JER, 第 1 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1996 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 11 筆
第 95 頁
... regulator will receive no support from the external institutions and will be unable to levy penalties . This value remains even if the firm's behavior and underlying characteristics are fully known to the regulator . However , when ...
... regulator will receive no support from the external institutions and will be unable to levy penalties . This value remains even if the firm's behavior and underlying characteristics are fully known to the regulator . However , when ...
第 96 頁
... regulator must enforce an environmental standard among a population of n identical firms . The regulator recognizes that firms ' choice of pollution above the standard will be influenced by monitoring and en- forcement policies ...
... regulator must enforce an environmental standard among a population of n identical firms . The regulator recognizes that firms ' choice of pollution above the standard will be influenced by monitoring and en- forcement policies ...
第 97 頁
... regulator : one to determine the firm's pollution level ( monitor- ing ) and one to bring about a penalty given that monitoring reading ( en- forcement ) . The regulator's choice of a monitoring probability will in general be firm ...
... regulator : one to determine the firm's pollution level ( monitor- ing ) and one to bring about a penalty given that monitoring reading ( en- forcement ) . The regulator's choice of a monitoring probability will in general be firm ...