NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

GERMANY AND THE WAR.

ALTHOUGH SO many portentous events, sufficient to have satisfied our easy-going forefathers for a year, have been crowded into the past month -although Louis Napoleon flatters himself that he has broken the Austrian yoke in Italy-although England hugs herself in her neutrality and blindly closes her eyes to the consequences of Napoleonic successthere is one great fact, towering above all the rest: Prussia has decided on action, and has at length mobilised her army. With the certainty of a general war resulting from this step, we may be permitted to survey the past conduct of Germany, and the gradations which have produced this consummation.

The great difficulty with which Germany has had to contend during the last six months was undoubtedly the defective organisation of the Confederation, which, called into life by the Congress of Vienna, has by no means produced the desired effect. Cumbrous, slow in movement, and inefficient in action, the necessary result has been that Austria and Prussia have formed an imperium in imperio, and the Confederation has gradually degenerated into a machine for ensuring the external peace of Germany, instead of representing her foreign interests in a national and dignified manner. Still, in spite of its many faults, this institution must possess some good qualities, for, though utterly overthrown in 1848, the rulers called it into existence again so soon as tranquillity was restored. Austria and Prussia both erred in their neglect of the Confederation, which would have become a powerful ally if properly managed, and the consequences of that neglect have been the present

war.

If we regard the proportional power of the several German states, we must come to the conclusion that not one of them possesses individually sufficient strength to withstand any European great power. Leaving the smaller states out of the question, even the two principal German powers, partly through their peculiar geographical position, partly through the medley of races forming their population, are in such a condition that they must succumb to any external attack. But by both belonging to the Confederation, they would derive from it a strength which, if properly organised and animated with one will, might defy the whole of Europe. Even so early as 1804, Gentz wrote, impressively: "From the moment that Austria and Prussia stand shoulder to shoulder, and move in the same direction, there will be no separate interest left throughout Germany. The great and small princes will at July-VOL. CXVI. NO. CCCCLXIII.

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once collect beneath the wings of this powerful Confederation-the wellminded through conviction and love, the unpatriotic through fear."

This Confederation which Gentz so earnestly desired instead of the old and tottering Holy Roman Empire, has now been in existence nearly fifty years; but the hearty coalescence of the two great powers has not yet been effected. It existed, it is true, temporarily, prior to 1848, when both Prussia and Austria entertained absolutistic tendencies and sought their own safety in the maintenance of such ideas; but since that eventful year the interests of the two powers have been sundered in a most peculiar manner. The more that Austria felt the necessity for reviving the Confederation, and uniting herself more closely with Germany, the more did Prussia recede from the Confederation, and thus aroused the jealousy and suspicions of the other German states.

It would be unjust, however, to make the present responsible for the sins of the past. Since November, 1858, when the Prince of Prussia assumed the reins of government in the name of his brother, Germany has looked with renewed hopes to Prussia, and these were certainly justified by the change, that took place in the public opinion of that country. Those political parties, which-some from conviction, others from the force of circumstances-had estranged themselves under the former ministry from the general interests of the German states, now turned their sympathies towards them with such unanimity and moderation as deserve the most sincere recognition. The new ministry itself, though it hesitated a considerable time ere publishing the programme of its future direction, displayed a caution and tact in arranging the internal affairs of the country, that was adapted to reconcile all parties, and the prince regent more than once declared that he would maintain the existing treaties conscientiously, and while keeping the universal interests of Germany ever steadily before him, promote them to the best of his energies.

Such a change of feeling in Prussia necessarily attracted the attention of the other German countries, and assured Prussia a moral influence in Germany, such as she had sought in vain during the last ten years to secure. The promises, either suggested by, or proclaimed in, the public declarations of the new ministry, were fulfilled; many important changes were introduced in the internal administration, and only one touchstone still remained to be applied-how Prussia intended to regulate her external policy, not merely towards Europe, but in her relations to the Germanic Confederation.

Prussia's position as regards Germany and the Continent generally should be entirely dependent on the Confederation, and, consequently, a closer connexion with Austria was indispensable. The Manteuffel ministry had committed a grievous error in this respect; in union with Austria, it would have been an easy task for Prussia to remove all those defects, justly or unjustly laid to the charge of the Diet, and give it an organisation better suited to the requirements of the age. This Austria desired, and the smaller states would not have opposed it, or else their resistance could have been easily overcome.

