the levity, the injustice, and the disorder of a government, merely popular, must be equally subversive of public and private happiness. It is by a just combination of the three, where each having an absolute veto on the others the particular interest of neither can prevail, that the general interest of the whole society will best be known and pursued, and this great nation raised to that station of happiness and glory, which nature seems to have intended.

This form of government has undoubtedly its objections, in common with every other; and since human institutions cannot but partake of the weakness of man, it is in vain that we seek perfection among imperfect beings. In the immense. range of affairs, the extremes unite in evil. Reason and happiness are found in a just medium. The wise man stops there, and he who passes farther is lost.

You have heard, gentlemen, the observations which it has always been my design to offer you, when an occasion should present. I have constantly acted with reference to your will, because I have made it my duty to consider you the organs of the will of the nation, and I have ever recognised in the people the right of being governed according to their wishes.

You require of me, gentlemen, and of every public functionary, an oath never to make any change in your constitution. I will take this oath; but I pray you to consider with me for a moment the consequences it involves. My observation is perhaps superficial, and my fears vain; and the hopes of others may be as well founded as they are brilliant. But no one of us is infallible; there is no one but God, who, having foreseen all, can have preordained all. It is at least possible, that the seeds of evil may be concealed in the constitution, and that nothing but time and circumstances may be wanting to cause their development.

If this happens, as there will be no means of changing it, those to whom the people will have confided their interest will have only the sad alternative of violating their oaths on the one hand, or their duty on the other. It is also possible, that a

great majority of the nation may one day be opposed to this form of judgment. Should we not preserve the right of change to this majority? Can we with justice oppose its will? Reflect, gentlemen, on this alternative, and let me urge you to continue your session for a time. Let us together make trial of your work; do not bind yourselves not to change your decrees; for no one is too wise to improve himself in the school of experience. If, after this trial, the Constitution answers your expectations, you will place it with the more confidence in the hands of your successors. If, on the contrary, you find parts of it to be feeble, or ill-adjusted, you will have it in your power to amend them.

But if you still persist in your determination to conclude your task without delay, at least grant the prayer which I make you in behalf of twenty-four millions of Frenchmen, of future generations, nay, of the human race. Deign in mercy to point out the means, by which the people can express their will, without being exposed to the perilous convulsions, which we have so lately experienced.

Whatever may be the result of your deliberations, I repeat to you, gentlemen, that I submit to them unreservedly. Let us then banish all suspicion; it cannot but be injurious to the interests of the empire. I give you my confidence, and I demand yours. Let us then labor in concert for the liberty and prosperity of the French nation.

But that this labor may not be suspected, and may meet with no opposition, I require of you, gentlemen, that you repeal the decree, which prevents me from choosing in the National Assembly the agents of the executive power. I would have it permitted me to nominate, as Ministers of the Constitution, those among you who have shown themselves its most zealous partizans. I would have the choice I shall make obtain your approbation, so that invested with the full force of public opinion, the Ministers may meet no obstacles in the execution of your plan. This appears to me the more proper, inasmuch as to the Ministers will appertain the exerci se

of royal power, and as you may naturally wish, that, in giving success to your work, they may show in the most striking manner how much I have been deceived in my opinion. I hope you will perceive, gentlemen, in the request I make to you, an unequivocal proof of the sincerity of my conduct; of that sincerity, which the French have a right to expect from their King, and which for his own honor a King ought ever to

exhibit.

WRITTEN FOR THE

MEMOIR

KING OF FRANCE, RESPECTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION.

On the original manuscript is the following endorsement, in the handwriting of Mr Morris;- Memoir given to M. de Montmorin on the 31st of August, 1791. He gave it to the King after the step was taken, which this Memoir was to influence. The King returned it with a request to have a translation.' The King took the oath to accept and maintain the constitution on the 14th of September.

In the present posture of affairs what is the King to do? This question is important, and, to decide it properly, three things are necessary. First, a retrospect of the past; secondly, an examination of the present; and thirdly, a rational investition of the future.

It may be said, in general, that few Kings have shown a more tender regard for their subjects; and an eloquent discourse might be made, in which some striking incidents of the present reign might be placed in a strong light, but this would be attended with inconveniences. There is little dignity in praising one's self, and still less in begging future favor on the score of past kindness. Men in general are not very grateful

for benefits bestowed on themselves, and no one thinks himself bound, in his own particular, to return good offices performed for a whole nation. All agree in considering the good done as so much gained, and in looking forward for as much more as they can contrive to obtain. A discourse of this sort, therefore, would be attended with no profound effect. The fine phrases in it would be applauded, and at the next moment the speaker might be insulted. Such things have already happened.

In reviewing the past, therefore, we must not seek for occasions or means to make his Majesty applaud himself. Still less should he beg the poor pittance of gratitude at the hands of the ungrateful. But it is important for him to show that he has acted consistently. And yet this should be accomplished in such manner, as to produce the effect without appearing to intend it; because such appearance would place him in the situation of one, who defends himself before his judges, and a King should never forget that he is accountable only to God. It is a general fault in his discourses, since the States-General were first convened, that too great court is paid to popularity. The consequence of such proceeding is, that the inonarch purchases momentary favor for his Ministers, at the expense of royal authority. The people revere only those who show superiority without contempt, and that calm wisdom which their breath can neither reach nor ruffle.

To render a short view of the past in some degree useful, it may be proper to show what the King might have done at particular periods. For instance, when he determined to convoke the States-General, he might have given to the kingdom such a Constitution as he pleased; and if he had chosen a tolerable form of government, those who now exclaim against all monarchic power, would have raised statues to Louis the Sixteenth. But, by the manner of convoking the States, some questions were left undecided, which necessarily tended to create dissension; and from thence must have resulted, as a necessary consequence, one of two things; either that royal

authority would preserve sufficient force to decide the question during the contest, in which case (if that authority was exercised) one of the parties would be thrown into opposition, so as to obstruct the good intentions of the King; or else, that the royal authority not having sufficient force, one of the parties would overpower the other, in which case a future scene of violence must succeed, and suspicions arise tending to multiply those acts of injustice, which ever attend the steps of a predominant faction. These things ought to have been foreseen, because in such circumstances they are inevitable, and nothing is so vain as the expectation to allay the heats of party, by sprinkling on them a few soft sentences or pretty phrases.

When the States-General were assembled, the King might still, by his speech at the opening, have given them whatever form he pleased; and it is the more surprising, that this opportunity was neglected, as the many discussions of every kind, which had taken place on that subject, ought to have pointed out the evil, and led to the best remedy which remained. This measure would have been attended, however, with the first inconvenience above mentioned. Possibly it was with a view to avoid such inconvenience, that it was thought prudent to wait until the strength of the parties should be fairly tried, and then to join the strongest. But the mischiefs resulting from such a line of conduct were self-evident. First, it contains an acknowledgment of weakness, and that, in matters dependent on public opinion, always creates the thing which it confesses. Secondly, it contains a proof of bad faith, and of course precludes the hope of zealous assistance from anybody. And thirdly, it must prevent the royal authority from being brought into action, until that action should be evidently useless; and consequently the King could not command the party which he might join, under such auspices, but they would command him. Whatever might have been the reason for neglecting to organize the States-General on that day, this at least is certain, that such neglect showed timidity, and of