JER, 第 1 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1996 |
搜尋書籍內容
第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 23 筆
第 48 頁
... agent has direct control ; i . e . , the agent has a discretion as to how much resource to consume . The latter is the cost of resource over which the agent cannot exercise direct control , exam- ples being the cost of investment ...
... agent has direct control ; i . e . , the agent has a discretion as to how much resource to consume . The latter is the cost of resource over which the agent cannot exercise direct control , exam- ples being the cost of investment ...
第 50 頁
... agent ( irrespective of outcome level realized ) because this permits the principal to discourage the inefficient use of resource by the agent ' . One interesting result from Model 2 , however , is that cost allocation is desirable even ...
... agent ( irrespective of outcome level realized ) because this permits the principal to discourage the inefficient use of resource by the agent ' . One interesting result from Model 2 , however , is that cost allocation is desirable even ...
第 60 頁
... agent derives utility from perks . In essence , the principal prevents an inordinately inefficient use of resources by charging the agent the cost of the resources ( regardless of out- come ) . Another way of seeing that the principal's ...
... agent derives utility from perks . In essence , the principal prevents an inordinately inefficient use of resources by charging the agent the cost of the resources ( regardless of out- come ) . Another way of seeing that the principal's ...