Instead of this wise policy, the Prussian ministry strove for several years to form a confederation within the Confederation, in the hope of thus increasing Prussia's influence at home and abroad. The working

of this scheme was very different from what had been anticipated, for it only aroused jealousy, and, as its necessary consequence, mistrust and opposition to the best intended propositions. During this unhappy period the German press kept up a most unjustifiable and persistent attack on Austria; but had they acted wisely, Prussia's so-called independent policy, ever speaking of German interests, but neglecting or misunderstanding them at the decisive moment, ought to have been assailed, for it placed Prussia in an untenable position as regarded the great questions of the day.

The error of this policy-which attempted to reserve Prussia's unlimited strength in the most violent storms of political passion, in order that it might in the end give the triumphant decision-lies on the surface. Prussia standing alone, surrounded by powerful neighbours, is no longer able to force a decision in the question of peace or war, for every struggle between the great powers must necessarily assume enormous dimensions, and Germany become the cockpit, for the sake of drawing on her resources. Alliances with foreign powers cannot be arbitrarily made, for they depend on the assistance, sacrifices, and guarantees one nation can offer the other, and must become the more entangling for Prussia in proportion to her desires and power of performance, unless she have Germany and Austria to back her. At the same time that policy called "der freien Hand," which is assumed to afford Prussia so many advantages, necessarily shakes that mutual confidence which must precede every firm and permanent alliance. A state which only seeks to form treaties that increase its own strength, can easily be converted from a friend into a savage foe, so soon as its personal advantage appears to demand such a change. Finally, the friends of this policy forget that wars cannot be avoided because a peace-desiring government wraps itself in passive neutrality, but only by opportune and decisive diplomatic action. The state that displays apprehension of a war from the outset, and is only disposed to take up arms against injustice under compulsion, can never acquire any influence in the councils of the great powers, for "whoso does not join in action, cannot join in council."

These considerations, whose truth Prussia must have felt during the Eastern war, and would have felt still more deeply at the Congress of 1856, had she not sacrificed German interests on behalf of a close connexion with France and Russia, ought to have enlightened the Manteuffel ministry as to the errors of its policy. The press complained bitterly at the time; the ministry was called the shield-bearer of France," Prussian policy the "handmaiden of the foreigner," and thus the severest condemnation was pronounced. The defenders of the ministry urged in reply the double position of Prussia both as a German and a European power, and it was hinted that the former must naturally yield to the latter. The national German organs sharply criticised the folly of such pretensions, in language of which the following extract from the National Zeitung will serve as a sample:

Prussia is and should be in every place and at every moment German, nothing but German, and never, anywhere, European. If we accustom ourselves to the idea of being to-day German, to-morrow European or separatists-of going so far as a German, so far as a European power-we shall lose the firm ground we stand on, and begin to oscillate. We sacrifice our natural horizon, and create

an artificial division of interests, which must lead us to take a distorted view of our interests, whatever name we may be pleased to give them. Practically, we arrive at this result: so long as we fancy we are acting as a European power we let the Germanic Confederation out of sight, while our sole importance as a state arises from other countries regarding us as the most powerful German state... Prussia is only a portion of Germany, and as the end always stands in a ratio to the means employed, the interests of united Germany cannot be guaranteed by Prussia alone.

The Manteuffel ministry having been dismissed, let us now see whether its foreign policy shared the same fate. An opportunity was soon afforded the new ministry for showing to the world its views as to the future policy of Prussia, and specially of Germany. We will regard her position in the present war waging between Austria and France.

Unfortunately, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the European position Prussia has assumed, and the neglect of her relations with the Confederation, have produced the present crisis, so fraught with menace to Germany, and probably to Europe. Our conviction leads us to the assertion that Prussia would, from the outset, have assumed a different status between the contending powers had she not forgotten those duties imposed on her in her quality as a member of the Confederation. Let us examine this more closely.

