The Santa Maria. the Court did not consider the appellants as in- 1825. fected by the marine trespass committed by the captors. "The circumstances of the case were such as to restrain the Court from inserting in its decree any thing which might increase its severity. The loss was heavy, and it fell unavoidably on one of two innocent parties. The Court was not inclined to add to its weight by giving interest in the nature of damages. The allowance of interest, therefore, in the Court below, is overruled." Besides, in that case, the Court had all the questions of equitable deductions and allowances before them on the original appeal, and gave a very special decree and mandate, which, ex industria, omitted interest. But here the question is not between two equally innocent parties. Here none of the questions of freight, insurance, duties, and interest, were raised in the original cause. They were all reserved as incidental to the stipulation, which was not then brought before this Court. The doctrine laid down in Rose v. Himely, that after a decree in this Court, and the cause sent by mandate to the Court below, and the further proceedings upon the mandate are appealed from, nothing is before this Court on the appeal but what is subsequent to the mandate, is unquestionably a sound and salutary rule. But is it any thing more than what the general principles of law would establish? Is it any thing more than an application of the familiar maxim as to res a 5 Cranch's Rep. 317. Maria. 1825. adjudicata? "Nothing is before this Court," The Santa says the Chief Justice," but what is subsequent to the mandate." This is unquestionably true, but with this indispensable qualification, that the matter in question prior to the mandate was, or ought necessarily to have been, before the Court originally. The rule was applied to the claims of freight and insurance which the original decree of this Court had expressly allowed, but which the commissioner appointed by the Circuit Court under the mandate had disallowed. But no case can be found which requires the Court below to pass any decree, in the first instance, upon the stipulation, or to allow interest before the appeal, or which requires the question of interest, or any similar incidental claim, to be brought before this Court upon the original appeal. The rule in regard to matters prior or subsequent to the mandate, appears to be understood precisely in this manner by the learned Judge who delivered the opinion of the Court in Martin v. Hunter. "A final judgment of this Court is conclusive upon the rights which it decides, and no statute has provided any process by which this Court can revise its own judgments."a The claim for interest is an incident to the execution of the mandate for restitution. Interest is impliedly due, wherever a liquidated sum of money is wrongfully withheld. "If a man has ought to answer my money by way of loan, he a 1 Wheat. Rep. 304. 354. The Santa Maria. he ought, a fortiori, to answer interest; and it is 1825. still stronger, when one by wrong takes from me my money or goods, which I am trading with, in order to turn them into money. 19a Were not this the case, a strong temptation would be presented to debtors to violate their duty. In the language of Lord Mansfield, "they would be encouraged to make use of all the unjust dilatoriness of chicane, and the more the plaintiff is injured, the less he will be relieved." This is emphatically applicable to the present case, where the capturing claimant has superadded to the original wrong done to the owners of these goods, all the unjust dilatoriness of chicane. Mr. Justice STORY delivered the opinion of the Feb. 26th. Court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows: Several preliminary questions have been argued, which must be disposed of before the Court can entertain any question upon the merits of these claims; and if disposed of one way, they put an end to the controversy. In the first place, it is asserted, that Mr. Burke is a malæ fidei claimant, entitled to no favour whatever; and by reference to the original a 1 P. Wms. 396. See also 1 Binn. Rep. 494. 9 Johns. Rep. 71. 11 Mass. Rep. 504. 1 N. Hamp. Rep. 180. b. The Diana, 3 Wheat. Rep. 58. 3 Dall. Rep. 333. 336. 2 Burr. Rep. 1088. See also 1 H. Bl. 305. 3 Wils. Rep. 205. 7 Term Rep. 124. 2 Bos. & Pull. 219. 1 Johns. Cas. 27. 1 Johns. Rep. 343. 4 Mass. Rep. 171. The Santa The rule, that peal from a thing is before the proceed ings plained, 1825. proceedings, will be found a party to the wrongful capture and detention of the property. And the first question, therefore, that arises, is, whether upon this appeal the Court can look into upon an ap- those proceedings for the purpose of ascertainmandate, no-ing the guilt or innocence of the claimant? The the Court but principle laid down in the case of Rose v. HimeSubse- ly, (5 Cranch, 313.) that upon an appeal from a mandate, ex- mandate, nothing is before the Court but the proceedings subsequent to the mandate, is undoubtedly correct in the sense in which that expression was used, with reference to the doctrine of that case. Whatever had been formerly before the Court, and was disposed of by its decree, was considered as finally disposed of; and the question of interest raised upon the execution of the mandate in that case, was in that predicament. But upon all proceedings to carry into effect the decree of the Court, the original proceedings are always before the Court, so far as they are necessary to determine any new points or rights in controversy between the parties, which were not terminated by the original decree. The Court may, therefore, inspect the original proceedings, to ascertain the merits or demerits of the parties, so far as they bear on the new claims, and must decide upon the whole examination what its duty requires. In the present case, it is impossible to separate the stipulation from the other proceedings. It is unintelligible without reference to them. The Court must inspect them, to guide it in its future acts, and to enable it to carry into effect the decree of the Supreme Court. That The Santa decree restores the property generally as claim- 1825. ed by the libellant; but what that property is, in what predicament it is, and what are the means by which it is to be restored, must be ascertained, before the Court can institute any farther proceedings. After a ge neral decrce in this Court, charges and cannot be set up in low. Another preliminary question is, whether the subject matter of these claims is, in this stage of of restitution the cause, open for discussion. All the claims new claims for of Mr. Burke might certainly have been brought liens forward and insisted upon in the original pro- the Court beceedings. If his right to the property was not established, still he might be entitled to equitable deductions for meliorations or charges; and if these claims were favoured by the Court, the decree of restitution would have been subject to these deductions. They would then have constituted a lien upon the property, and the Circuit Court must have enforced it. But no such claims were insisted upon in the written allegations, or even viva voce at the hearing; the omission was voluntary, and the decree of restitution passed in the most absolute and unconditional form. The consequences of now admitting them to be brought before this Court by appeal, would be most inconvenient and mischievous in practice. It would encourage the grossest laches and delays. The party might lie by through the whole progress of the original cause, until a final decree, holding the real owner out of his property, and securely enjoying, as in this case, the profits, and then start new claims for future investigation, which would protract the final decision to an indefinite period. Such a |