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and directing the negroes import-
ed contrary to the act to be sold,
and the proceeds to be paid, "one
moiety for the use of the com-
manding officer of the capturing
vessel, and the other moiety to the
'Treasurer of the Charity Hospi-
tal of New-Orleans, for the use
and benefit of the said hospital;"
no other person is entitled to the
first moiety than the commanding
officer of the armed vessels of
the navy, or revenue cutter, who
may have made the seizure, un-
der the 7th section of the act of
Congress. Ib.

332

22. Quære, How far the State legisla-
tures may authorize the condemna-
tion of vessels as unseaworthy, by
tribunals or boards constituted by
State authority, in the absence of
any general regulation made by
Congress under its power of re-
gulating commerce, or as a branch
of the admiralty jurisdiction?
Janney v. Columbian Ins. Co.

418
23. Under the Duty Act of 1799, c.
126. [cxxvi.] s. 43. it is no cause
of forfeiture, that the casks, which
are marked and accompanied
with the certificates required by
the act, contain distilled spirits
which have not been imported
into the United States, or a mix-
ture of domestic with foreign spi-
rits; the object of the act being
the security of the revenue, with-
out interfering with those mer-
cantile devices which look only
to individual profit, without de-
frauding the government. Sixty
Pipes of Brandy,
24. The District Court has not juris-
diction of a suit for wages earned
on a voyage, in a steam vessel,
from Shippingport, in the State of
Kentucky, up the river Missouri,
and back again to the port of de-

421

25.

26.

27.

28.

parture, as a cause of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. The
Thomas Jefferson,

428

The admiralty has no jurisdiction
over contracts for the hire of sea-
men, except in cases where the
service is substantially perform-
ed upon the sea, or upon waters
within the ebb and flow of the
tide. Ib.

But the jurisdiction exists, although
the commencement or termina-
tion of the voyage is at some
place beyond the reach of the
tide. It is sufficient, if the ser-
vice is essentially a maritime ser-
vice. Ib.

Quære, Whether, under the pow-
er to regulate commerce among
the several States, Congress may
not extend the remedy, by the
summary process of the Admiral-
ty, to the case of voyages on the
western waters? Ib.

However this may be, the act of
1790, c. 29. for the government
and regulation of seamen in the
merchant service, confines the re-
medy in the District Courts to
such cases as ordinarily belong to
the admiralty jurisdiction. Ib.
29. Upon an appeal from a mandate

30.

31.

to carry into effect a former de-
cree of the Court, nothing is be-
fore the Court but the proceed-
ings subsequent to the mandate.
The Santa Maria, 431. 442
But the original proceedings are
always before the Court, so far as
is necessary to determine any new
points in controversy between the
parties, which are not terminated
by the original decree. Ib.
After a general decree of restitu-
tion in this Court, the captors, or
purchasers under them, cannot set
up in the Court below new claims
for equitable deductions, meliora-
tions, and charges, even if such

443

claims might have been allowed,
had they been asserted before the
original decree. Ib.
32. Nor can the claimants, or original
owners, in such a case, set up a
claim for interest upon the stipu-
lation taken in the usual form, for
the appraised value of the goods,
interest not being mentioned in
the stipulation itself. Ib. 445
33. Nor can interest be decreed
against the captors personally, by
way of damages for the detention
and delay, no such claim having
been set up,upon the original hear-
ing in the Court below, or upon the
original appeal to this Court. Ib.
34. The case of Rose v. Himely, (5
Cranch, 313.) reviewed, explain-
ed, and confirmed. 1b. 446
35. Upon a mandate to the Circuit
Court, to carry into effect a gene-
ral decree of restitution by this
Court, where the property has
been delivered upon a stipulation
for the appraised value, and the
duties paid upon it by the party
to whom it is delivered, the amount
of the duties is to be deducted
from the appraised value. Ib.
36. The Courts of the United States,
proceeding as Courts of admiral-
ty and maritime jurisdiction,
have jurisdiction in cases of ma-
ritime torts, in personam, as well
as in rem. Manro v. Almeida,

473
37. The Courts of the United States,
proceeding as Courts of admiral-
ty and maritime jurisdiction, may
issue the process of attachment to
compel appearance, both in cases
of maritime torts and contracts.
Ib.
38. Under the Process Act of 1792,
c. 137. [xxxvi.] s. 2. the proceed-
ings in cases of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction in the
Courts of the United States, are
to be according to the modified

39.