When Napoleon III. gave the Austrian envoy the memorable Newyear's greeting, and Sardinia thereupon no longer disguised her designs upon Austrian Italy, England and Prussia interposed as disinterested and friendly states, and offered their mediation to settle the matters in dispute. Much has been written and said about this mediation, and its merits have been doubted as much as they have been praised. We cannot venture any decided opinion on the subject: one thing is certain, however, that up to February 3rd there was not a sign of any mediation having been effectually tried at Paris. Prussia was not even represented there, for her minister to France had been residing for a lengthened period at Berlin, where he eventually died. Probably, the two cabinets were more active at Vienna, in a manner, however, which ordinary men cannot exactly approve. It seems quite certain from the Blue-book that efforts were being made at that time, both from London and Berlin, to force the Austrian cabinet to conciliate the wrath of the French emperor by concessions; but this can scarcely be termed a mediation, when the assailed party is expected to yield to the unjustifiable demands of the haughty challenger. The next step was the mission of Lord Cowley to Vienna, because Louis Napoleon cleverly pointed out the injurious effect of long-forgotten treaties, which Austria had formed several years back with a few Italian rulers. They were asserted to act detrimentally on the peace of Europe, partly because they furnished fresh nutriment to the revolutionary virus in Italy, and partly because they affected Sardinia's moral influence over the peninsula.

We have already done our best to prove the falsehoods contained in this accusation brought by the Emperor of the French against the Austrian government in Italy. We are glad to find, too, that the most liberal writers in Germany support our views. They deny Napoleon's right to set himself up as judge of treaties which sovereign states have formed; and they have fully proved the innocuous nature of such treaties.

The mediating powers, however, thought differently, and Lord Cowley was sent to see how much Austria would yield in the matter of these treaties, for the sake of securing the peace of Europe. The result of his mission was allowed to be satisfactory, but Napoleon, with the help of Russia, neutralised all the exertions of England. Russia proposed a congress of the four Powers, in the event of Austria declining their mediation, which should regulate the affairs of Italy. Then commenced the most perfidious negotiations Europe has ever witnessed. Austria gave her assent to the congress, on conditions which were accepted by England, Prussia, and Russia, but France sought to delay the meeting of the congress by every possible excuse, while she tried to complete her armaments with a spirit and magnitude far beyond the mere support of Sardinia in the event of a war with Austria. The conditions Austria offered were falsified, and tricks played about the question of disarmament, so that Lord Derby himself was compelled repeatedly to express his apprehensions that a war was inevitable.

Prussia, all this while, was unconsciously playing Napoleon's game: the few official documents she has allowed to be published show that she has continually believed that Napoleon III. was acting honestly, and sincerely desired to ensure the lasting peace of Europe by his interference in the affairs of Italy. This unhappy error, this miscomprehension of the actual political condition of Europe, explains not only Prussia's peculiar position towards Germany, but also that she has assumed towards Austria. We may be allowed to quote the following passage from a clever German pamphlet on the subject :*

It has frequently been asked with amazement how any state could adhere to such a belief, after all that Napoleon has done since his elevation to the throne. Is not the idea of universal dominion in Europe the pervading principle of all the emperor's designs? To lay the basis of it, he sacrificed thousands of his soldiers and millions of the public property in a war against Russia; he signed the peace of Paris so soon as the northern empire had, at least tacitly, recognised his superiority; he thrust Turkey into an endless succession of embarrassments, weakened her internal strength by supporting her rebellious vassals; he employed the peace he had patched up to excite restlessness and apprehension throughout Europe; and he substituted intrigue for open and honourable policy. Any one who has calmly watched Europe since 1853 cannot blind himself to the conviction that Napoleon entertained hostile designs on the peace of Europe, and has proceeded to their execution slowly but surely.

Prussia, however, resolutely closed her eyes to the danger, and assumed a very embarrassing position between the two contending powers. Starting on the assumption that Austria was equally to blame with France, she considered that the former power had no claim, as a member of the Confederation, on the support of Germany in defending her Italian possessions. Entertaining such views, Prussia thought herself justified in interfering, not on behalf of Germany, but as a European great

power.

The assertion that a federative state has no claim to call on the other members for assistance, if it be attacked in its non-German possessions, is based on a fallacy. A state is indivisible, and it is impossible for a ruler to wage war on behalf of one portion of his dominions, and declare the

* Preussen und der Bund. Eine Mahnung. Leipzig: 1859.