1825. Wright V. Denn. so that the words naturally and properly had relation to the quantity of estate which the testator intended to give J. C., that is, all the remainder, which is the same in effect as all his estate. If the words were merely to be referred to the lands he intended to devise to J. C., they would be ineffectual, for it was impossible that he could have any remainder of lands, when he had devised all to A. C.; so that they must refer to the estate in the lands. Such is the substance of the reasoning of the Court; upon which it is unnecessary to say more, than that the case turned upon the supposed incongruity of construing the testator's words otherwise than as importing the whole remaining interest in the lands, upon all of which lands a life estate was already attached. And the final devise over, which carried a plain fee to the sisters, being a substitution for the former estate to J. C., in the event of his death before the testator, greatly fortifies this interpretation. This case has been much relied on by the plaintiff in error upon the present argument; but it is very distinguishable from that before the Court. There, a life estate was given, and the terms, "whole remainder," had a natural meaning, as embracing the whole remaining interest. Here, on the contrary, there is no preceding interest given in the real estate, and therefore the terms, "all the rest," are not susceptible of that sense. There, a substituted estate, in fee, was clearly given; here no clause occurs, leading necessarily to such a conclusion. All that the case in Lutwyche, taken as the fullest autho rity, establishes, is, that the words "rest and re- a See Lord Hardwicke's comments on this case, in Bailis v. Gale, (2 Vesey's Rep. 48.) 1825. Wright V.. Denn. Wright V. Denn. 1825. personal estate for payment of debts and legacies; and then the will says, as to the rest" of my goods and chattels, real and personal, moveable and immoveable, as houses, gardens, tenements, my share in the copperas works, &c. I give to the said A." Lord Hardwicke, after some hesitation, held it a fee in A., relying upon the introductory clause, and the charge of the debts and legacies on the land, and upon the language of the residuary clause. Whatever may be the authority of this decision, it certainly does not pretend to rest solely on the residuary clause ; and its containing a mixed devise of real and personal estate, was not insignificant in ascertaining the testator's intention. It may also be admitted, that the words "lands and tenements," do sometimes carry a fee, and are not confined to a mere local description of the property. But, in their ordinary sense, they import the latter only; and when a more extensive signification is given to them in wills, it arises from the context, and is justified by the apparent intention of the testator to use them in such extensive signification. The cases cited at the bar reach to this extent, and no farther. Their authority is not denied; but their application to the present ease is not admitted. We may, then, take it to be the general result of the authorities, that the words, "all the rest of my lands," do not, of themselves, import a devise of the fee; but, unless aided by the context, the devisee, whether he be a sole or a re siduary devisee, will, if there be no words of 1825. limitation, take only a life estate. Wright V. Denn. Effect of the words, " in version, or re We next come to the effect of the words, "in possession, reversion, or remainder," and, as incidental thereto, the effect of the word "tenements." That the term "remainder" may, in possession, resome cases, connected with other clauses, carry mainder," &c. a fee, has been already admitted, and was the very point in 1 Lutw. 755. The same is true in respect to the word "reversion." This is affirmed in the case of Bailis v. Gale, (2 Ves. Rep. 48.) where the devise was, "I give to my son, C. G., the reversion of the tenement my sister now lives in, after her decease, and the reversion of those two tenements now in the possession of J. C." Lord Hardwicke, in pronouncing judgment, relied on the legal signification of the word "reversion," and that its use by the testator was fairly to be inferred to be in its legal sense, as the whole right of revertor; and he adverted to the circumstance, that the devise was to a child, to whom it could scarcely be presumed the parent intended to give merely a dry reversion, or to split up his interest in it into parts. But, in that case, as in 1 Lutw. 755. there were antecedent estates created or existing in the land; and the devise was of a "reversion," and not, as in this case, of "all the rest of my lands, &c. in reversion," &c. The land now in controversy was not held by the testator as a reversionary estate, but as an estate in possession; and in no way, therefore, can the doctrine help the present case. But there are cases, which are contrary to Bailis v. Gale, and some Wright V. Denn. 1825. what clash with its authority. In Peiton v. Banks, (1 Vern. Rep. 65.) the case was, that a man devised his lands to his wife for life, and he the gave reversion to A. and B., to be equally divided betwixt them. The Court decided, that A. and B. took an estate as tenants in common for life only. And Sergeant Maynard stated a similar decision to have been made about twenty years before that time. It is not material, however, to enter upon the delicate inquiry, which of these authorities is entitled to most weight, because the present case does not require it. The word " tenements," a fee, inde stances. In respect to the word "tenements," it is only does not carry necessary to observe, that is has never been conpendent of strued in a will, independently of other circumother circum- stances, to pass a fee. In Canning v. Canning, (Moseley's Rep. 240.) and Doe, ex dem. Palmer, v. Richards, (3 D. & E. 356.) and Denn, ex dem. Moor, v. Miller, (5 D. & E. 558.) S. C. (2 Bos. & Pull. 247.) the same term occurred, as well as the broader expression, ❝ hereditaments;" in neither case was the term "tenement," supposed to have any peculiar effect; and the argument, attempting to establish a fee upon the import of the word "hereditaments," even in a residuary clause, was deliberately overruled by the Court. The same doctrine was held in Hopwell v. Ackland, (Salk. Rep. 239.) If, then, it is asked, what interpretation the Court put upon the words " all the rest," in connexion with "lands and tenements?" the answer is, that no definite meaning can, in this will, be |