JER, 第 1 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1996 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 65 筆
第 95 頁
... assume that Fx ( x , E ) > 0 . We assume Fxx ( x , E ) < 0 : larger violations bring increasingly se- vere penalties at the margin , holding regulatory effort equal . This structure gives both the firm and the regulator the power to ...
... assume that Fx ( x , E ) > 0 . We assume Fxx ( x , E ) < 0 : larger violations bring increasingly se- vere penalties at the margin , holding regulatory effort equal . This structure gives both the firm and the regulator the power to ...
第 256 頁
... assume that the innovations in et are assumed mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags , i.e. , the covariance matrix Σ and ( N × N ) coefficient matrices A¿ , i = 1 , 2 , ... , r , are diagonal . Further , the variance of 7 is ...
... assume that the innovations in et are assumed mutually uncorrelated at all leads and lags , i.e. , the covariance matrix Σ and ( N × N ) coefficient matrices A¿ , i = 1 , 2 , ... , r , are diagonal . Further , the variance of 7 is ...
第 330 頁
... Assume that initially there are n identical firms involved in Cournot competition . Each firm has a constant returns to scale ( CRS ) technol- ogy . Demand function is linear ; P = a - bQ ( P is a product price , Q is the total industry ...
... Assume that initially there are n identical firms involved in Cournot competition . Each firm has a constant returns to scale ( CRS ) technol- ogy . Demand function is linear ; P = a - bQ ( P is a product price , Q is the total industry ...