THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY.*

THE past month has fully realised the expectations which all farsighted politicians entertained as to the policy of the Emperor of the French, who has at length boldly laid aside the mask, and stepped into the arena as the champion of Italy. Scarcely had the Austrians sent in their ultimatum to Sardinia than French troops began crossing the western frontier of that country. In deference to the expressed wishes of the British cabinet, the Austrians did not cross the Ticino till five days later, on the 29th of April; and thus the last accusation against Austria, that she precipitated the war, is removed. Louis Napoleon was the aggressor, by being the first to infringe neutral territory, and thus futilising the efforts made by the English ministry to prevent this dread appeal to arms. This aggressive movement on the part of the French was accompanied by a manifesto, in which the old platitudes about the abnormal condition of Italy were repeated. In fact, the only passage in this lengthened document deserving comment is the one in which the emperor alludes to the "national and traditional policy of France." If we turn to the second volume of the Napoleon Correspondence, we find a startling light thrown on this policy. Sixty-three years ago the first Napoleon installed himself at Milan, under the same pretext of liberating Italy, and employed the same honeyed words as his nephew has just done. In his first proclamation to the army of Italy, the third Napoleon stimulates the ardour of his men by saying, "In the Via Sacra of ancient Rome inscriptions were chiselled upon the marble, reminding the soldiers of their exalted deeds." What is this but a counterfeit presentment of the first Napoleon's classic allusions? He addressed his starving troops thus: "To restore the capital-to replace there the statues of the heroes who made it immortal-to rouse the Romans from centuries of slavery: such will be the fruit of our victories. They will form an era in history; to you will belong the glory of having changed the face of the most beautiful part of Europe." The imitation is so apparent throughout (except where the emperor tries to console his troops as to the effect of the armes de précision), that we are justified in assuming that the present liberator of Italy will tread closely in his uncle's footsteps. What they were, we will string together a few illustrative passages to show. The liberator began by imposing a fine of twenty millions on Milan-of course the inhabitants must pay for so priceless a gem as liberty-and when Pavia declined freedom on those terms, Napoleon stormed the city, shot the officials, and gave the city up to plunder. With Venice he secured a rupture for the sake of booty-he, himself, confesses it; and as to Sardinia, her fate in those evil days is sadly suggestive for the present.

*In order to prevent continued references, the writer of this article recommends his readers, who desire further information, to the following works: Unsere Zeit. Leipzic: Brockhaus. 1859; Guerre de l'Indépendance Italienne. Par Général Ulloa. Paris: Hachette; Revue des Deux Mondes, April 1, 1859; Handbook to North Italy. London: Murray; The Armies of the Great Powers. By Lascelles Wraxall. W. H. Allen and Co.

On the 26th of April, 1796, Bonaparte, in a despatch to the Directory, writes:

"The King of Sardinia has surrendered at discretion, giving up three of his strongest fortresses and half of his dominions." Then he adds, suggestively, "If you do not desire to accept his submission, but insist on dethroning him, you must cajole him for a few weeks, and give me warning. I will get possession of Valenza, and march upon Turin. As to Genoa, by all means oblige it to pay fifteen million francs."

The imperial troops, we hear, have landed at Leghorn, to secure the independence of Tuscany. The first Napoleon sent Murat to Naples with the same object, giving him the following instructions: "You must use the utmost severity, for there is no other way of governing the Italians. Shoot, hang, tax, confiscate, terrify!" If such be the national and traditional policy of France, hapless Italy will soon have cause to regret the intervention.

The manifesto of Napoleon was soon followed by that of Franz Joseph, and active preparations were made on both sides for the coming campaign. Unfortunately for the Austrians, the delay acceded to the wishes of England disabled them from carrying out their original plan of marching on Turin, and the sudden concentration of French troops at Genoa prevented any advance into the country through fear of the plains being suddenly inundated by the rising rivers and the Austrians' retreat being intercepted. The great point, however, was to gain time, and Gyulai executed a manœuvre which deserves considerable praise. The first object was to prevent France landing an expeditionary force in Italy and arousing the population, for Austria at the moment was not fully prepared to meet the French on her own territory and keep down the rebels. It was of the utmost importance that the French should be diverted from the real place of danger, and this could be only effected by making a demonstration against Sardinia. By the 1st of May five Austrian corps d'armée had crossed the Ticino, and threatened to envelop the Sardinian army drawn up along the Dora Baltea. Napoleon immediately fell into the trap, and hurried every available man to the seat of war. To us it seems quite clear that Gyulai had no serious intention of advancing, for we do not find that he had any siege train with him to form têtes de pont to secure his retreat over the Po, and his reputation justified the supposition that he would not advance too far into an enemy's country and allow his communication to be cut off with his base. However, the Emperor Napoleon seemed to be of that opinion, for he pushed on his troops to Alessandria, but, before that time, the Austrian commander had effected his purpose. After supporting his army for nearly three weeks at the expense of Sardinia, he gradually concentrated his troops beyond the Po, and now holds a most excellent position, with a rapid river to guard his front, and his flank covered by two strong places, while he commands the road from Casale, where the allies are now collected in strength. Gyulai is therefore at liberty to accept or decline a combat, and if he choose to hold his position, he cannot be driven from it without heavy loss. But the advantages Austria has derived from this strategical combination are incalculable: she has been enabled, by the delay, to pour one hundred thousand additional troops into Lombardy, and is now safe from any coup de main by which Pia

