literary rank, which confequently would furnish fo many more inftances of mutual communication and credit. Nor, if we pafs on to the other qualification of Integrity, shall we find our argument for the value of Faith as a principle of knowledge checked or weakened in its progrefs. It is very usual indeed to murmur and declaim against the deceitfulness of the world: but the reafon of the cafe, and the opinion of the fenfible part of mankind, authorise a more favourable determination. In enquiring into this fubject, by an investigation of the motives that are likely to sway men in giving evidence of facts and opinions, we should be careful not to omit any among the principal ones on either fide. And first, in the number of those that incline men to Veracity, the natural love of truth is by no means to be paffed over. As natural, it is alfo univerfal, and may be fuppofed to direct every man's teftimony, unless it can be fhewn that fome other motive interferes fufficiently powerful to set it afide. It will easily be replied that this is much too often the cafe. But, though this be undeniable by reason of the corruption of our nature, yet it still remains, and often directs by its influence. It is likewife to be confidered at other times as an affiftant affiftant to the reft on the fame fide. Such are the shame of afferting what is at the fame time fecretly contradicted by the evidence of our own mind; the natural tendency to felf-love and to benevolence, which are both generally best promoted by adherence to truth; the fear of detection, and the dread of the punishment that, in fome shape or other, awaits the voluntary and premeditated violation of it. And, if to thefe powerful motives of conduct we, laftly, add the fanction which true religion lends to every part of virtue, we shall be led to acknowledge that there is ample ground for confidence in the Veracity of human teftimony. Whoever shall decide otherwise, will maintain an opinion unworthy of God in his creation and moral government of the world. The Almighty must either be supposed to have conceived a mean plan in intending to create fuch vile and wicked beings, or to have come short of his purpose, or to have suffered them to fall into fuch objects as are deftitute of all claim to refpectability. But this, not only a pious man, but also any candid and fenfible obferver of mankind will never admit to be the cafe. We must indeed allow that there is room for caution, while every kind of depraved paffion and external temptation is present to folicit them occafionally to falfhood and diffimulation. But I contend, that to suppose the qualification of Veracity too sub lime for man in his present ftate, and that it is ridiculous to attribute it to him; or, because some things are to be disbelieved, to conclude that all are to be doubted, and not very many to be received with perfect confidence, is far from accuracy and genuine circumfpection. These require that a line fhould be drawn and true criticism will enable men, by contemplating the nature of the evidence, and investigating its circumstances, to set at a great distance from the limits of hesitation an infinite number of affertions proposed to their belief. On the contrary, it is too manifeft, from our experience and observation, that weakness and ignorance of mind are very great caufes of incredulity. The one is that which so often leads to disbelief, the other at least to distrust and fufpicion. For the latter is deficient in thofe qualifications of experience and theory, which give fo material a support to the credit of a new relation: the former, as it is still more pitiable, is the cause of as grievous and more culpable mistakes than credulity itself: nor can such scrupulousness ever deserve the name of prudence; or will the end of fuch habits ever be wisdom and knowledge. If, referring to what has been argued on the Veracity and Ability of men as witneffes, we proceed to confider the Certainty annexed to this fpecies fpecies of knowledge, what has been already advanced will affift our enquiry. Philofophical writers on this fubject have ranked Faith very low in the scale of affent; I mean the Belief of human teftimony, which alone we are confidering. But this, I prefume, is evidently done only on account of the great variety of cafes under this head, in the lowest of which fuch evidence is entitled to small credit: nay in fome, as it has been intimated, it is entitled to none at all. This, however, affords no argument why there may not be many inftances, in which it would be utterly unreasonable not to place a perfect confidence, equal to that reposed on indemonftrable axioms or the certain deductions of science. I need not exemplify this affertion any farther than by mentioning, that, as otherwife no one could be certain of the existence of any thing to which he had not been a fenfible witnefs, a man could not know, to adduce fuch inftances as have been alledged by a great writer, that there did exift any country in the world which he had not feen, or that there had lived any person in past times whose name is only recorded by historians. Human testimony, in these and the innumerable other examples that might be adduced, is capable of an acceffion, of fo many undeniable confirmations of its truth, that it is impoffible for the human mind, conftituted as it is, to refufe as full and firm an af fent fent as it is capable of giving. And, first, these confirmations may arife out of the Matter itself of the report. For this, as it is evident, may be fuch as can of itself afford a very powerful argument for its truth. It may be parallel to other matters within our knowledge in fimilar cafes; or it may be likewife concluded as almoft certain from premises of which we are in poffeffion: it may be connected neceffarily or probably with other facts related on the fame authority, which have been proved to be true. It may also be such, that all the poffible causes of mistake or falfhood may be greatly overbalanced by others that guard from error and oblige to veracity; or that it may not admit of scarcely the leaft principle of deception: or, lastly, the confequences of mistating the fact may be such, that it would be in oppofition to every leading principle of the human heart to do fo. It is easy, but needless, to bring to view more particulars that tend to the fame purpose. The Character of the Witneffes alfo may in fome inftances of teftimony be placed beyond impeachment. They may be peculiarly capable of apprehending their fubject, eminently verfed in it, or affifted by circumstances that afford them a full and plain perception of it. Again, they may be particularly interested in the truth of what they relate. Their principles, their honor, their advantage, nay every paffion and defire belonging B to |