1 CHAN.] BLEST V. BROWN. [CHAL the contract was signed, and consequently found in Brown and Moore an injunction to restrain Millar and the plt. from negotiating the said bill or interfering with their receiving the same, and the plt. afterwards consented to deliver up the bill to Brown and Moore, and to pay their costs of suit. They admitted that there was a debt of 717. 10s. 6d. due to them for flour supplied to Millar for the retail trade of his shop. They denied, to their information and belief, that such debt was concealed from the plt. They said they received no part of the sum due to Millar from the Government, other than the 7717. 58. 7 d. above mentioned, and they said that they believed that Millar ceased to carry on his business in consequence of the Government cancelling his contract, owing to his supplying bad bread. They did not dispute the right of the plt. to a transfer of all their securities on the payment to them Frederick Brown said, that when he and Mr of the full amount due to them from the deft. Millar, called at the plt.'s house on the 29th May the ph upon such securities, and they submitted and insisted said, "Well, I suppose you have come about the bas that the bond was not in equity wholly void in its con- Mr. Brown." To which the deponent answered, “Is. ception as against the plt., but valid and binding on here it is, will you read it over?" and handed it to him. him, and that the same, if not void ab initio, did not The plt. thereupon carefully and attentively read eve become void by their conduct. They admitted having the bond and condition, and then said, “Well, I he brought an action on the bond, and they submitted no objection to sign it." The deponent positively denied that the same had become forfeited at law by the neg- having said "No" to any such question as stated in the lect of the deft. Millar and of the plt. to pay them the bill, and said that the plt. never made any inquiry a moneys due to them for flour supplied as in the condi- the point. He further said that the plt.'s wife w tions to the bond mentioned, and that the plt. was not present during the whole interview, but that she liable for the sum of 500l. and interest. They sub-came in just as the plt. had finished reading the bond. mitted that the bill was a mere attempt to delay their action and ought to be dismissed with costs. He wholly denied that any representations wOTO TEACH by him to the plt. on behalf of Brown and More Mrs. Blest, by her evidence, and on cross-examinative, corroborated the statements made by her husband and Millar as to what took place at the interview. Mr. on cross-examination, when asked how he came not te tell his friend Mr. Blest that he then owed Brown and Moore something, replied, "I was perfectly content d Frederick Brown was." He was then asked why be supposed Mr. Blest asked the question. He replied "I suppose that he asked the question to see that everything was safe." He was then asked how it was he did not say that the conditions on which (as be said) Mr. Blest consented to sign did not exist. replied, "Because if I had told him what Frederick Brown and I knew, he would not have signed the bond." The deft. Millar, by his answer, said that after his tender had been accepted, he was surprised to hear from Frederick Brown that Brown and Moore would require a guarantee for payment. On the 30th May 1860 he (Millar) signed a memorandum of deposit with Brown and Moore of the lease of his business premises. Afterwards William Brown said, that with this security and a bond for 500l. he should be satisfied. A meeting took place at the Corn Exchange, and William Brown then read over the conditions of the Government contract. When he came to the 22nd condition, he (Brown) observed: "Well, this is not what we are going to supply you with. We are not going to supply you with white." And I replied, Well, if you supply No. 2 equal to the two sample sacks which I lately received, it would answer my pur- The defts. Brown and Moore wholly denied the conpose with a mixture of rice." And William Brown versation respecting adulteration on all occasions, and then said, "Oh, we must have nothing of that sort;" affirmed that Millar never ventured in the remotest or words to that effect. The deft. then described the manner to hint to William Brown any intention of interview with the plt. on the 29th May 1860. mixing or adulterating their flour, and that bad be Frederick Brown and he went to the plt.'s house to- done so he would have declined to enter into the agether, and there saw the plt. and his wife in the bar-rangement, knowing that the result would have been parlour. No one else, he believed, was in the room. The deft. then introduced Frederick Brown to the plt.. and observed that he called about the guarantee bond for the 500. After some conversation the plt. asked Frederick Brown, "How long has Millar dealt with you ?" Frederick Brown said, "About two years." The deft. then observed, "Ever since I have been in the baking business." The plt. then said to Frederick Brown, It is a great pity that an old friend should lose a good job like this for the want of a friend. You say he has dealt with you for two years. Does he owe you any money now?" or to that effect; and the said Frederick Brown then answered, "No." The plt. then said, "Well, upon that I will sign it;" or to that effect; and accordingly did so. The bond was not read over, and the plt. immediately left, being apparently in a great hurry. the cancelling of the contract and the loss of their money. They wholly denied having contracted with Millar on the terms of the Government conditions, because their contract was entered into in entire ignorance of the stipulations of the twelfth, or asy other condition, and that they were never produced or brought to their knowledge in any way. On the 21st March last an injunction was granted to restrain the proceedings at law on the bond on the terms of the plt. paying 500l. into court. And the cause having come on before Stuart, V. C., bis Honour granted the relief prayed by the plt.'s bill, and decreed that his execution of the bond should be cancelled: (see 5 L. T. Rep. N.S. 663.) The defts. Moore and Brown DOW appealed. Malins, Q. C. and Haig appeared for the plt. Bacon, Q. C. and Southgate for the defts. Browa and Moore. Nalder for the deft. Millar. The deft. further said that from the delay occasioned by the demand for securities on the part of Brown and Moore, he was greatly pressed to get the first batch of bread supplied to the barracks by the 1st June. The bread sent out on the 1st June was free from any admixture of rice. He did not obtain The LORD CHANCELLOR.