libel, is of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 1825. or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the DisThe Thomas trict Court? The Court below dismissed the Jefferson. libel for want of jurisdiction, and the libellants have appealed from that decree to this Court. In the great struggles between the Courts of common law and the Admiralty, the latter never attempted to assert any jurisdiction except over maritime contracts. In respect to contracts for the hire of seamen, the Admiralty never pretended to claim, nor could it rightfully exercise any jurisdiction, except in cases where the service was substantially performed, or to be performed, upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb and flow of the tide. This is the prescribed limit which it was not at liberty to transcend. We say, the service was to be substantially performed on the sea, or on tide water, because there is no doubt that the jurisdiction exists, although the commencement or termination of the voyage may happen to be at some place beyond the reach of the tide. The material consideration is, whether the service is essentially a maritime service. In the present case, the voyage, not only in its commencement and termination, but in all its intermediate progress, was several hundreds of miles above the ebb and flow of the tide ; and in no just sense can the wages be considered as earned in a maritime employment. Some reliance has been placed in argument upon that clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789, (ch. 20. s. 9.) which includes all seizures made on waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten The Thomas 1825. or more tons burthen, (of which description the waters in this case are,) within the admiralty juJefferson. risdiction. But this is a statuteable provision, and limited to the cases there stated. To make the argument available, it should be shown, that some act of Congress had extended the right to sue in Courts having admiralty jurisdiction, to cases of voyages of this nature. We have for this purpose examined the act of Congress for the government and regulation of seamen in the merchants' service, (act of 1790, ch. 29.) and though its language is somewhat general, we think that its strict interpretation confines the remedy in the Admiralty to such cases as ordinarily belong to its cognisance, as maritime contracts for wages. It merely recognises the existing, and does not intend to confer any new jurisdiction. Whether, under the power to regulate commerce between the States, Congress may not extend the remedy, by the summary process of the Admiralty, to the case of voyages on the western waters, it is unnecessary for us to consider. If the public inconvenience, from the want of a process of an analogous nature, shall be extensively felt, the attention of the Legislature will doubtless be drawn to the subject. But we have now only to declare, that the present suit is not maintainable as a cause of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, upon acknowledged principles of law. The decree of the Circuit Court, dismissing the libel for want of jurisdiction, is therefore affirmed. Decree accordingly. [PRIZE.] The SANTA MARIA. The Spanish Consul, Libellant. Upon an appeal from a mandate to carry into effect a former decree of the Court, nothing is before the Court but the proceedings subsequent to the mandate. But the original proceedings are always before the Court, so far as is necessary to determine any new points in controversy between the parties, which are not terminated by the original decree. After a general decree of restitution in this Court, the captors, or purchasers under them, cannot set up in the Court below new claims for equitable deductions, meliorations, and charges, even if such claims might have been allowed, had they been asserted before the original decree. Nor can the claimants, or original owners, in such a case, set up a claim for interest upon the stipulation taken in the usual form, for the appraised value of the goods, interest not being mentioned in the stipulation itself. Nor can interest be decreed against the captors personally, by way of damages for the detention and delay, no such claim having been set up, upon the original hearing in the Court below, or upon the original appeal to this Court. The case of Rose v. Himely, (5 Cranch, 313.) reviewed, explained, and confirmed. Upon a mandate to the Circuit Court, to carry into effect a general decree of restitution by this Court, where the property has been delivered upon a stipulation for the appraised value, and the duties paid upon it by the party to whom it is delivered, the amount of the duties is to be deducted from the appraised value. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Maryland. This cause was formerly before the Court, and the decision then pronounced will be found re 1825. The Santa 1825. ported, ante, vol. 7. p. 490. The claim of Mr. Burke, as a bona fidei purchaser, was then reMaria. jected, upon the ground of the illegality of the The Santa original capture, it having been made in violation of the neutrality of the United States; and a general decree of restitution was awarded in favour of the libellant, suing in his official character as the Consul of Spain, for the benefit of the original owners. A mandate issued from this Court to the Court below, to carry that decree into effect. Pending the original proceedings in the Court below, and before the appeal, the property, upon the application of Mr. Burke, was delivered to him, upon a stipulation given with sureties in the usual manner, for the payment of the appraised value, according to the future decree of the Court. The appraisers estimated the property at 7,473 dollars and 43 cents, being, as they declare, "the long price, including custom-house duties," and for this sum, the stipulation was given. Upon the application to the Court below, to enforce the mandate of this Court, Mr. Burke filed a petition, asserting that he had incurred cost and expenses, and paid certain liens upon the property. The specifications now insisted on, were the following: (1) Insurance on the property from Galveztown to Baltimore, viz. 751 dollars and 25 cents. (2.) Duties paid on the same at Baltimore, viz. 1945 dollars and 14 cents. A petition was also filed on behalf of Mr. Burke and a Mr. Forbes, (who now, for the first time, appeared in the cause,) as joint owners of the schooner Harriet, in which the property in ques Maria tion was brought from Galveztown to Baltimore, 1825. praying for the allowance of freight for the voy- The Santa age, amounting to 1,500 dollars. The libellant also made an application for interest upon the amount of the stipulation to be decreed in his favour, either from the time of capture, from the date of the stipulation, or from the decree of this Court. The respective claims of all the parties for these allowances were rejected by the Circuit Court, and from the decree dismissing them an appeal was taken to this Court. The Attorney General, for the appellant, Feb. 10th. Burke, stated, that the allegation demanding restitution in the original case, was filed by the Spanish Consul against the goods, and the appellant claimed the cargo as having been remitted to him in return for an outward cargo shipped to his agent at Matagorda. It is now alleged, that he was part owner of the capturing vessel, and, therefore, as a wrong doer, not entitled to the equitable deductions he claims. He insists, that he is a bona fidei purchaser, without notice of the illegal capture, and, therefore, entitled to be allowed for duties and other charges. In the admiralty, the libellant and claimant are both actors." If, therefore, it had been the wish of the libellant to put in issue the fact of Burke's knowledge of, or connexion with, the illegal capture, he should have answered the averment which is VOL. X. a Jennings v. Carson, 4 Cranch's Rep. 23. 55 |