cenza could be taken in the flank, while, at the same time, enabled to hold the Tuscan army in check. So far, then, we think that the advantages of the campaign are on the side of the Austrians, and we trust we have solved that eternal question as to "what they can be about."

Decidedly the most surprising thing about the opening of the campaign is the strange want of preparation the French have displayed: after the praises lavished on their military administration, we certainly did not expect to find that the emperor's utmost resources amounted to 120,000 men, and those utterly deficient in commissariat train. The guns, too, of the emperor's invention, and which were to revolutionise the art of war, we hear it whispered, are a failure, and the whole of the artillery will be rearmed. On the other hand, the Austrians have shown that they were fully aware of the stake they were playing for, and the Continent was amazed at finding that the stolid Tedeschi could, as it were, summon from the ground a splendidly appointed army of 130,000 men, which could be marched into an enemy's country withont running any risk of disturbance at home. We may, however, be permitted to give a glance at the real capabilities of the Austrian army, and show that Napoleon's boast of clearing Italy of the Tedeschi within three months has something of the Gascon element about it.

The great improvements in the Austrian army date from the disastrous campaigns of 1848, when the defection of all the Hungarian regiments proved the necessity of abolishing the system of raising troops exclusively from the various provinces of the empire. A general conscription has been introduced, much after the fashion of that obtaining in France. The duration of service is for eight years, and no class is exempt. To quote from a recent French writer on the subject:

The two first classes (from twenty to twenty-one years of age) can always be called out; the five following (from twenty-two to twenty-six years) are only summoned in default of a sufficient number of men being produced by the two first classes, and married men are exempt. On the other hand, marriage is forbidden to the members of the two first classes, and they are not allowed to leave the country prior to the annual drawings. Any infraction of these regulations is punished by compulsory enrolment. Those called out are obliged to pay all the expenses of making up the lists, drawing, and revision: the parishes pay the quota for the indigent classes, which presses heavily upon them. As in France, exemption by purchase is permitted; but while, in the former country, the money produced by this source forms a dotation for the army, enabling the pensions to be augmented and a premium offered for re-enlistment, in Austria the money is paid directly into the treasury.

The Austrian infantry is composed of 62 regiments of the line, the Imperial Tyrolese Rifle Regiment, 14 frontier regiments, and 25 battalions of light infantry. No change has been made in the formation of the Tyrolese regiment or of the border troops, who were originally instituted by the great Eugene of Savoy. The Illyrians and Croats of whom they are composed supply the best infantry in the army, and have always displayed their fidelity to the House of Austria. The entire strength of the Austrian infantry intended to act against an enemy, may be estimated at

If we deduct 150,000 from these to garrison fortresses and protect the Gallician frontier, the emperor would have at his disposal close on 300,000 admirably trained infantry, provided with the necessary

reserves.

The cavalry has also been greatly improved since 1848, and now consists of 8 regiments of cuirassiers, 8 of dragoons, 12 of hussars, and 12 of lancers. Its effective strength may be estimated at 20,000 heavy cavalry, and 44,000 light cavalry, or a total of about 65,000 men.

The artillery, like that of the French, is divided into siege and field regiments. The latter consists of 12 regiments, each composed of 4 batteries of eight 6-pounders, 6 horse batteries, 3 12-pounder batteries of six guns each, and, lastly, a howitzer battery. The siege artillery is only composed of 8 battalions, with an effective strength, on paper, of 18,000 men. There is also a rocket regiment, of which the Austrians speak most highly, and composed of 4000 men, with 2500 horses. The imperial artillery has, therefore, 168 batteries, with 1344 guns, and 20 rocket batteries, with a strength of 51,000 men. Adding to these the coast, fortress, and technical artillery, we have a grand total of 70,000 men. The Austrians have justly considered that artillery and riflemen will play the chief part in modern warfare, and to these two arms they have devoted special attention.

