 | William Cruise - 1818 - 624 頁
...for implication; but necessary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." 20. The first case in which a devise by implication was allowed, arose in 13 Hen. VII. A man devised... | |
 | Great Britain. Court of Chancery - 1818 - 608 頁
...for Implication : but necessary Implication means, not natural Necessity, but so strong a Probability of Intention, that an Intention contrary to that,...which is imputed to the Testator, cannot be supposed. I do not notice Earle v. Wihon (a) and all the other Cases ; as they only go to this ; that the Description... | |
 | Sir John Comyns - 1822 - 1042 頁
...for implication ; but necessary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator, cannot be supposed." 1 V. & B. 466. («) 1. It was formerly held, that a devise to a ttranger, after the death of the devisor's... | |
 | sir William Blackstone - 1825 - 626 頁
...for implication, but necessary implication means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." 1 V. & B. 466. Therefore if the devise were to a stranger after the death of the wife, the wife would... | |
 | Sir John Comyns - 1825 - 1026 頁
...implication ; but necessary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong; a proLability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator, canuot be supposed." 1 V. £ B. 466. (j/) I. It wns formerly held, that a devise to a stranger, after... | |
 | 1871 - 982 頁
...cases on the construction of instruments, means " not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." Then the question resolves itself into this, whether, having regard to the language of this will, guarding... | |
 | Great Britain. Court of Exchequer - 1832 - 818 頁
...implication, but "necessary implication'' means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed. Lord LYNDHURST CB — This question has arisen on the devise by the testator to his grandaughter Mary... | |
 | Great Britain. Court of Chancery, James Russell, James William Mylne - 1837 - 808 頁
...meaning," as Lord Eldon says in Wilkinson v. Adam (c) " not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." Mr. Bacon, for the representatives of James Gladman, the only legitimate child of Mary Gladman. The... | |
 | Alexander Mansfield Burrill - 1851 - 570 頁
...for implication, but necessary implication means not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that •which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed. Lord Eldon, C., 1 Ves. de B. 466. See 3 Paige's RI 1 Jarman on Wills, 465, (431, Perkins' ed.) et teg.... | |
 | Great Britain. Court of Chancery - 1854 - 650 頁
...Wilkinson v. Adam, Is, "necessary implication means, not natural necessity, but so strong a probability of intention, that an intention contrary to that which is imputed to the testator cannot be supposed." The phrases given in Wykham v. Wykham are, " probable necessity " and " an implication so probable... | |
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... necessary implication,' I will repeat what I have before stated from a note of Lord Hardwicke's judgment in Cotton v. Helyar (2 Cox Ch. 348), that, in construing a will, conjecture must not be taken for implication; but 'necessary implication' means... 
