 10. PATENT. USURY.
1. Congress has, by the constitution, exclusive authority to regulate the proceedings in the Courts of the United States; and the States have no authority to control those proceedings, except so far as the State process acts are adopted by Congress, or by the Courts of the United States under the authority of Congress. Weyman v. Sou- thard, 2. The proceedings on executions, and other process, in the Courts of the United States, in suits at common law, are to be the same in each State, respectively, as were used in the Supreme Court of the State in September, 1789, subject to such alterations and ad- ditions as the said Courts of the United States may make, or as the Supreme Court of the United States shall prescribe by rule to the other Courts. Ib.
3. A State law regulating executions, enacted subsequent to September, 1789, is not applicable to execu- tions issuing on judgments render- ed by the Courts of the United States, unless expressly adopted
by the regulations and rules of those Courts. Ib.
4. The 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. which pro- vides, "that the laws of the se- veral States, except," &c. "shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply," does not apply to the process and prac- tice of the Courts. It is a mere legislative recognition of the prin- ciples of universal jurisprudence, as to the operation of the lex loci. Ib. 24 5. The statutes of Kentucky con- cerning executions, which require the plaintiff to endorse on the ex- ecution that bank notes of the Bank of Kentucky, or notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, will be received in payment, and, on his refusal, au- thorize the defendant to give a replevin bond for the debt, paya- ble in two years, are not applica- ble to executions issuing on judg- ments rendered by the Courts of the United States. Ib.
6. The case of Palmer v. Allen, (7 Cranch, 550.) reviewed and re- conciled with the present decision. Ib. 37 7. The provision in the Process Act
of 1792, c. 137. [xxxvi.] author- izing the Courts of the United States to make alterations in the regulations concerning execu- tions, and other process issuing from those Courts, is not a dele- gation of legislative authority, and is conformable to the consti- tution. Ib. 8. The act of assembly of Kentucky of the 21st of December, 1821, which prohibits the sale of pro- perty taken under executions for less than three fourths of its ap- praised value, without the consent
of the owner, does not apply to a venditioni exponas issued out of the Circuit Court for the Dis- trict of Kentucky. Bank of United States v. Halstead, 51 9. The laws of the United States au- thorize the Courts of the Union so to alter the form of the process of execution used in the Supreme Courts of the States in 1789, as to subject to execution lands and other property, not thus sub- ject by the State laws in force at that time. 10. The Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, expressly extending to a capias, held that Congress must be understood as having adopted that process as one that was to issue permanently from the Courts of the United States, whenever it was in use in September, 1789, as a State process. Bank of United States v. January, note a, 68 11. Quære, How far a will of lands,
duly proved and recorded in one State, so as to be evidence in the Courts of that State, is thereby rendered evidence in the Courts of another State, (provided the record, on its face, shows that it possesses all the solemnities re- quired by the laws of the State where the land lies,) under the 4th art. sec. 1. of the constitution of the United States? Darby's lessee v. Mayer, 465.469
See PLEADING, 3, 4, 5, 6.
1. J. P., by his last will, after certain pecuniary legacies, devised as fol- lows: "Item, I give and be-
queath unto my loving wife M., all the rest of my lands and tene- ments whatsoever, whereof I shall die seised in possession, reversion, or remainder, provided she has no lawful issue. Item, I give and bequeath unto M., my beloved wife, whom I likewise constitute, make, and ordain, my sole execu- trix of this my last will and testa- ment, all and singular my lands, messuages and tenements, by her freely to be possessed and enjoy- ed," &c. " and I make my loving friend, H. J., executor of this my will, to take care, and see the same performer, according to my true intent and meaning," &c. The testator died seised without issue, and, after the death of the testator, his wife M. married one G. W., by whom she had lawful issue. Held, that she took an es- tate for life only under the will of her husband, J. P. Wright v. Denn, 204.225 2. Where there are no words of limi- tation to a devise, the general rule of law is, that the devisee takes an estate for life only, unless, from the language there used, or from other parts of the will, there is a plain intention to give a larger estate. Ib. 227, 228 3. To make a pecuniary legacy a charge upon lands devised, there must be express words, or a plain implication from the words of the will. 229
4. Where words are used by a testa- tor, which are insensible in the place where they occur, or their ordinary meaning is deserted, and no other is furnished by the will, they must be entirely disregarded. Ib. 239 5. An introductory clause, showing an intention to dispose of the whole of the testator's estate, will
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