JER, 第 2-3 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1997 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 46 筆
第 217 頁
... individual who is known to shirk is not likely to be joined by his / her mentor or protege in a quit threat . The ... individual commensurately with the marginal value of his / her contributions to the firm ) , the other party may well ...
... individual who is known to shirk is not likely to be joined by his / her mentor or protege in a quit threat . The ... individual commensurately with the marginal value of his / her contributions to the firm ) , the other party may well ...
第 155 頁
... individual utility is not consid- ered . The government , to finance its expenditure , is allowed to use proportional taxes on labor and capital income at the rate of twi and tri respectively and a proportional consumption tax ( tc ) on ...
... individual utility is not consid- ered . The government , to finance its expenditure , is allowed to use proportional taxes on labor and capital income at the rate of twi and tri respectively and a proportional consumption tax ( tc ) on ...
第 163 頁
... individual budget con- straint and production constraint respectively . Notice that the capital market equilibrium is not included as a constraint because the debt policy is freely available in our model . Then the Lagrangean becomes ...
... individual budget con- straint and production constraint respectively . Notice that the capital market equilibrium is not included as a constraint because the debt policy is freely available in our model . Then the Lagrangean becomes ...
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常見字詞
adjustment costs aggregate Asian assumed b₁ banks blue crab budget constraint capital coefficient cointegration consumption convex crisis customer market denotes dynamic elasticity equation estimated exchange rate exogenous expenditure tax F-Statistics factor price Figure foreign exchange market growth Hanyang University health-related investment HKAB Hong Kong Hong Kong dollar implies incentives increase individual Industrial Policy Industry Promotion Law inflation interest rate intrinsic bubbles IPI transition Journal of Economic labor marginal cost maximize mentor mentor/protege relationship menu cost migration mold industry monetary base money demand money supply natural production function optimal tax outliers output paper Pareto-improving transition partners period price adjustment price level production function proteges quadratic quit threat regression response returns to scale sector shocks significant SME policy SN(t Statistics Table tax rates tax steady tax system theorem tion utility function variable velocity welfare y₁ YDEV zero