294 Opinion of the Court. to the respondent clear of the lien of the subsequent levy, and rested its decision upon its view of the effect of § 67 (f). Since the judgment is based exclusively upon a federal ground, we have jurisdiction. Section 67 (f) provides: "All levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against him, . . . shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, . . . shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt, unless the court shall, on due notice, order that the right under such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be preserved for the benefit of the estate; and thereupon the same may pass to and shall be preserved by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as aforesaid. And the court may order such conveyance as shall be necessary to carry the purposes of this section into effect: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall have the effect to destroy or impair the title obtained by such levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien, of a bona fide purchaser for value who shall have acquired the same without notice or reasonable cause for inquiry." The court held that the section, proprio vigore, nullified the lien of the levy so that the property passed to the trustee discharged thereof, and concluded that, since, at the time of the sheriff's sale, the property was discharged of the lien, the sale, and the deed delivered pursuant to it, were void; and, as a trustee's sale would pass title clear of the lien, the same result would follow from the bankruptcy court's validation, with the trustee's consent, of the assignee's sale previously made. low rightly declined to give effect to that statute and as it found that the cause of action was not barred by laches, it rightly gave judgment for respondents. Petitioners argue that under New York law, laches is not a defense to actions like the present and that in the light of our decisions in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 304 U. S. 202, federal courts in the exercise of the equity jurisdiction conferred upon them by § 24 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S. C. § 41, are no longer free to apply a different rule. But in this case laches has not been held to be a defense and the Court has not declined to give effect to a state statute shown to be applicable. In the circumstances we have no occasion to consider the extent to which federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon them by Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting those remedies. Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS is of opinion that the judgment should be reversed for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Clark, J., in the Circuit Court of Appeals. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. FISCHER v. PAULINE OIL & GAS CO. CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA. No. 239. Submitted December 12, 1939.-Decided February 26, 1940. 1. Where a state supreme court bases its judgment exclusively upon its construction of a federal statute, expressly declining to consider an alternative local ground, the judgment is reviewable by this Court. P. 296. 294 Opinion of the Court. 2. Section 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act does not intend that an adjudication of bankruptcy shall operate automatically, and irrespective of any action on the part of the trustee, to discharge an execution lien obtained within four months prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. P. 300. The section is intended for the benefit of creditors of the bankrupt and, therefore, does not avoid liens as against all the world but only as against the trustee and those claiming under him, or as respects the bankrupt's exempt property. P. 301. 3. A trustee in bankruptcy appeared in a state court and unsuccessfully objected to the confirmation of a sale on execution of property that had belonged to the debtor, upon the ground that the execution lien had been discharged by force of § 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act. Held that the decision against him, from which he did not appeal, was binding, as to that question, against the trustee and against one who later applied for, and with the trustee's acquiescence obtained, confirmation by the bankruptcy court of a sale of the same property which had been made to him by the debtor's assignee for creditors. P. 303. 185 Okla. 108; 90 P. 2d 411, reversed. CERTIORARI, 308 U. S. 509, to review the reversal of a judgment directed for the plaintiff in an action to quiet title to an oil and gas lease, to recover materials, machinery, etc., and for damages. Plaintiff relied on a sheriff's sale, confirmed by a state court; defendant on a sale by an assignee for creditors, confirmed by a court of bankruptcy. Mr. Claude H. Rosenstein submitted for petitioner. Mr. Charles E. France submitted for respondent. MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. An appeal taken in this care was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Section 237 (a), Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat. 936, 937). Treating the papers whereon the appeal was allowed as a petition for writ of certiorari as required by Opinion of the Court. 309 U.S. § 237 (c), Judicial Code, as amended (43 Stat. 936, 938), we granted certiorari, 308 U. S. 509, because the judgment of the Supreme Court of Oklahoma1 is based upon a construction of § 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,2 which raises an important question concerning the operation of the section, not settled by decision of this court, on which state courts have reached conflicting conclusions. The petitioner brought action to quiet his title to an oil and gas lease and to gain possession of the leased premises together with materials, machinery, tools, and appliances thereon, and for mesne profits, and damages. His claim was based on a sheriff's deed consummating an execution sale under a judgment entered upon an award of the State Industrial Commission against Geraldine Oil Company. The respondent's title was derived through a conveyance by an assignee for the benefit of creditors of the same company, confirmed by a bankruptcy court. The respondent cross-petitioned for a judgment declaring the sheriff's sale to petitioner void and quieting respondent's title. The trial court directed a verdict for petitioner and entered judgment thereon, which the Supreme Court reversed. August 30, 1934, the Commission made an award to one Rainbolt against Snyder, as employer, and Geraldine Oil Company, as owner of the property. For payment of the award Geraldine Oil Company was secondarily liable. October 11, 1934, Geraldine Oil Company, being insolvent, assigned the property in question to a trustee for the benefit of creditors. 'Pauline Oil & Gas Co. v. Fischer, 185 Okla. 108; 90 P. 2d 411. '11 U. S. C. § 107 (f). The provisions of § 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 are now carried over into, modified and clarified by chapter VII, § 67a, (1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 840, 875. The question here presented, however, may arise under the later Act. 294 Opinion of the Court. December 8, 1934, the award in favor of Rainbolt was filed of record in a State District Court and became a judgment of that court. January 21, 1935, the assignee for the benefit of creditors sold the property to the respondent. September 13, 1935, execution issued on the Rainbolt judgment, and, September 17th, the sheriff levied on the property as property of the Geraldine Oil Co. The execution was issued on the theory that the assignment for the benefit of creditors was invalid, and the property, therefore, remained that of the assignor.3 October 24, 1935, Geraldine Oil Company was adjudged a voluntary bankrupt in the District Court of the United States for Western Oklahoma. November 12, 1935, the sheriff sold the property, pursuant to the execution, and the petitioner bought it. A notice of the adjudication in bankruptcy was read at the sale in the presence of the petitioner. On the same day the sheriff made return of the sale to the court out of which the execution issued. November 21, 1935, the trustee in bankruptcy filed in that court his objections to the confirmation of the sheriff's sale, alleging, inter alia, that Geraldine Oil Company was insolvent when Rainbolt obtained judgment and had been so ever since; that the company had been adjudicated a bankrupt within four months of the securing of the lien under the execution, and that, by virtue of § 67 (f) of the Bankruptcy Act, the lien was absolutely void. March 28, 1936, the court ordered that the sale be confirmed and granted the trustee in bankruptcy an exception to its action. The latter gave notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, but it does not appear that he perfected an appeal. The order of confirmation was entered of record April 22, 1936. 3 See Wells v. Guaranty State Bank, 56 Okla. 688; 156 P. 896; First State Bank v. Bradshaw, 174 Okla. 268; 51 P. 2d 514. |