The Dos common law doctrine in England, it had been 1825. long since settled in that country, that all rights of prize were derived from the grant of the crown. Hermanos. Without entering into all the distinctions as to the capacity in which the crown took, whether in the king's office of Admiral, or jure coronæ, it might be laid down as a general proposition, that non-commissioned captors, as a matter of strict right, were not entitled to any share of the prizes captured by them. Captures made by tenders or boats, sent out by officers of the navy, but not regularly attached by public authority to the navy, are condemned as droits of admiralty." But in these, and all other cases of seizures by non-commissioned captors, it was usual to reward the takers with a liberal share of the property, in the discretion of the Court of Admiralty." There was no reason why any different principle or mode of proceeding should be adopted in this country. It does not depend upon any peculiar municipal regulations, but grows out of a principle recognised by all the writers on public law : Bello parta cedunt reipublica. In the present case, a moiety of the proceeds had been allowed to the actual captors as salvage; but the provisions in the Prize Acts for the distribution of prizes, were confined to commissioned public and private armed vessels. a The Melomasne, 5 Rob. 41. The Charlotte, Id. 280. and note. b The San Bernardo, 1 Rob. 178. The Haase, Id. 286. The Amor Parentum, Id. 303. c The Elsebe, 5 Rob. 173. 181. 1825. The Dos Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court, that whatever might have been Hermanos. the ancient doctrine in England in respect to March 7th. captures in war, it is now clearly established in that kingdom, that all captures jure belli, are made for the government, and that no title of prize can be acquired but by the public acts of the government conferring rights on the captors. If the original law of England authorized an individual to acquire to his own use the property of an individual, without any express authority from the public, that law was changed long before the settlement of this country. It never was the law of this country. Before the revolution, all captures from the enemy accrued to the government, to be distributed according to law; and the revolution could not strip the government of this exclusive prerogative, and vest it in individuals. It is, then, the settled law of the United States, that all captures made by non-commissioned captors, are made for the government; and since the provisions in the Prize Acts, as to the distribution of prize proceeds, are confined to public and private armed vessels, cruising under a regular commission, the only claim which can be sustained by the captors in cases like the present, must be in the nature of salvage for bringing in and preserving the property. In the present case, the District Court have awarded one half of the prize proceeds, or salvage, to the captors. It was an exercise of sound discretion; and this Court would, with extreme reluctance, interfere with that discretion, unless The Dos in a very clear case of mistake. We perceive 1825. no such mistake in this case, and are well satisfied with the amount of the salvage as decreed Hermanos. by the District Court. As to the question which has been made, whether the appeal was in due time, it appears, that the appeal was prayed for within five years, and was actually allowed by the Court within that period. It is true that the security required by law was not given until after the lapse of the five years; and, under such circumstances, the Court might have disallowed the appeal, and refused the security. But, as the Court accepted it, it must be considered as a sufficient compliance with the order of the Court, and that it had relation back to the time of the allowance of the appeal. The mode of taking the security, and the time for perfecting it, are matters of discretion, to be regulated by the Court granting the appeal; and when its order is complied with, the whole has relation back to the time when the appeal was prayed. We must presume the security was given, in this case, according to the rule prescribed by the District Court, and the appeal was, therefore, in time. Decree affirmed, with costs. 1825. The Josefa [SLAVE TRADE ACTS. INSTANCE COURT.] The JOSEFA SEGUNDA. ROBERTS and others, Claimants. The District Courts have jurisdiction, under the Slave Trade Acts, to determine who are the actual captors, under a State law made in pursuance of the 4th section of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, c. 77. and directing the proceeds of the sale of the negroes to be paid, "one moiety for the use of the commanding officer of the capturing vessel," &c. In order to constitute a valid seizure, so as to entitle the party to the proceeds of a forfeiture, there must be an open, visible possession claimed, and authority exercised, under the seizure. A seizure, once voluntarily abandoned, loses its validity. A seizure, not followed by an actual prosecution, or by a claim, in the District Court, before a hearing on the merits, insisting on the benefit of the seizure, becomes a nullity. Under the 7th section of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, c. 77. the entire proceeds of the vessel are forfeited to the use of the United States, unless the seizure be made by armed vessels of the navy; or by revenue cutters, in which case distribution is to be made in the same manner as prizes taken from the enemy. Under the act of the State of Louisiana of the 13th of March, 1818, passed to carry into effect the 4th section of the Slave Trade Act of Congress of 1807, c. 77. and directing the negroes imported contrary to the act to be sold, and the proceeds to be paid, “one moiety for the use of the commanding officer of the capturing vessel, and the other moiety to the Treasurer of the Charity Hospital of New-Orleans, for the use and benefit of the said hospital;" no other person is entitled to the first moiety than the commanding officer of the armed vessels of the navy, or revenue cutter, who may have made the seizure, under the 7th section of the act of Congress. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Loui siana. The Josefa This is the same case which was reported ante, 1825. vol. 5. p. 338. It was a proceeding against the vessel, and the negroes taken on board of her, Segunda. under the Slave Trade Act of the 3d of March, 1807, c. 77. in which the vessel was condemned in the Court below, and that decree was affirmed on appeal, by this Court. After the condemnation of the vessel in the District Court, and before the appeal to this Court, the negroes found on board of her were, (under the 4th section of the act of Congress, and under an act of the State of Louisiana, passed on the 13th of March, 1818, in pursuance of the act of Congress;) delivered by the Collector of the Customs for the port of New-Orleans, to the Sheriff of the parish of New-Orleans, for sale according to law. A cross libel was afterwards filed by the alleged original Spanish owners, claiming restitution of the negroes, which was dismissed, and, on appeal, the decree affirmed by this Court. By consent of all the parties in interest, the negroes were sold by the Sheriff, and the proceeds lodged in the Bank of the United States, subject to the order of the Court below. After the cause had been remanded to the District Court, a question arose in that Court respecting the manner in which these proceeds, as well as those of the vessel and effects, were to be distributed, and the parties respectively entitled to them. Mr. Roberts, an inspector of the revenue, claimed a moiety of the proceeds as the original seizor or captor; Messrs. Gardner, Meade, and Humphrey, respectively, made similar claims under subse |