as in the beasts they sometimes hunt, and by whom they are sometimes hunted."*

I shall add but two instances more of impropriety in single words, instances which I have reserved for this place, as being somewhat peculiar, and therefore not strictly reducible to any of the classes above mentioned; instances, too, from authors of such eminence in respect of style, as may fully convince us, if we are not already convinced, that infallibility is not more attainable here than in other articles. "As I firmly believe the divine precept, delivered by the Author of Christianity, there is not a sparrow falls to the ground without my Father, and cannot admit the agency of chance in the government of the world, I must necessarily refer every event to one cause, as well the danger as the escape, as well the sufferings as the enjoyments of life." There is very hittle affinity, either in sense or in sound, between precept and doctrine; and nothing but an oscitancy, from which no writer whatever is uniformly exempted, can occount for so odd a misapplication of a familiar term. The words in connexion might have shown the error. It is the doctrines of our religion that we are required to believe, and the precepts that we are required to obey. The other example is, " Their success may be compared to that of a certain prince, who placed, it is said, cats, and other animals, adored by the Egyptians, in the front of his army, when he invaded that people. A reverence for these phantoms made the Egyptians lay down their arms, and become an easy conquest." What the author here intended say, it is hard to conjecture; but it is unquestionable, that in no sense whatever can cats and other animals be called phantoms.

I shall now, before I proceed to consider impropriety as it appears in phrases, make a few reflections on those principles which most frequently betray authors into such misapplications in the use of single words. As to that which hath been denominated the vulgarism, its genuine source seems to be the affectation of an easy, familiar, and careless manner. The writers who abound in this idiom generally imagine, that their style must appear the more natural, the less pains they bestow upon it. Addison hath exactly hit their notion of easy writing. "It is," says he, "what any man may easily write." But these people, it would seem, need to be informed, that ease is one thing, and carelessness is another; nay, that these two are so widely different, that the former is most commonly the result of the greatest care. It is like ease in motion, which, though originally the effect of discipline, when once it hath become habitual, has a more simple and more natural appearance than is to be observed in any manner which untutored Nature can produce. This sentiment is well expressed by the poet:

But ease in writing flows from art, not chance;
As those move easiest who have learned to dance.§

Boblinb. Ph. Es. ii. Sect. 2.

†General Introduction to the Account of the Voyages of Commodore Byron, &c. by Hawkesworth.

Bolinb. Ph. Es. iv. Sect. 1.

§ Pope's Imitations.

True ease in composition, accompanied with purity, differs as much from that homely manner which affects the familiarity of low phrases and vulgar idioms, as the appearance of a woman that is plainly but neatly dressed differs from that of a slattern. But this affectation is to be considered as the spring of one species of impropriety only.

All the rest, unless when chargeable on inadvertency, as they sometimes doubtless are, seem naturally to flow from one or other of these two sources, which are almost diametrically opposite to the former. One is, the love of novelty; the other, a fondness for variety. The former, when excessive, tends directly to misguide us, by making us disdain the beaten track, for no other reason but because it is the beaten track. The idea of vulgarity in the imaginations of those who are affected by this principle is connected with every thing that is conceived as customary. The genu ine issue of this extreme, much worse, I acknowledge, than the former, is not only improprieties, but even absurdities, and fustian, and bombast. The latter, to wit, a fondness for variety, produceth often the same effect, though more indirectly. It begets an immoderate dread of becoming tedious, by repeating too frequently the same sound. In order to avoid this, a writer resolves at any rate to diversify his style, let it cost what it will. And, indeed, this fancied excellence usually costs more than it is worth. Very often propriety and perspicuity both are sacrificed to it.

It is justly observed by Abbé Girard,* that when a performance grows dull through an excess of uniformity, it is not so much because the ear is tired by the frequent repetition of the same sound, as because the mind is fatigued by the frequent recurrence of the same idea. If, therefore, there be a remarkable paucity of ideas, a diversity of words will not answer the purpose, or give to the work the agreeable appearance of variety. On the contrary, when an author is at great pains to vary his expressions, and for this purpose even deserts the common road, he will, to an intelligent reader, but the more expose his poverty, the more he is solicitous to conceal it. And, indeed, what can more effectually betray a penury of words, than to be always recurring to such as custom hath appropriated to purposes different from those for which we use them? Would the glitter of jewels which we know to be stolen, produce an opinion of the wearer's affluence? And must not such alienations of words, if I may be allowed the metaphor, awaken a suspicion of some original defects which have given occasion to them? We should hardly say that a house were richly furnished, I am sure we could not say that it were well furnished, where we found a superfluity of utensils for answering some purposes, and a total want of those adapted to other purposes not less necessary and important. We should think, on the contrary, that there were much greater appearance both of opulence and taste, where, though there were little or nothing superfluous, no vessel or piece of furniture useful in a family were wanting. When one is obliged to make some utensil supply purposes to which they were not originally destined; when, for instance," the copper

pot boils milk, heats porridge, holds small beer, and, in case of necessity, serves for a jorden :"* there are always, it must be confessed, the strongest indications of indigence. On the contrary, when every real use hath some instrument or utensil adapted to it, there is the appearance, if not of profusion, of what is much more valuable, plenty.

