court of France, which you have communicated to me, (and which I have communicated to the present ministry with your letter,) that even to the last hour some part of the late ministry were still set upon the American war to the last extremity; and probably another more prudent part of the ministry would proceed no further; which, if it be so, may reasonably be imputed as the cause of the dissolution of the late ministry.

These have been the arguments, which I have always driven and insisted upon with the greatest expectation of success, viz. prudential arguments from the total impracticability of the war, responsibility, &c. I have been astonished beyond measure, that these arguments have not sooner had their effect. If I could give you an idea of the many conferences, which I have had upon the subject, I should tell you, that many times Felix has trembled. When reduced by the terror of responsibility either to renounce the American war, or to relinquish their places, they have chosen the latter; which is a most wretched and contemptible retribution, either to their country or to mankind, for the desolation in which they have involved every nation, that they have ever been connected with. Peace they would not leave behind them. Their legacy to their country, and to mankind has been, Let darkness be the burier of the dead!

As to the proposal of a separate peace arising from a desire of reconciliation, it certainly was so on the part of the people of England; but, on the part of the late ministry, it probably arose from the hopes of suggesting to France ideas of some infidelity on the part of America towards them. If you should ask me, why I have seemed to conspire with this, my answer is very plain. In the first place, if I could have prevailed with the late ministry to have actually made an irrevocable

offer, on their own part, of a separate peace to America, that very offer would in the same instant have become on their part also a consent to a general peace; because they never had any wish to a separate contest with France, and, America being out of the question, they would have thought of nothing after that but a general peace. I never could bring them even to this. They wished that America should make the offer of a separate treaty, for obvious views. My proposal was, that they should offer irrevocable terms of peace to America. If they had meant what they pretended, and what the people of England did really desire, they would have adopted that proposition. Then the question would have come forward upon the fair and honorable construction of a treaty between France and America, the essential and direct end of which was fully accomplished. When I speak of Great Britain offering irrevocable terms of peace to America, I mean such terms as would have effectually satisfied the provision of the treaty, viz. tacit independence.

*

I send you a paper entitled a Breviate, which I laid before the late ministry; and their not having acted upon it, was a proof to me, that the disposition of their heart to America was not altered, but that all their relenting arose from the impracticability of that war, and their want of success in it. But, desponding as they were at last, it was not inconsistent with my expectations of their conduct, that they should make great offers to France to abandon America. It was the only weapon left in their hands. In course of negotiating with the late ministry, I perceived their courage drooping from time to time, for the last three or four years; and it was upon that ground I gave

* See this Breviate in the Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. III. p. 351.

them credit for an increasing disposition towards peace. Some dropped off, others sunk under the load of folly, and at last they all failed. My argument ad homines to the late ministry might be stated thus. "If you don't. kill them, they will kill you. But the war is impracticable on your part; ergo, the best thing you can do for your own sake is to make peace." This was reasoning to men, and through men to things. But there is no measure of rage in pride and disappointment; "Spicula cæca relinquunt

Infixa venis, animasque in vulnere ponunt."

So much for the argument of the breviate, as far as it respected the late ministry. It was a test, which proved that they were not sincere in their professions. If they had been in earnest to have given the war a turn towards the House of Bourbon, and to have dropped the American war, a plain road lay before them. The. sentiments of the people of England were conformable to the argument of that breviate; or rather I should say, what is the real truth, that the arguments of the breviate were dictated by the notoriety of that sentiment in the people of England. My object and wish always have been to strike at the root of the evil, the American war.

If the British nation have jealousies and resentments against the House of Bourbon, yet still the first step in every case would be to rescind the American war, and not to keep it lurking in the rear, to become hereafter, in case of certain events, a reversionary war with America for unconditional terms. This reversionary war was never the object of the people of England; therefore the argument of the breviate was calculated bona fide to accomplish their views, and to discriminate the fallacious pretences of the late administration from the real wishes of the country, as expressed in

the circular resolution of many counties in the year 1780, first moved at York, on March 28th, 1780 Every other principle and every mode of conduct only imply, as you very justly express it, a secret hope that war may still produce successes, and then-. The designs, which have been lurking under this pretext, could not mean any thing else than this, Who knows, but that we may still talk to America at last? The only test of clear intentions would have been this, to have cut up the American war, and all possible return to it for any cause, or under any pretext. I am confident, that the sentiment of the people of England is, and always has been, to procure peace and reconciliation with America, and to vindicate the national honor in the contest with the House of Bourbon. If this intention had been pursued in a simple and direct manner, I am confident, that the honor and safety of the British nation would long ago have been established in a general peace with all the belligerent powers. These are the sentiments upon which I have always acted in those negotiations, which I have had upon the subject of peace with the late ministry; reconciliation with America, and peace with all the world, upon terms consistent with the honor and safety of my own country.

Peace must be sought in such ways, as promise the greatest degree of practicability. The sentiments of individuals as philanthropists may be overborne by the power of ancient prejudices, which too frequently prevail in the aggregates of nations. In such case, the philanthropist, who wishes the good of his own country and of mankind, must be the bulrush bending to the storm, and not the sturdy oak, unavailingly resisting. National prejudices are, I hope, generally upon the decline. Reason and humanity gain ground every

day against their natural enemies, folly and injustice. The ideas of nations being natural enemies to each other are generally reprobated. But still jealousies and ancient rivalships remain, which obstruct the road to peace among men. If one belligerent nation will entertain a standing force of three or four hundred thousand fighting men, other nations must have defended frontiers and barrier towns, and the barrier of a neigh bouring island, whose constitution does not allow a standing military force, must consist in a superiority at sea. It is necessary for her own defence. If all nations by mutual consent will reduce their offensive powers, which they only claim under the pretext of necessary defence, and bring forward the reign of the millennium; then away with your frontiers and barriers, and your Gibraltars, and the key of the Baltic, and all the hostile array of nations,

"Aspera compositis mitescant sæcula bellis." These must be the sentiments of every philanthropist in his interior thoughts. But, if we are not to seek peace by some practicable method, accommodated to the remaining prejudices of the multitude, we shall not in our own time, I fear, see that happy day. If Great Britain and France are ancient rivals, then, until the reign of the millennium shall approach, arrange that rivalship upon equitable terms; as the two leading nations of Europe, set them in balance to each other, the one by land, the other by sea. Give to France her elevated rank among the nations of Europe; give to Great Britain the honor of her flag, and the security of her island by her wooden walls; and there would be no obstruction to general and perpetual peace. The prejudices of disrespect between nations prevail only among the inferior ranks. Believe me, for one at least, I have the highest sentiments of respect for