40.

41.

42.

admiralty practice in our own.
country engrafted upon the Bri-
tish practice; and it is not a suf-
ficient reason for rejecting a parti-
cular process, which has been
constantly used in the Admiralty
Courts of this country, that it has
fallen into desuetude in England.
Ib.

The process by attachment may
issue, wherever the defendant has
concealed himself or absconded
from the country, and the goods
to be attached are within the ju-
risdiction of the admiralty. Ib.
It may issue against his goods and
chattels, and against his credits
and effects in the hands of third
persons. Ib.

The remedy by attachment in the
admiralty, in maritime cases, ap-
plies even where the same goods
are liable to the process of foreign
attachment, issuing from the
Courts of common law. Ib.
It applies to the case of a pirati-
cal capture, and the civil remedy
is not merged in the criminal of-
fence. 1b.

43. In case of default, the property
attached may be condemned to
answer the demand of the libel-
lant. Ib.

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1. Although bills of review are not
strictly within the statute of limi-
tations, yet Courts of equity will
adopt the analogy of the statute
in prescribing the time within
which they shall be brought.
Thomas v. Harvie, 146. 149
2. Appeals in equity causes being
limited by the Judiciary Acts of
1789, c. 20. s. 22. and of 1803,
c. 353. [xciii.] s. 2. to five years
after the decree, the same period
of limitation is applied to bills of
review Ib.
150
3. Quære, Whether a bill of review,
founded upon matter discovered
since the decree, is also barred by
the lapse of five years?

Ib.

151

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152. 168

gy to bar relief in equity, even
where the period of limitation for
a writ of right, or other real ac-
tion, has not expired. Elmendorf
v. Taylor,
6. The rule which requires all the
parties in interest to be brought
before the Court, does not affect
the jurisdiction, but is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Court, and
may be modified according to cir-
lb.
166
7. The joinder of improper parties,
as citizens of the same State, &c.
will not affect the jurisdiction of
the Circuit Courts in equity, as
between the parties who are pro-
perly before the Court, if a decree
may be pronounced as between
the parties who are citizens of the
same State. Carneal v. Banks,

cumstances.

181. 188
8. A decree must be sustained by the
allegations of the parties, as well
as by the proofs in the cause, and
cannot be founded upon a fact not
put in issue by the pleadings. lb.
9. In the Courts of the United States,
wherever the case may be com-
pletely decided as between the
litigant parties, an interest exist-
ing in some other person, whom
the process of the Court cannot
reach, as if such a party be a re-
sident of another State, will not
prevent a decree upon the merits.
Elmendorf v. Taylor,

167
10. Bill to rescind a contract for the
exchange of lands dismissed un-
der the special circumstances of
the case. Carneal v. Banks,

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CONSTRUCTION OF STA-

TUTE.

See ADMIRALTY, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15.
20, 21. 23. 28. 38.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4. 7. 9, 10.
PATENT.
USURY.

COLLECTOR.

ADMIRALTY, 14, 15.

CONSULS.

See ADMIRALTY, 9.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1.21

1. Congress has, by the constitution,
exclusive authority to regulate
the proceedings in the Courts of
the United States; and the States
have no authority to control those
proceedings, except so far as the
State process acts are adopted by
Congress, or by the Courts of the
United States under the authority
of Congress. Weyman v. Sou-
thard,
2. The proceedings on executions,
and other process, in the Courts
of the United States, in suits at
common law, are to be the same
in each State, respectively, as
were used in the Supreme Court
of the State in September, 1789,
subject to such alterations and ad-
ditions as the said Courts of the
United States may make, or as
the Supreme Court of the United
States shall prescribe by rule to
the other Courts. Ib.

3. A State law regulating executions,
enacted subsequent to September,
1789, is not applicable to execu-
tions issuing on judgments render-
ed by the Courts of the United
States, unless expressly adopted

by the regulations and rules of
those Courts. Ib.

