JER, 第 1 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1996 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 26 筆
第 330 頁
... output of firm i as q , and the total industry output as Q. Then a firm i ( i = 1 , 2 , ... , n ) chooses optimal output in the following manner . max ( a - bQ - c1 ) qi.3 3 qi ( 1 ) The symmetric equilibrium output , profit of each ...
... output of firm i as q , and the total industry output as Q. Then a firm i ( i = 1 , 2 , ... , n ) chooses optimal output in the following manner . max ( a - bQ - c1 ) qi.3 3 qi ( 1 ) The symmetric equilibrium output , profit of each ...
第 331 頁
... output to maximize its profit . Therefore the problem of a non - RJV firm and an RJV firm can be stated as follows . max ( a - bQ - c1 ) 9i , qi max ( a - bQc2 ) ¶j , qj where i = 1 , 2 , , n − 2 , ( 3 ) ( 4 ) where j = n − 1 , n ...
... output to maximize its profit . Therefore the problem of a non - RJV firm and an RJV firm can be stated as follows . max ( a - bQ - c1 ) 9i , qi max ( a - bQc2 ) ¶j , qj where i = 1 , 2 , , n − 2 , ( 3 ) ( 4 ) where j = n − 1 , n ...
第 336 頁
... output in response to the output reduction of merging firms . Since output is the strategic substitute in Cournot competition , the expansion of output by outsiders has a negative effect on the profit of insiders . This kind of negative ...
... output in response to the output reduction of merging firms . Since output is the strategic substitute in Cournot competition , the expansion of output by outsiders has a negative effect on the profit of insiders . This kind of negative ...