ART. IX.-Essays on the Pursuit of Truth, on the Progress of Knowledge, and on the Fundamental Principles of all Evidence and Expectation. By the AUTHOR of Essays on the Formation and Publication of Opinions. London. R. Hunter. 1829. 12mo. pp. 302.

THIS writer has acquired considerable reputation by a former work, On the Formation and Publication of Opinions,' and two or three treatises on Political Economy. He is a keen observer of men and things, an original and close thinker, and in his style, clear, polished, and forcible. His faults are those of a mind inclining to skepticism and gloom, the natural consequences of speculating much on the absurdities and abuses which still prevail.

He begins his essay 'On the Pursuit of Truth,' by insisting on the importance of the subject.

'The overwhelming importance of this knowledge, is attested by the sad tale of error and suffering, which every page of history presents to our observation. What possible problem can mankind have to solve but one, how to make themselves conjointly as happy, and for that purpose as noble-minded and virtuous as they can during the short term of their mortal existence? And how have they hitherto solved this problem? In what numerous ways have they proved themselves totally blind to their real interests, perverted their resources, exasperated the unavoidable evils of their condition, and inflicted gratuitous and unprofitable misery on each other, and on themselves? It is clear that men can have no interest in suffering, no preference for unhappiness in itself, and wherever they are found in headlong career after it, it must be under an impression that they are in pursuit of a different object. It is error therefore, it is illusion, it is an incapacity on their part to see the real consequences of actions, the real issues of events, that gives rise to all those evils which desolate the world, except such as can be traced to the physical circumstances of man's nature and condition.'-pp. 8, 9.

The states of mind favorable and unfavorable to the pursuit of truth are next considered; and the qualities which an inquirer should aim to possess, are shown to be, a simple desire to arrive at the truth, and a freedom form disturbing passions, and preconceived errors.

The preoccupation of the understanding by erroneous opinions, is one of the greatest impediments which offer themselves in the pursuit of accurate knowledge. The mere preoccupancy itself, is an obstacle scarcely to be overcome; but as the opinions thus lodged are generally the objects of awe and veneration, the task of removing them becomes almost hopeless. No language can describe with sufficient force, the tenacity with which early received notions are retained: they seem to enter into the very essence of the soul, to weave themselves into the tissue of the understanding, till it transcends the power of conception to imagine them erroneous. Of those notions in particular, which are coeval with our earliest recollections, and the origin of which we cannot trace, we seem incapable of suspecting the falsity.

'When such notions are combined with that kind of fear and awe which we have already described, there is no degree of absurdity to which they may not rise. A modern writer, in his travels through Mesopotamia, relates that at Orfah (the ancient Ur of the Chaldees) the river, and the fish in it, are regarded as sacred to Abraham, and the inhabitants firmly believe, that if any of the fish were caught, no process of cooking could make any impression on their bodies. Here is a notion which any one might at once put to the test by direct trial; a fact, which they have only to stretch out their hands to verify or disprove; yet so thoroughly preocupied are the minds of the people by the prejudice instilled in early infancy, such awe do they feel in relation to it, that they have not the slightest suspicion of its absurdity, and would think it profane to attempt to submit it to the ordeal of actual experiment.'-pp. 20-22.

The third chapter states in what circumstances inquiry is a duty, and this duty is shown to be incumbent on all men, SO far as they have the means and opportunity, in regard to subjects having an important bearing on their conduct and happiness. Several prejudices adverse to inquiry are then examined and exposed, particularly those which represent it as likely to contaminate the mind, as being presumptuous, and as being morally wrong.

'There is contamination in preposterous and obscene images crowding before the intellectual vision, notwithstanding a full and distinct perception of their character; but there is no contamination, no evil in a thousand false arguments coming before the mind, if their quality is clearly discerned. The only possible evil in this case is mistaking false for true; but the

man who shrinks from investigation, lest he should mistake false for true, can have no reason for supposing himself free from that delusion, in his actual opinions. That he should be more likely to escape from error without, than with investigation, is a species of absurdity which requires no exposure.' p. 32.

"The presumption he has to repress, is not any presumption in relation to other beings in possession of secrets, which he is trying clandestinely to wrest from them, but merely the presumption of drawing positive and ample conclusions from doubtful and slender premises, of supposing that he has discovered what he has not, that he has succeeded where he has only failed, that he has done what still remains to be accomplished; in a word, the presumption of overrating his own achievements. Here indeed a man may err in self-confidence, but an evil cannot obviously arise from searching too far, which is best remedied by searching farther, by closer reasoning and more rigorous investigation.'-pp. 38-39.

