proper word. The corresponding metaphor, syneedoché, or metonymy, in another language will often be justly chargeable with obscurity and impropriety, perhaps even with absurdity. In support of this remark, let it be observed, that the noun sail in our tongue is frequently used, and by the same trope that the noun puppis, in Latin, to denote a ship. Let these synecdochés of a part for the whole, which are so very similar, be translated and transposed, and you will immediately perceive, that a man could not be said to speak Latin, who in that language should call a ship velum; nor would you think that he spoke better English, who in our language should call it a poop. These tropes therefore are of a mixed nature. At the same time that they bear a reference to the primitive signification, they derive from their customary application to the figurative sense, that is, in other words, from the use of language, somewhat of the nature of proper terms.

In further confirmation of this truth, it may be remarked, that of two words, even in the same language, which are synonymous, or nearly so, one will be used figuratively to denote an object which it would be unsufferable to employ the other to denote, though naturally as fit for suggesting it. It hath been said, that "an excellent vein of satire runs through the whole of Gulliver's travels." Substitute here artery in the room of vein, and you will render the sentence absolutely ridiculous. The two words, beast and brute, are often metaphorically applied to human creatures, but not in the same signification. The former denotes either a blockhead or a voluptuary of the grossest kind; the latter, one in the highest degree unmannerly and ferocious. Accordingly, we speak of beastly ignorance; we say, "gluttony is a beastly vice;" but we should say, "his behaviour to those unhappy people was quite brutal." The word brutish, however, though derived from the same root, is employed like beastly, to denote stupid or ignorant. Thus to say of any man," He acted brutishly," and to say, "he acted brutally," are two very different things. The first implies he acted stupidly; the second, he acted cruelly and rudely. If we recur to the nature of the things themselves, it will be impossible to assign a satisfactory reason for these differences of application. The usage of the language is therefore the only reason.

It is very remarkable that the usages in different languages are in this respect not only different, but even sometimes contrary; insomuch that the same trope will suggest opposite ideas in different tongues. No sort of metonymy is commoner amongst every people than that by which some parts of the body have been substituted to denote certain powers of affections of the mind, with which they are

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This doctrine might be illustrated by innumerable examples, if it were necessary. For an instance, take that expression of Cicero, (Pro Legario,) Cujus latus ille mucro petebat ?" Here we have a synecdoché in the word mucro, and a metaphor in the word petebat, neither of which can be suitably rendered into English. "Whose side did that point seek?" is a literal version, but quite intolerable. "Whom did you mean to assail with that sword ?" Here the sense is exhibited; but as neither trope is rendered, much of the energy is lost. In like manner in the phrase, "Vario Marte pugnatum est," They fought with various success," there is a metonymy in the word Marte, which no translator into any modern language, who hath common sense, would attempt to transplant into his version. See Traité des Tropes, par M. Du Marsais, Art. vii. iv.

supposed to be connected. But as the opinions of one nation differ on this article from those of another, the figurative sense in one tongue will by no means direct us to the figurative sense in another. The same may be said of different ages. A commentator on Persius has this curious remark: "Naturalists affirm, that men laugh with the spleen, rage with the gall, love with the liver, understand with the heart, and boast with the lungs."* A modern may say with Sganarelle in the comedy, "It was so formerly, but we have changed all that." For so unlike are our notions, that the spleen is accounted the seat of melancholy and ill-humour. The word is accordingly often used to denote that temper; so that with us a splenetic man, and a laughing merry fellow, form two characters that are perfect contrasts to each other. The heart we consider as the seat not of the understanding, but of the affections and of courage. Formerly indeed we seem to have regarded the liver as the seat of courage; hence the term milk-livered for cowardly.

One plain consequence of the doctrine on this head which I have been endeavouring to elucidate is, that in every nation where from time to time there is an increase of knowledge, and an improvement in the arts, or where there often appear new works of genius in philosophy, history, or poetry, there will be in many words a transition more or less gradual, as that improvement is more or less rapid, from their being the figurative to their being the proper signs of certain ideas, and sometimes from their being the figurative sign of one, to their being the figurative signs of another idea. And this, by the way, discloses to us one of the many sources of mutation to be found in every tongue This transition will perhaps more frequently happen in metaphor than in other tropes, inasmuch as the relation of resemblance is generally less striking, and therefore more ready to be overlooked, than those relations on which the others are founded. Yet that they too will sometimes be affected by it, we have no reason to question.

