1825. upon

The Palmyra.

upon that part of the decree awarding damages. The whole cause is not, therefore, finally determined in the Circuit Court; and we are of opinion that the cause cannot be divided, so as to bring up successively distinct parts of it.

The case in 3 Cranch, 179. is essentially different. In that case, which was an appeal in an equity cause, there was a decree of foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property. The sale could only be ordered after an account taken, or the sum due on the mortgage ascertained in some other way; and the usual decree is, that unless the defendant shall pay that sum in a given time, the estate shall be sold. The decree of sale therefore is, in such a case, final upon the rights of the parties in controversy, and leaves ministerial duties only to be performed.

Appeal dismissed."

a See Young v. Grundy, 6 Cranch, 51. Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 Wheat. Rep. 448.

APPENDIX.

NOTE I.

Documents relating to the Slave Trade, referred to in the case of THE ANTELOPE.

(A.)

Report of the Committee to whom was referred so much of the President's Message, of the 7th of December last, as relates to the Suppression of the Slave Trade.

FEBRUARY 16, 1825.-Read, and committed to the committee of the whole House on the state of the Union.

THE Committee on the Suppression of the Slave Trade, to whom was referred so much of the President's message, of the 7th December last, as relates to that subject, have, according to order, had the same under consideration, and respectfully report:

That, pursuant to the almost unanimous request of the House of Representatives, expressed by their resolution of the 28th February, 1823, the President of the United States concluded a convention with Great Britain, on the 13th of March, in the following year, by which the African slave trade was denounced to be piracy under the laws of both countries; the United States having so declared it, by their antecedent act of the 15th of May, 1820, and it being understood between

the contracting parties, as a preliminary to the ratification of the convention by the United States, that Great Britain should, by an act of her parliament, concur in a similar declaration.

With great promptitude, and in accordance with this agreement, such an act was passed, declaring the African slave trade to be piracy, and annexing to it the penalty denounced against this crime by the common law of nations. A copy of this act was transmitted, by the British government, to the executive of the United States, and the convention submitted, by the President, to the Senate, for their advice and consent.

The convention was approved by the Senate, with certain qualifications, to all of which, except one, Great Britain, sub modo, acceded: her government having instructed its minister in Washington to tender to the acceptance of the United States, a treaty, agreeing, in every particular except one, with the terms approved by the Senate. This exception, the message of the President to the House of Representatives presumes "not to be of sufficient magnitude to defeat an object so near to the heart of both nations," as the abolition of the African slave trade, "and so desirable to the friends of humanity throughout the world." But the President further adds, " that, as objections to the principle recommended by the House of Representatives, or, at least, to the consequences inseparable from it, and which are understood to apply to the law, have been raised, which may deserve a reconsideration of the whole subject, he has thought proper to suspend the conclusion of a new convention, until the definitive sentiments of Congress can be ascertained."

Your committee are therefore required to review the grounds of the law of 1820, and the resolution of 1823, to which the rejected, or, as they rather hope, the suspended convention, referred. The former was the joint act of both branches of Congress, approved by the President ; the latter, although adopted with extraordinary unanimity, was the single act of the House of Representatives.

Upon the principle or intention of the act of Congress of 1820, making the slave trade punishable as piracy, the history of the act may reflect some light.

A bill from the Senate, entitled "An act to continue in force the act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the crime of piracy, and also to make further provision to punish the crime of piracy," came to the House of Representatives on the 27th of April, 1820, and was, on the same day, referred to a committee of the whole, to which had been referred a bill of similar purport and title, that had originated in the House of Representatives.

1