'If we may contract guilt by inquiry, we may contract guilt by remaining in our present state. The only valid reason which can be assigned, why we may commit an offence by embarking in any inquiry is, that we may miss the right conclusion; but it is obvious that we may equally miss it by remaining in our actual opinions. It is then incumbent on us to know, whether we are committing an offence by remaining in our present opinions; in other words, it is necessary to inquire whether those opinions are true; thus the reason assigned for not inquiring, leads itself to the conclusion that it is necessary to inquire.'-p. 41.

Having shown that inquiry under certain circumstances is a duty, the next question relates to the manner in which it ought to be conducted. Our predilections and prejudices are not to be put off at will, it is true; but we can guard against them, and merely to suspect them, will do much to lessen their power. At any rate, let our predilections and prejudices be what they may, we can resolve and endeavour, whatever subject we undertake to examine, to examine it with diligence and impartiality. The following strictures are severe, but they are just and seasonable.

'While there is so much laxity and want of discrimination in regard to candor and uprightness in the prosecution of our inquiries, while research on the most momentous subjects may be neglected or perverted with impunity, we cannot expect to find the spirit of integrity carried to its highest perfection in

the commerce of life. From one who exhibits a want of proper diligence and scrupulous impartiality in his treatment of evidence in literature or science, it would be vain to look for uncompromising integrity when he is called to adjust the contending claims of his fellow men, or to decide between his own rights and those of others.'-p. 65.

In speaking of many who take upon themselves the office of public instruction, the author asks,

'Is their language, "Read, examine for yourselves, draw your own inferences, impartially investigate; we present you with our conclusions and the reasons on which they are founded; we believe them to be strong, but put them to the test; assist us by pointing out any fallacies you may descry; let us be coadjutors in the grand cause of truth?" Is it not on the contrary, "The doctrine we annonnce is the only one which can be free from error; avoid all those writings which are opposed to it, as you would avoid the contamination of the plague; do everything in your power to banish any opposite suggestions from your own minds; shun the moral turpitude of doubting what we teach; fear and confide?"—pp. 66, 67.

'On this point,' he proceeds, 'there can be no compromise. It is either right or wrong to be partial in our investigations. If it is wrong to be partial, it is wrong to recommend and enforce partiality; it is a departure from the distinct line of duty, a deviation from candid, upright, and honorable conduct. This representation, it will be observed, by no means implies that a man should refrain from urging his opinions with all the arguments in his power; but the moment he begins to teach the necessity of thinking as he does, to set forth the guilt of dissenting from his doctrine, and to insist on the avoidance of all opposite considerations, that moment he commits an offence against the moral law of truth.'-pp. 67, 68.

The principles advocated in this essay, imply, that no blame is incurred by the disbelief of any set of prescribed doctrines, even though true doctrines, if the investigation which has led to this disbelief, has been conducted with fairness and diligence.

'But the objector replies, "You have suffered your passions to interfere; it is perversity of heart and malignity of disposition, which have rendered propositions incredible to you, that have been admitted by others." If this accusation is meant to apply to the manner in which we have designedly treated the evi

dence, then as by the supposition we have conducted the examination with fairness and diligence, it is manifestly out of place. But if the intention of it is to charge us with being possessed by passions, which have involuntarily on our parts exaggerated some portions of the evidence and weakened others, and thus led to erroneous conclusions, we reply: 1. This is a mere gratuitous assumption. 2. It is at all events an involuntary error which is charged upon us. 3. Since by the supposition we have conducted the examination with perfect fairness, notwithstanding our suffering under these passions, the greater is our merit. 4. The circumstance of having conducted it fairly, ought to be received in the absence of all other evidence, as conclusive proof that no such passions have prevailed. 5. As we have just the same grounds for throwing such an imputation on our opponent, we may with equal fairness suppose, that in forming an opinion different from ours, he has been in fluenced by some of these reprehensible passions.'-pp. 72, 73.

Another important topic respects the influence of the institutions and practices of society on the progress of truth. Under this head, the author speaks of the tendency of establishments, civil or ecclesiastical, which bestow emolument on individuals, with the stipulation, that they shall teach, hold, or profess certain doctrines, definitively prescribed. He also offers some very sensible remarks, on what Mr Locke calls 'principling children,' without inculcating, at the same time, the duty of examination, as they become capable of it, and an entire freedom of thought.

Many things must be taught them for which they can for a while have no other authority than the teacher; but if we really wish to produce in them a love of truth, a desire after knowledge, a spirit of candour, and that integrity of mind which will best preserve them from error, nothing must be taught them as a doctrine, which it is their duty to believe, and of which it is a crime to doubt. All the instruction given them should be accompanied with inducements to exert their own faculties, to seek for reasons of what is asserted. They should be rescued from the mere passive adoption of what is proposed to them by authority, and trained to the habit of drawing their own inferences. All the reverence which they are commonly educated to feel for particular doctrines and authorities, they should be taught to feel for truth itself, and for honesty of investigation. It is under such a discipline that we should expect to see minds of integrity arise which would be blessings to the world.'—p. 90.