*Cornutus on these words of the first satire, Sum petulanti splene cachinno. "Physici dicunt homines splene ridere, felle irasci, jecore amare, corde sapere, et pulmone jactari." In the ancient piece called the Testaments of the twelve patriarchs, supposed to be the work of a Christian of the first century, we find these words in the testament of Nephtali, for illustration that God made all things good, adaptimg each to its proper use : Καρδιαν εις φρόνησιν, ηπαρ προς θυμον, χύλην προς πικρίαν, εις γέλωτα πληνα, νεφρους εις πανουργίαν. Grab. Spicil, patrum, 1. Sec. T. 1. Ed. 2. p. 212.

"Cela etoit autrefois ainsi; mais nous avons changé tout cela." Le medecin malgré lui. Molière.

From these things we may observe, by the way, how unsafe it is in translating, especially from an ancient language into a modern, to reckon that because the proper sense in two words of the different languages corresponds, the metaphorical sense of the same words will correspond also. In this last respect the words, as we have seen, may nevertheless be very different in signification, or even opposite. I think, in particular, that many translators of the Bible have been betrayed into blunders, though not sufficiently adverting to this circumstance. For instance, nothing at first appears to be juster, as well as a more literal version of the Greek dxAλnpoxapdios, than the English hard-hearted. Yet I suspect, that the true meaning of the former term, both in the Septuagint and in the New Testament, is not cruel, as the English word imports, but indocile, intractable. The general remark might be illustrated by numberless examples; but this is not the place.

That in those metonymies in particular, of which some instances have been given, wherein the connexion may be justly accounted more imaginary than real, such changes in the application should arise, might naturally be expected. The transition from the figurative to the proper in regard to such terms as are in daily use, is indeed inevitable. The word vessel in English hath doubtless been at first introduced by a synecdoché to signify a ship, the genus for the species, but is now become by use as much a proper term in this signification, as the word ship itself.

With regard to metaphor, it is certain, that in all languages there are many words which at first had one sense only, and afterwards acquired another by metaphorical application, of which words both senses are now become so current, that it would be difficult for any but an etymologist to determine which is the original and which the metaphorical. Of this kind in the English tongue are the substantives conception, apprehension, expression; the first of these, conception, when it notes an action of the mind, and when the beginning of pregnancy in a female, is alike supported by use; the second and third terms, apprehension for seizure, and expression for squeezing out, are now rather uncommon. Yet these are doubtless the primitive significations.

It may be further remarked, that in some words the metaphorical sense has justled out the original sense altogether, so that in respect of it they are become obsolete. Of this kind in our tongue, are, the verbs to train, to curb, to edify, to embrace, the primitive significations whereof were, to draw, to bend, to build, to lift. And if one should now speak of the acuteness of a razor, or of the ardour of a fire, we could not say that to a linguist he would speak unintelligibly, but by every man of sense he would be thought to express himself both pedantically and improperly. The word ruminale, though good in the metaphorical sense, to denote musing on a subject, would scarcely be admitted, except in poetry, in the literal sense, for chewing the cud. Thus it happens with languages as with countries; strangers received at first through charity, often in time grow strong enough to dispossess the natives.

Now in regard to all the words which fall under the two last remarks, whatever they were formerly, or in whatever light they may be considered by the grammarian and the lexicographer, they cannot be considered as genuine metaphors by the rhetorician. I have already assigned the reason. They have nothing of the effect of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like proper terms, they suggest directly to his mind, without the intervention of any image, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by them.

From all that hath been said, it evidently follows, that those metaphors which hold mostly of the thought, that is, those to which the ear hath not been too much familiarized, have most of the peculiar vivacity resulting from this trope; the invariable effect of very frequent use being to convert the metaphorical into a proper meaning. A metaphor hath undoubtedly the strongest effect, when it is first ushered into the language; but by reason of its peculiar boldness, this, as was hinted already, is raerly to be hazarded. I may say, it

