objection to the argument. Substitute, then, the word oysters for horses in the minor, and it will stand thus :

All animals feel;

All oysters are animals;
Therefore all oysters feel:

In order to give the greater advantage to the advocate for this scholastic art, let us suppose the antagonist does not maintain the opposite side from any favour to Descartes' theory concerning brutes, but from some notion entertained of that particular order of beings, which is the subject of dispute. It is evident, that though he should admit the truth of the major, he would regard the minor as merely another manner of expressing the conclusion; for he would conceive an animal no otherwise, than as a body endowed with sensation or feeling.

Sometimes, indeed, there is not in the premises any position more generic, under which the conclusion can be comprised. In this case you always find that the same proposition is exhibited in different words: insomuch that the stress of the argument lies in a mere synonyma, or something equivalent. The following is an example:

The Almighty ought to be worshipped;
God is the Almighty;

Therefore God ought to be worshipped.

It would be superfluous to illustrate that this argument could have no greater influence on the Epicurean, than the first mentioned one would have on the Cartesian. To suppose the contrary is to suppose the conviction effected by the charm of a sound, and not by the sense of what is advanced. Thus, also, the middle term and the subject frequently correspond to each other; as the definition, description, or circumlocution, and the name. Of this I shall give an example in Disamis, as in the technical dialect, the third mood of the third figure is denominated :

Some men are rapacious;

All men are rational animals;

Therefore some rational animals are rapacious.

Who does not perceive that rational animals is but a periphrasis for men?

It may be proper to subjoin one example at least in negative syllogisms. The subsequent is one in Celarent, the second mood of the first figure:

Nothing violent is lasting;

But tyranny is violent;

Therefore tyranny is not lasting.

Here a thing violent serves for the genus of which tyranny is a species; and nothing can be clearer than that it requires much less experience to discover, whether shortness of duration be justly attributed to tyranny the species, than whether it be justly predicated

of every violent thing. The application of what was said on the first example to that now given, is so obvious, that it would be losing time to attempt farther to illustrate it.

Logicians have been at pains to discriminate the regular and consequential combinations of the three terms, as they are called, from the irregular and inconsequent. A combination of the latter kind, if the defect be in the form, is called a paralogism; if in the sense, a sophism; though sometimes these two appellations are confounded. Of the latter, one kind is denominated petitio principii, which is commonly rendered in English a beginning of the question, and is defined, the proving of a thing by itself, whether expressed in the same or in different words; or, which amounts to the same thing, assuming in the proof the very opinion or principle proposed to be proved. It is surprising that this should ever have been by those artists styled a sophism, since it is in fact so essential to the art, that there is always some radical defect in a syllogism, which is not chargeable with this. The truth of what I now affirm will appear to any one, on the slightest review of what has been evinced in the preceding part of the chapter.

The fourth and last observation I shall make on this topic is, that the proper province of the syllogistical science is rather the adjustment of our language, in expressing ourselves on subjects previously known, than the acquisition of knowledge in things themselves. According to M. du Marsais, "Reasoning consists in deducing, inferring, or drawing a judgment from other judgments already known; or rather, in showing that the judgment in question has been already formed implicitly, insomuch that the only point is to develope it, and show its identity with some anterior judgment."* Now I affirm that the former part of this definition suits all deductive reasoning, whether scientifical or moral, in which the principle deduced is distinct from, however closely related to, the principles from which the deduction is made. The latter part of the definition, which begins with the words or rather, does not answer as an explication of the former, as the author seems to have intended; but exactly hits the character of syllogistic reasoning, and indeed of all sorts of controversy merely verbal. If you regard only the thing signified, the argument conveys no instruction, nor does it forward us in the knowledge of things a single step. But if you regard principally the signs, it may serve to correct misapplication of them, through inadvertency or otherwise.

In evincing the truth of this doctrine, I shall begin with a simple illustration from what may happen to any one in studying a foreign tongue. I learn from an Italian and French dictionary, that the Italian word pecora corresponds to the French word brebis, and from a French and English dictionary, that the French brebis corresponds to the English sheep. Hence I form this argument,

* Le raisonnement consiste à déduire, à inférer, à tirer un jugement d'autres jugemens déja connus ou plutot à faire voir que le jugement dont il s'agit, a déja été porté d'une manière implicite; des sorte qu'il n'est plus question que de le déveloper, et d'en faire voire l'identité avec quelque jugement anterieur. Logique, Art. 7.

Pecora is the same with brebis,

Brebis is the same with sheep;

Therefore pecora is the same with sheep.

This, though not in mood and figure, is evidently conclusive. Nay, more, if the words pecora, brebis, and sheep, under the notion of signs, be regarded as the terms, it has three distinct terms, and contains a direct and scientifical deduction from this axiom, "Things coincident with the same thing are coincident with one another." On the other hand, let the things signified be solely regarded, and there is but one term in the whole, namely, the species of quadruped, denoted by three names above mentioned. Nor is there, in this view of the matter, another judgment in all the three propositions but this identical one," A sheep is a sheep."

Nor let it be imagined that the only right application can be in the acquisition of strange languages. Every tongue whatever gives scope for it, inasmuch as in every tongue the speaker labours under great inconveniences, especially on abstract questions, both from the paucity, obscurity, and ambiguity of the words on the one hand; and from his own misapprehensions, and imperfect acquaintance with them, on the other. As a man may, therefore, by an artful and sophistical use of them, be brought to admit, in certain terms, what he would deny in others, this disputatious discipline may, under proper management, by setting in a stronger light the inconsistencies occasioned by such improprieties, be rendered instrumental in correcting them. It was remarked above,* that such propositions as these, "Twelve are a dozen," "Twenty are a score," unless considered as explications of the words dozen and score, are quite insignificant. This limitation, however, it was necessary to add; for those positions which are identical when considered purely as relating to the things signified, are nowise identical when regarded purely as explanatory of the names. Suppose that through the imperfection of a man's knowledge in the language, aided by another's sophistry, and perhaps his own inattention, he is brought to admit of the one term, what he 'would refuse of the other, such an argument as this might be employed,

Twelve, you allow, are equal to the fifth part of sixty;
Now a dozen are equal to twelve;

Therefore a dozen are equal to the fifth part of sixty.