In a language there may be great redundancies, and, at the same time, great defects. It is infinitely less important to have a number of synonymous words, which are even sometimes cumbersome, than to have very few that can be called homonymous, and, consequently, to have all the differences which there are in things, as much as possible, marked by corresponding differences in their signs. That this should be perfectly attained, I own is impossible. The varieties in things are infinite, whereas the richest language hath its limits. Indeed, the more a people improve in taste and knowledge, they come the more, though by imperceptible degrees, to make distinctions in the application of words which were used promiscuously before. And it is by thus marking the delicate differences of things, which in a ruder state they overlooked, more than by any other means, that their language is refined and polished. Hence it acquires precision, perspicuity, vivacity, energy. It would be no difficult task to evince, as partly it may be collected from what hath been observed already, that our own language hath from this source received greater improvements in the course of the last century and of the present, than from the accession of new words, or perhaps from any other cause. Nothing then, surely, can serve more to corrupt it, than to overturn the barriers use hath erected, by confounding words as synonymous, to which distinct significations have been assigned. This conduct is as bad policy with regard to style, as it would be with regard to land, to convert a great part of the property into a common. On the contrary, as it conduceth to the advancement of agriculture, and to the increase of the annual produce of a country, to divide the commons, and turn them into property, a similar conduct, in the appropriation of words, renders a language more useful and expressive.

PART II. - Impropriety in Phrases.

I COME now to consider the improprieties which occur in phrases. The first of this kind of which I shall take notice is, when the expression, on being grammatically analyzed, is discovered to contain some inconsistency. Such is the phrase of all others after the superlative, common with many English writers. Interpreted by the rules of syntax, it implies that a thing is different from itself. Take these words for an example, "It celebrates the church of England, as the most perfect of all others." — Properly, either perfect than 66 other," or any as the most perfect of all churches."

* Swift.

Swift's Apology for the Tale of a Tub.

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as more

This is precisely the same sort of impropriety into which Milton hath fallen in these words,

Use, indeed, may be pleaded for such expressions, which, it must be acknowledged, use hath rendered intelligible. But still the general laws of the language, which constitute the most extensive and important use, may be pleaded against them. Now, it is one principal method of purifying a language, to lay aside such idioms as are inconsistent with its radical principles and constituent rule; or as, when interpreted by such principles and rules, exhibit manifest nonsense. Nor does the least inconvenience result from this conduct, as we can be at no loss to find expressions of our meaning, altogether as natural, and entirely unexceptionable.

Sometimes, indeed, through mere inattention, slips of this kind are committed, as in the following instance: "I do not reckon that we want a genius more than the rest of our neighbours." The impropriety here is corrected by omitting the words in italics.

Another oversight, of much the same kind, and by the same author, we have in the following passage: "I had like to have gotten one or two broken heads for my impertinence."§ This unavoidably suggests the question, How many heads was he possessed of? Properly, "I was once or twice like to have gotten my head broken.'

Another from the same work, being a passage formerly quoted for another purpose, is this, "The first project was to shorten discourse by cutting polysillables into one."|| One thing may be cut into two or more; but it is inconceivable that, by cutting, two or more things should be made one.

Another, still from the same hand, "I solemnly declare, that I have not wilfully committed the least mistake." The words used here are incompatible. A wrong wilfully committed is no mistake. Addison hath fallen into an inaccuracy of the same kind, in the following lines:

So the pure limpid stream, when foul with stains
Of rushing torrents and descending rains.**

A stream may doubtless be at one time limpid, and at another foul,

which is all that the author meant; but we cannot properly call it a pure limpid stream, when it is foul with stains. So much for those improprieties which involve in them some absurdity.

I shall next illustrate those by which an author is made to say one thing when he means another. Of this kind I shall produce only one example at present, as I shall have occasion afterwards of considering the same fault under the article of perspicuity. "I will in stance in one opinion, which I look upon every man obliged in conscience to quit, or in prudence to conceal; I mean, that whoever argues in defence of absolute power in a single person, though he offers the old plausible plea, that it is his opinion, which he cannot help, unless he be convinced, ought, in all free states, to be treated as the common enemy of mankind."* From the scope of the discourse it is evident he means, that whoever hath it for his opinion, that a single person is entitled to absolute authority, ought to quit or conceal that opinion: because, otherwise, he will, in a free state, deserve to be treated as a common enemy. Whereas, if he says any thing, he says, that whoever thinks that the advocates for absolute power ought to be treated as common enemies, is obliged to quit or conceal that opinion; a sentiment very different from the former.

The only species of impropriety that remains to be exemplified, is that wherein there appears some slight incongruity in the combination of the words, as in the quotations following: "When you fall into a man's conversation, the first thing you should consider is, ."+ Properly, "fall into conversation with a man." “I wish, sir, you would animadvert frequently on the false taste the town is in, with relation to plays as well as operas." Properly," the false taste of the town."

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"The presence of the Deity, and the care such an august cause is to be supposed to take about any action."§ The impropriety here is best corrected by substituting the word being in the place of cause; for though there be nothing improper in calling the Deity an august Cause, the author hath very improperly connected with this appellative some word totally unsuitable; for who ever heard of a cause taking care about an action?

I shall produce but one other instance. "Neither implies that there are virtuous habits and accomplishments already attained by the possessor, but they certainly show an unprejudiced capacity towards them." In the first clause of this sentence, there is a gross inconsistency; we are informed of habits and accomplishments that are possessed, but not attained; in the second clause there is a double impropriety the participial adjective is not suited to the substantive with which it is construed; nor is the subsequent preposition expressive of the sense. Supposing, then, that the word possessor hath been used inadvertently for person, or some other general term, the sense may be exhibited thus: "Neither implies that there are virtuous habits and accomplishments already attained by this person; but

*Sentiments of a Church of England Man.

† Spectator No. 49.

§ Pope's View of the Epic Poem.

+ Ib. No. 22.

Guardian No. 34.