It may be fairly estimated, then, that the Emperor of Austria can send into the field a fully equipped army of 400,000 men, without weakening his defences at home, and there is no doubt nearly the whole of these are now concentrated in, or en route for, Lombardy.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Emperor Napoleon possesses a most tremendous military strength, and, according to his arrangements, he will, within a short period, possess an army of 580,000 men, with 82,000 cavalry horses and 1182 guns, intended to take the field. In addition, in the event of any reverse, the Emperor of the French will be enabled to count on 150,000 additional troops, drawn from old non-commissioned officers who have served their time, and conscripts whom it has not yet been considered necessary to call out.

Although, therefore, the numerical preponderance appears to be on the side of the allies, and, were the contest to be carried on in the open field, the result would be certain, it must not be forgotten that Austria has a resource worth a second army in her admirable strategic position in Lombardy. We may, therefore, be allowed to take a rapid survey of the terrain on which the campaign will probably take place, and show what obstacles the allies will have to contend with ere they can drive the Austrians from their last stronghold in Italy.

The first line of defence that offers itself against an invasion from the west is the river Po. This great river, which rises in Mount Viso, traverses Piedmont and Lombardy, and finally falls into the Adriatic after a course of 140 leagues. It is navigable nearly through its entire length, and is the great commercial highway of Northern Italy. It is in

no place fordable, and its passage would afford considerable difficulty to an invader. The best bridge is at Piacenza, but that is held by the Austrians, who have formed a strong entrenched camp there, and the siege of the works would necessitate a considerable delay. Hence it is more than probable that the allies would cross the Po at Casale, which is held by the Sardinians, and, to prevent that, Gyulai has concentrated his strength between the Sesia and the Ticino. If, however, the Austrians were compelled to fall back in the presence of an imposing force, it is doubtful whether they would try to hold the lines of the Adda and Ticino, which cover the duchy of Milan. These rivers can easily be crossed at numerous points, and there is no great fortification near them which would stand a regular siege. Milan could not hold out a week, Brescia must surrender at once, and Bergamo is of no great value. The only strong place in the duchy is Pizzighitone, which defends an important passage of the Adda, but, as it is not on the high road to Milan, the allies would not probably stop to reduce it. The only place to which the Austrians seem to attach any importance along their lines is Pavia, which they have converted into a depôt during their invasion of Piedmont, but, in the event of their being compelled to fall back, they would make no stand here. Hence we are of opinion that the Austrians would make no extreme effort to hold the duchy of Milan : it would soon fall into the hands of the allies, and the Austrians would, of course, take care to devastate it before they finally retreated. But the real theatre of war is excellently described in the following extract from the Revue des Deux Mondes:

The lines of the Mincio and the Adige appear to mark the limit of an invasion on the part of an army attacking Lombardy. On the banks of these rivers the Austrians have collected all their resources, and prepared all the defences art can suggest. On this terrain, so carefully prepared and so carefully studied, they will await the enemy, and prepare for the result of the campaign. The course of the Mincio is only about ten leagues from the Lago di Garda to the marshes surrounding Mantua. Two strong fortresses, Peschiera and Mantua, defend either extremity of this line. The Adige, whose course is much longer, and volume of water far more considerable, can only be crossed in the fifteen leagues separating Verona from Legnago. Above Verona it is defended by impassable heights; below, near Legnago, it forms marshes connected with those at the mouth of the Po. The Adige is nowhere fordable, and it is navigable both above and below Verona, where it is about one hundred yards in width. This river would oppose greater difficulties than all the rest to the passage of an army, and has always been justly regarded as the best defensive line in Italy. The terrain near Verona is intersected by vineyards and gardens; towards Mantua and Legnago it is covered with rice-fields and innumerable irrigatory canals. The road from Verona to Legnago has been traced between one of these canals and the course of the Adige-an arrangement which assures a free communication between the two places. It is easy to understand what security an army is in thus placed between two rivers and four strong places, not fearing to be turned in the north owing to the mountains, nor to the south on account of the marshes extending to the sea. It could march speedily on any menaced point, only accept battle when the chances appeared favourable, and could retire under the protection of the fortresses in the event of a check.

Here it was that the successes of Charles Albert stopped after the gleam of fortune produced by the capture of Peschiera, and he was at