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Congress has, by the constitution, exclusive authority to regulate the
proceedings in the Courts of the United States; and the States have no authority to control those proceedings, except so far as the State process acts are adopted by Congress, or by the Courts of the Uni
ted States under the authority of Congress. The proceedings on executions, and other process, in the Courts of the United States, in suits at common law, are to be the same in each State, respectively, as were used in the Supreme Court of the State in September, 1789, subject to such alterations and additions as the said Courts of the United States may make, or as the Supreme Court of the United States shall prescribe by rule to the other
Courts. A State law regulating executions, enacted subsequent to September,
1789, is not applicable to executions issuing on judgments rendered by the Courts of the United States, unless expressly adopted by
the regulations and rules of those Courts. The 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. which provides, “ that the laws of the several States, except," &c. “ shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the United States, in cases where they apply," does not apply to the process and practice of the Courts. It is a mere legislative recogVOL. X.
vition of the principles of universal jurisprudence, as to the opera
tion of the lex loci. The statutes of Kentucky concerning executions, which require the
plaintiff to endorse on the execution that bank notes of the Bank of Kentucky, or notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky will be received in payment, and, on his refusal, authorize the defendant to give a replevin bond for the debt, payable in two years, are not applicable to executions issuing on judgments rendered by
the Courts of the United States. The case of Palmer v. Allen,(7 Cranch, 550.) reviewed and reconciled with the present decision.
This cause was certified from the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky, upon a certificate of a division of opinion between the Judges of that Court, on several motions, which occurred on a motion made by the plaintiffs to quash the Marshal's return on an execution issued on a judgment obtained in that Court, and also to quash the replevin bond taken on the said execution, for the following causes :
1. Because the Marshal, in taking the replevin bond, and making said return, has proceeded under the statutes of Kentucky, in relation to executions; which statutes are not applicable to executions issuing on judgments in this Court, but the Marshal is to proceed with such executions according to the rules of the common law, as modified by acts of Congress, and the rules of this Court, and of the Supreme Court of the United States.
2. That if the statutes of Kentucky, in relation to executions, are binding on this Court, viz. the statute which requires the plaintiff to endorse on the execution, that bank notes of the Bank of Kentucky, or notes of the Bank of the Common
wealth of Kentucky, will be received in payment, 1825. or that the defendant may replevy the debt for
Wayman two years, are in violation of the constitution of
Southard. the United States, and of the State of Kentucky, Southar and void.
3. That all the statutes of Kentucky which authorize a defendant to give a replevin bond in satisfaction of a judgment or execution, are unconstitutional and void.
4. Because there is no law obligatory on the said Marshal, which authorized or justified him in taking the said replevin bond, or in making the said return on the said execution.
The Court below being divided in opinion on the points stated in the motion, at the request of the plaintiffs, the same were ordered to be certified to this Court.
The cause was argued by Mr. Cheves, and Mr. March 15th, Sergeant, for the plaintiffs; and by Mr. Bibb, and " Mr. Monroe, for the defendants, at the last term.
On the part of the plaintiffs it was insisted, that the executions issued by the Courts of the United States for the District of Kentucky, are to be regulated and governed by the laws of the United States, and not by the laws of the State of Kentucky.
It was not necessary to analyse the particular provisions of the State laws, because the questions that would arise were of a general nature, and rendered any such statement unnecessary. These questions were,
1. Whether, by the constitution of the United
1825. States, Congress has the power to regulate the Wayman P
proceedings of the Federal Courts ?
2. Whether Congress has regulated those proSouthard.
ceedings, and in what manner ?
1. That Congress has the power, was too plain to admit of a doubt. If they have not, they have no power at all, and the whole of that interesting portion of the constitution is inoperative. The clause in question is the third article of the constitution, which establishes and regulates the judicial power. It is a simple text, but it is a very comprehensive one, or it is nothing. It does nothing more, in terms, than authorize Congress to establish Courts, and declare the cases over which they shall have jurisdiction. The grounds of decision are, of course, comprehended. They are to be according to the law of the case. The means for arriving at the decision, or for giving it effect, are not expressly provided. But as the means are indispensable to the attainment of the end, which is the administration of justice, they are necessarily included in the grant; and the power to provide them is, of course, implied in the power to establish judicial tribunals. A Court is a place where justice is judicially administered. To say merely that Courts should be established, would be entirely idle. To say, therefore, that Courts shall be established, means that all the needful and usual incidents to Courts shall be established.
This proposition was so completely self-evi
a Co. Litt. 58.