known. Certainly it is necessary to make some observations upon the articles, but not to have the trouble of speaking of them before they are decreed. The King will yet have a fair opportunity, and it will be possible for him, by wise and noble conduct, to regain all he ought to desire. The future will present the harvest of the seed which is now sown.

SPEECH

COMPOSED FOR THE KING OF FRANCE, WITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

The first Constitution of France was more than two years under deliberation by the National Assembly before it was completed; that is, from June seventeenth, 1789, to September third, 1791. Several weeks, however, before it was completed, it was presumed, that such would be the result, and that this Constitution would be accepted by the King. A draft of it was already before the public, and it became a question with the Ministry, or with certain individuals among the King's friends, whether it should be adopted by him, without an expression of his or their sentiments on some of its more prominent features.

It was probably at the suggestion of the Count de Montmorin, that Mr Morris drew up the following SPEECH and OBSERVATIONS, intended to be delivered by the King to the National Assembly, on the occasion of his taking the oath to observe the constitution. This paper was handed to the Count de Montmorin on the twenty-seventh of August, and returned to Mr Morris again on the eighteenth of October. Meantime the King took the oath on the fourteenth of September, without reservation, or any public declaration of his views, this course having doubtless been deemed the most expedient by his counsellors.

Gentlemen,

It is no longer your King who addresses you. Luis the Sixteenth is only a private individual. You have just offered him the crown, and informed him on what conditions he must accept it.

I assure you, Gentlemen, that if I were a stranger to France, I would not mount the slippery steps of the throne. But the blood, which flows in my veins, does not permit me to be insensible to the fortunes of the French. Descended from a long line of Kings, the remembrance of those who are no more, the rights of future generations, and my paternal love for the people whom Divine Providence has once placed in my care, everything, in fine, forbids me to abandon my post. I must at least maintain it, so as to secure you from anarchy, and from civil war. In this perilous position, I have taken counsel only of my own conscience. It is this, which has decided me to accept your Constitution. May it ensure the tranquillity of the kingdom, and contribute to its prosperity!

France, in granting you its entire confidence, has placed you in possession of the whole power. You have therefore become responsible, before the throne of the Almighty, for the happiness of this immense people, whose fortune is in your hands. I have been a King. Nothing remains to me now, either of authority or of influence. Yet I have a last duty to fulfil. It is that of imparting to you my reflections on your work. I pray you to hear them with serious attention.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTION.

Previous to any examination of the Constitution, it is proper to acknowledge, in the most explicit manner, the eternal maxim of reason and justice, that all government ought to be instituted and exercised for the benefit of the people. And, parting from that principle, we should in any particular society seek that form of government, which is best calculated to protect its citizens against foreign invasion, and secure domestic tranquillity, with the enjoyment of liberty and property.

You have determined on a hereditary monarchy, and by that means you have the certainty, that the chief executive. magistrate must ever desire the prosperity of France. A King

of France can have no interest distinct from that of the people. Their happiness, their power, and their glory must necessarily be the source of his. Every other public person may have other objects; but your King can aggrandize himself only by increasing the wealth and influence of the nation. He may be mistaken, and he may be misled, but he cannot be bought. It is the misfortune of his situation to see with the eye and act with the hands of others; it is, therefore, evidently his interest, that the representatives of the people should watch over his Ministers, and that they should be punished for misconduct, whether arising from incapacity or any other cause. He cannot but wish also for a strict and regular administration of justice, since that is alike necessary to his glory and to the national prosperity.

These are among the advantages of hereditary monarchy. Whether you have provided against the evils to which it is liable, and secured the good of which it is susceptible, is a question deeply interesting to France, and to the human

race.

You begin with a declaration of the rights of man, but since the instruments of this sort, which have hitherto appeared, have occasioned much metaphysical discussion, it may well be supposed, that a King whose occupations require a knowledge of man, such as he exists, and not such as he may be imagined in abstract contemplation, is little fitted to decide on the merit of such compositions. There seems, however, to be some inconvenience in joining it to a constitution, because if the constitution secures those rights, whatever they may be, it is unnecessary, and otherwise it is useless; but there is in every case the risk of seeming contradictions. Controversies may thence arise, and whoever may be the judge of such controversies, becomes thereby arbiter of the constitution.

To show that this inconvenience is not imaginary, it will perhaps suffice to recal to your recollection the first article of your declaration, that men are born and exist free and equal in rights.' You have decided, however, that the representatives shall be distributed among the eighty three departments, according to the three proportions of Territory, Population, and Direct Taxes. It results, therefore, that a given number of men, in one of the departments, will have the rights of electing more representatives, than the same number in another department. They might then imagine, that they are not equal in the very important right of choosing the members of the Legislative body.

You have also declared, that the law is the expression of the general will; that all citizens have the right of concurring personally, or by their representatives, in its formation; and that, all citizens, being equal in the eye of the law, are equally admissible to all dignities, places, and public employments, without other distinction than that of virtues and talents.' On the other hand you have established, that to be an effective citizen, it is requisite to pay, in some part of the Kingdom, a direct tax, at least equal to the value of three days' labor, and that no one can be an elector unless he unites with the necessary conditions for being an effective citizen, that of paying a direct tax of days' labor.' In reconciling these various clauses, it may be doubted whether the first is to be regarded as an inalienable right, or if, on this hypothesis, the second is a just modification of it.

You have also declared, 'that for the maintenance of the public forces, and for the expenses of the government, a general tax is indispensable, and that it ought to be equally distributed among all the citizens, according to their ability;' and yet by your constitution you delegate exclusively to the legislative body the right of imposing public taxes, of determining the nature and quality thereof, and the mode of collecting them.' Now, as many taxes, and particularly those which are called indirect, are distributed among the citizens, not according to

their ability, but according to what they consume, and even to their most urgent necessities, it may happen, that your declaration may become, in regard to imposts for a part of the citizens, the ground of a serious complaint.

Without farther considering the collateral circumstances, it is proper now to examine the organization and the distribution of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. According to the declaration of rights every society wherein the separation of powers is not determined has no constitution.' That the separation of powers is of great importance cannot, indeed, be denied. It is necessary then to examine, whether you have provided for it in such a manner, that no one of them can encroach in the others. Commencing with the LEGISLATIVE POWER, you have decreed as follows;

ART. I. The National Assembly, forming the Legislative body, is permanent, and is composed of only one chamber. In case of the King's refusing his assent to the decrees of the Legislative body, this refusal is only suspensive, and when the two legislatures, succeeding that which shall have presented the decree, shall have successively presented the same decree in the same terms, the King shall be considered to have given it his

sanction.

'ART. II. The Legislative body cannot be dissolved by the King. The representatives of the nation are inviolable. They can for a criminal deed be arrested in the act, or by virtue of an order of arrest, but notice shall be given thereof without delay to the Legislative body, and the prosecution cannot be continued until after the Legislative body shall have decided, that there is ground for accusation.

'ART. III. The Legislative body has the right of police in the place of its sessions, and in the compass around, which it shall have determined upon. It has the right of disposing of the forces, which by its own consent are quartered in the city, when it shall hold its sessions; and the Executive power cannot introduce, or quarter, any body of troops of the line