4. The 34th section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, c. 20. which pro-
vides, "that the laws of the se-
veral States, except," &c. "shall
be regarded as rules of decision
in trials at common law, in the
Courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply," does
not apply to the process and prac-
tice of the Courts. It is a mere
legislative recognition of the prin-
ciples of universal jurisprudence,
as to the operation of the lex loci.
Ib.
24
5. The statutes of Kentucky con-
cerning executions, which require
the plaintiff to endorse on the ex-
ecution that bank notes of the
Bank of Kentucky, or notes of
the Bank of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, will be received in
payment, and, on his refusal, au-
thorize the defendant to give a
replevin bond for the debt, paya-
ble in two years, are not applica-
ble to executions issuing on judg-
ments rendered by the Courts of
the United States. Ib.

6. The case of Palmer v. Allen,
(7 Cranch, 550.) reviewed and re-
conciled with the present decision.
Ib.
37
7. The provision in the Process Act

of 1792, c. 137. [xxxvi.] author-
izing the Courts of the United
States to make alterations in the
regulations concerning execu-
tions, and other process issuing
from those Courts, is not a dele-
gation of legislative authority,
and is conformable to the consti-
tution. Ib.
8. The act of assembly of Kentucky
of the 21st of December, 1821,
which prohibits the sale of pro-
perty taken under executions for
less than three fourths of its ap-
praised value, without the consent

42

of the owner, does not apply to
a venditioni exponas issued out
of the Circuit Court for the Dis-
trict of Kentucky. Bank of
United States v. Halstead, 51
9. The laws of the United States au-
thorize the Courts of the Union
so to alter the form of the process
of execution used in the Supreme
Courts of the States in 1789,
as to subject to execution lands
and other property, not thus sub-
ject by the State laws in force at
that time.
10. The Process Acts of 1789 and
1792, expressly extending to a
capias, held that Congress must
be understood as having adopted
that process as one that was to
issue permanently from the Courts
of the United States, whenever it
was in use in September, 1789, as a
State process. Bank of United
States v. January, note a, 68
11. Quære, How far a will of lands,

Ib.

duly proved and recorded in one
State, so as to be evidence in the
Courts of that State, is thereby
rendered evidence in the Courts
of another State, (provided the
record, on its face, shows that it
possesses all the solemnities re-
quired by the laws of the State
where the land lies,) under the
4th art. sec. 1. of the constitution
of the United States? Darby's
lessee v. Mayer,
465.469

COVENANT.

See PLEADING, 3, 4, 5, 6.

D.

DEVISE.

1. J. P., by his last will, after certain
pecuniary legacies, devised as fol-
lows: "Item, I give and be-

queath unto my loving wife M.,
all the rest of my lands and tene-
ments whatsoever, whereof I shall
die seised in possession, reversion,
or remainder, provided she has
no lawful issue. Item, I give and
bequeath unto M., my beloved
wife, whom I likewise constitute,
make, and ordain, my sole execu-
trix of this my last will and testa-
ment, all and singular my lands,
messuages and tenements, by her
freely to be possessed and enjoy-
ed," &c. " and I make my loving
friend, H. J., executor of this my
will, to take care, and see the
same performer, according to my
true intent and meaning," &c.
The testator died seised without
issue, and, after the death of the
testator, his wife M. married one
G. W., by whom she had lawful
issue. Held, that she took an es-
tate for life only under the will of
her husband, J. P. Wright v.
Denn,
204.225
2. Where there are no words of limi-
tation to a devise, the general
rule of law is, that the devisee
takes an estate for life only, unless,
from the language there used, or
from other parts of the will, there
is a plain intention to give a larger
estate. Ib.
227, 228
3. To make a pecuniary legacy a
charge upon lands devised, there
must be express words, or a plain
implication from the words of the
will.
229

Ib.

4. Where words are used by a testa-
tor, which are insensible in the
place where they occur, or their
ordinary meaning is deserted, and
no other is furnished by the will,
they must be entirely disregarded.
Ib.
239
5. An introductory clause, showing
an intention to dispose of the
whole of the testator's estate, will

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