JER, 第 1 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1996 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 58 筆
第 95 頁
... firm's behavior and underlying characteristics are fully known to the regulator . However , when there is asymmetric information , in that the firm knows more about its behavior and / of characteristics than the regulator does ...
... firm's behavior and underlying characteristics are fully known to the regulator . However , when there is asymmetric information , in that the firm knows more about its behavior and / of characteristics than the regulator does ...
第 331 頁
... firms ) compete in the product market while they cooperate in the R & D stage . With this change in cost structure , each firm chooses its output to maximize its profit . Therefore the problem of a non - RJV firm and an RJV firm can be ...
... firms ) compete in the product market while they cooperate in the R & D stage . With this change in cost structure , each firm chooses its output to maximize its profit . Therefore the problem of a non - RJV firm and an RJV firm can be ...
第 342 頁
... firm decreases and that of a merged firm increases due to the advantageous position of a merged firm . We get the change in the profit of merging firms by ( 2 ) and ( 29 ) .6 ΔΠ1 n - 1 = Π · n - 1 - ( In − 1 + IIn ) = [ ( n + 1 ) 2 ( n ...
... firm decreases and that of a merged firm increases due to the advantageous position of a merged firm . We get the change in the profit of merging firms by ( 2 ) and ( 29 ) .6 ΔΠ1 n - 1 = Π · n - 1 - ( In − 1 + IIn ) = [ ( n + 1 ) 2 ( n ...