I mark the case rather strongly, for the sake of illustration; for I am sensible, that in what regards things so definite as all names of number are, it is impossible for any who is not quite ignorant of the tongue, to be misled. But the intelligent reader will easily conceive, that in abstruse and metaphysical subjects, wherein the terms are often both extensive and indefinite in their signification, and sometimes even equivocal, the most acute and wary may be entangled in them.

*Chap. V. Sect. I. Part I.

In farther confirmation of my fourth remark I shall produce an example in Camestres, the second mood of the second figure:

All animals are mortal;

But angels are not mortal;

Therefore angels are not animals.

When the antagonist calls an angel an animal, it must proceed from one or other of these two causes, either from an error in regard to the nature of the angelic order, or from a mistake as to the import of the English word animal. If the first be the case; namely, some erroneous opinion about angels, as that they are embodied spirits, generated and corruptible like ourselves; it is evident that the forementioned syllogism labours under the common defect of all syllogisms. It assumes the very point in qusetion. But if the difference between the disputants be, as it frequently happens, merely verbal, and the opponent uses the word animal, as another name for living creature, and as exactly corresponding to the Greek term,* arguments of this sort may be of service for setting the impropriety of such a misapplication of the English name in a clearer light. For let it be observed, that though Nature hath strongly marked the principal differences to be found in different orders of beings, a procedure which hath suggested to men the manner of classing things into genera and species, this does not hold equally in every case. Hence it is, that the general terms in different languages do not always exactly correspond. Some nations from particular circumstances, are more affected by one property in objects, others by another. This leads to a different distribution of things under their several names. Now, though it is not of importance that the words in one tongue exactly correspond to those in another, it is of importance that in the same tongue uniformity in this respect be, as much as possible, observed. Errors in regard to the signs, tend not only to retard the progress of knowledge, but to introduce errors in regard to the things signified. Now by suggesting the different attributes comprised in the definition of the term, as so many mediums in the proof, an appeal is made to the adversary's practice in the language. In this way such mediums may be presented, as will satisfy a candid adversary, that the application he makes of the term in question, is not conformable to the usage of the tongue.

On the other hand it is certain, that in matters of an abstract and complex nature, where the terms are comprehensive, indefinite, not in frequent use, and consequently not well ascertained, men may argue together eternally, without making the smallest impression on each other, not sensible all the while, that there is not at bottom any difference between them, except as to the import of words and phrases. I do not say, however, that this is a consequence peculiar to this manner of debating, though perhaps oftener resulting from it, on account of its many nice distinctions, unmeaning subtleties, and mazy windings, than from any other manner. For it must be owned,

* ζων.

that the syllogistic art has at least as often been employed for imposing fallacies on the understanding, as for detecting those imposed. And though verbal controversy seems to be its natural province, it is neither the only method adapted to such discussions, nor the most expeditious.

To conclude then, what shall we denominate the artificial system, or organ of truth, as it has been called, of which we have been treating? Shall we style it, the art of reasoning? So honourable an appellation it by no means merits, since, as hath been shown, it is ill adapted to scientific matters, and for that reason never employed by the mathematician; and is utterly incapable of assisting us in our researches into nature. Shall we then pronounce it the science of logomachy, or in plain English, the art of fighting with words, and about words? And in this wordy warfare, shall we say that the rules of syllogizing are the tactics? This would certainly hit the matter more nearly; but I know not how it happens, that to call any thing logomachy or altercation, would be considered as giving bad names; and when a good use may be made of an invention, it seems unreasonable to fix an odious name upon it, which ought only to discriminate the abuse. I shall therefore only title it, the scholastic art of disputation.* It is the schoolmen's science of defence.

When all erudition consisted more in an acquaintance with words, and an address in using them, than in the knowledge of things, dexterity in this exercitation conferred as much lustre on the scholar, as agility in the tilts and tournaments added glory to the knight. In proportion as the attention of mankind has been drawn off to the study of Nature, the honours of this contentious art have faded, and it is now almost forgotten. There is no reason to wish its revival, as eloquence seems to have been very little benefited by it, and philosophy still less.

Nay, there is but too good reason to affirm, that there are two evils at least which it has gendered. These are, first, an itch of disputing on every subject, however uncontrovertible; the other, a sort of philosophic pride, which will not permit us to think that we believe any thing, even a self-evident principle, without a previous reason or argument. In order to gratify this passion, we invariably recur to words, and are at immense pains to lose ourselves in clouds of our own raising. We imagine we are advancing and making wonderful progress, while the mist of words in which we have involved our intellects, hinders us from discerning that we are moving in a circle all the time.†

* It answers to that branch of logic which Lord Verulam styles Doctrina de elenchis hermenia; concerning which he affirms, "Dedimus ei nomen ex usu, quia verus ejus usus est plané redargutio, et cautio circa usum verborum. Quinimo partem illam de prædicamentis, si recté instituatur, circa cautiones de non confundendis aut transponendis definitionum et divisionum terminis, præcipuum usum sortiri existimarnus, et hucetiam referri malumus." De Aug. Sci. L. v. c. 4.

How ridiculous are the efforts which some very learned and judicious men have made, in order to evince that whatever begins to exist must have a cause. One argues, "There must have been a cause to determine the time and place," as though it were more evident that the accidents could not be determined