ought never to be hazarded, unless when both the perspicuity is secured to an ordinary understanding by the connexion, and the resemblance suggested is very striking. A new metaphor (and the same holds, though in a lower degree, of every trope) is never regarded with indifference. If it be not a beauty, it is a blemish. Besides, the more a language advanceth in richness and precision, and the more a spirit of criticism prevails among those who speak it, the more delicate the people become in this respect, and the more averse to the admission of new metaphors. It is even proper it should be so, there not being the same plea of necessity in such languages, as in those that are but poorly supplied with words. Hence it is that in modern times, the privilege of coining these tropes is almost confined to poets and orators; and as to the latter, they can hardly ever be said to have this indulgence, unless when they are wrought up to a kind of enthusiasm by their subject. Hence also have arisen those qualifying phrases in discourse, which, though so common in Greek and Latin, as well as in modern languages, are rarely, if ever, to be met with either in the rudest or in the most ancient tongues. are, so to speak, if I may thus express myself, and the like.

These

I cannot help remarking, before I conclude this article of the origin of tropes, and of the changes they undergo, through the gradual operation of custom, that critics ought to show more reserve and modesty than they commonly do, in pronouncing either on the fitness or on the beauty of such as occur sometimes in ancient authors. For first, it ought to be observed, (as may be collected from what has been shown above,) that the less enlightened a nation is, their language will of necessity the more abound in tropes, and the people will be the less shy of admitting those which have but a remote connexion with the things they are employed to denote. Again, it ought to be considered that many words which must appear as tropical to a learner of a distant age, who acquires the language by the help of grammars and dictionaries, may, through the imperceptible influence of use, have totally lost that appearance to the natives, who considered them purely as proper terms. A stranger will be apt to mistake a grammatical for a rhetorical trope, or even an accidental homonymy for a far-fetched figure. Lastly, it ought to be remembered, how much the whole of this matter is every where under the dominion of caprice, and how little the figurative part of the language of any people is susceptible of a literal translation, that will be accounted tolerable, into the language of any other. If these things were properly attended to, I imagine we should, on these subjects, be more diffident of our own judgement, and consequently less captious and decisive.

So much for the nature of tropes in general, and those universal principles on which in every tongue their efficacy depends; and so much for the distinction naturally consequent on those principles into grammatical tropes and tropes rhetorical.

PART II. The different sorts of tropes conducive to vivacity.

I Now Consider severally the particular ways wherein rhetorical tropes may be rendered subservient to vivacity.

1. THE LESS FOR THE MORE GENERAL.

THE first way I shall mention is, when, by means of the trope, a species is aptly represented by an individual, or a genus by a species. I begin with this, because it comes nearest that speciality in the use of proper terms, from which, as was evinced already, their vivacity chiefly results. Of the individual for the species I shall give an example from our celebrated satirist Mr. Pope :

May some choice patron bless each gray goose quill !
May ev'ry Bavius have his Bufo still!*

Here, by a beautiful antonomasia, Bavius, a proper name, is made to represent one whole class of men; Bufo, also a proper name, (it matters not whether real or fictitious,) is made to represent another class. By the former is meant every bad poet, by the latter every rich fool who gives his patronage to such. As what precedes in the Essay secures the perspicuity, (and in introducing tropes of this kind, especially new ones, it is necessary that the perspicuity be thus secured,) it was impossible in another manner to express the sentiment with equal vivacity.

There is also a sort of antonomasia to which use hath long ago given her sanction, and which therefore needs not be introduced with much precaution. Such is the following application of famous names; a Solomon for a wise man, a Cresus for a rich man, a Judas for a traitor, a Demosthenes for an orator, and a Homer for a poet. Nor do these want a share of vivacity, when apposite and properly managed.

That kind of synecdoché by which the species is put for the genus, is used but sparingly in our language. Examples however occur sometimes, as when an assassin is termed a cut-throat, or a fiction a lie, as in these words of Dryden,

The cock and fox the fool and knave imply,
The truth is moral, tho' the tale a lie.

In like manner, slaughter, especially in battle, is by poets sometimes denominated murder, and legal prosecution, persecution. Often in these instances the word may justly be said to be used without a figure. It may however, in general, be affirmed of all those terms, that they are more vivid and forcible, for this single reason, because they are more special.

There is one species of the onomatopeia, which very much resembles the antonomasia just now taken notice of. It is when a verb is formed from a proper name, in order to express some particular action, for which the person to whom the name belonged was remarkable. An example of this we have in the instructions which Hamlet gave the players who were to act his piece before the king and the queen. He mentioned his having seen some actors who in their

Prologue to the Satires.