JER, 第 1 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1996 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 19 筆
第 97 頁
... expenditure on monitor- ing in this simple case is therefore nM ( where n is the number of firms in the regulated population ) . Given identical firms , the regulator will find identical behavior from firms that face identical ...
... expenditure on monitor- ing in this simple case is therefore nM ( where n is the number of firms in the regulated population ) . Given identical firms , the regulator will find identical behavior from firms that face identical ...
第 101 頁
... expenditures fall . More expensive monitoring has the opposite effect . The parameter w has no effect on optimal ... expenditure , although overall resources devoted to enforcement will rise with increases in E as the regulator must ...
... expenditures fall . More expensive monitoring has the opposite effect . The parameter w has no effect on optimal ... expenditure , although overall resources devoted to enforcement will rise with increases in E as the regulator must ...
第 324 頁
... expenditure / sales IADV : industry advertising expenses / industry sales IR & D : industry R & D expenditure / industry sales of MULT for PCM also increases from 1.2 to 6.5 324 Big Customers , Selling Expenses and Profit Margin.
... expenditure / sales IADV : industry advertising expenses / industry sales IR & D : industry R & D expenditure / industry sales of MULT for PCM also increases from 1.2 to 6.5 324 Big Customers , Selling Expenses and Profit Margin.