-I have heard this case any rice to mix with the flour until about ten days after with a very considerable amount of pain, and that pais The following case was cited: Sumner v. Fovel, 2 Mer. 30. BLEST V. BROWN. rises from observing how the inevitable evils of itigation are augmented by the evil procedure in this ourt adopted for the purpose of trying issues of fact. have here a question which involves at the uttermost sum of 500%. The course that has been adopted ere will add to the losing party, or rather both paries, an amount of expenditure which, in all probability, vill very considerably exceed the subject-matter. Now, here are two questions to be determined in this case. One is a question of law, the other is an issue of fact. t is very probable that if those questions had been reviously considered, it would have turned out wholly innecessary to have tried the question of fact. The lt. is a surety for a baker, who entered into a contract vith the Government to supply a quantity of bread or the use of the troops at Woolwich. contracts are, with great propriety, very minute and Government ery specific. Carefully as they are worded, I am afraid they, in almost every case, are found ineffectual o save the Government from a considerable amount of mposition. In this particular case bread was to be supplied, and in order to insure that bread being of a given quality, minute stipulations are inserted in the contract with regard to the quality of the flour, the mode of dressing the flour, the extent to which the flour might be mixed with different qualities, and then, finally, the quality of the bread which was to result from the use of that flour, and in that shape to be supplied to the troops. The deft. Millar was the baker who entered into this contract. Previously to tendering for it he entered into an engagement with the other defts., who are cornfactors, to supply him with flour of a given quality. That engagement is contained in the letter which is dated the 7th May 1860. The contract was afterwards obtained by the deft. Millar, and having obtained the contract-or rather a promise of the contract, for the contract is dated on a subsequent day-he, in conformity with his engagement with the cornfactors, had to find a surety, and desired to obtain the guarantee of the plt., who appears to have been in a respectable position of life, and to have been a hotel-keeper somewhere in the neighbourhood where the deft. Millar had carried on his business. Now, an application is accordingly made to the plt. by Millar on several occasions anterior to the day when the bond was executed. It appears from the evidence, without much contro versy, that on several occasions of Millar's applications the plt. expressed his unwillingness to enter into the engagement of the suretyship. Millar, however, was pertinacious in his entreaty, and, finally, it appears that an engagement was made for the parties to attend the plt. at his house on a particular day, viz. the day when the bond was executed. Unfortunately the point which arises in the contest is a question upon which there is great contradiction in the evidence, viz. what passed upon the occasion of that interview. The first head of equity made by the plt. is, that an erroneous statement with regard to the condition of "Millar was made by the admitted agent of the defts., the cornfactors, to him (the plt.) upon the occasion of the execution of the bond. The representation is alleged to have been this: that at that time Millar, the baker, was not indebted in anything to the defts. That is sworn to by the plt.; it is sworn to by his wife, and is, if it be necessary to notice such an oath, also sworn to by the deft. Millar. On the other hand, it is most distinctly contradicted by the agent, Mr. Frederick Brown, and a great number of arguments have been with great propriety presented to me in order to show that there was no inducement for the defts. to obtain this contract, that they would have been better without the contract, and that there was nothing to instigate them to use any kind of representation to prevail upon the plt. to enter into the contract. I am myself individually satisfied of the honesty of the defts.; I am also satisfied that their witness is a witness who comes to state what [CHAN. he believes to be true. help stating that the representation made to me on the On the other hand, I cannot part of the plt., and the representation on the part of his wife, are so consistent, notwithstanding the discrepancy which has been pointed out, but which rather corroborates the general agreement, and gives reason for believing the testimony-for, as it has been frequently observed, you must expect in accounts some slight difference in the narrative-I say, looking at this circumstance, I cannot refuse to give credit to the representation made by the plt., and also to the statement in confirmation of it by the wife. Well, but then in what manner am I to reconcile these apparently contradictory conclusions? I think the mode of recona satisfactory manner. I believe it to be perfectly true ciling them has been shown by the bar, and shown in that, at the time this question was put, Millar was not a defaulter in respect of his payments, and in that sense was represented as not being indebted to the cornfactors. I think the ordinary notion of debt would be something due and owing, and which ought to have been paid. In that sense I think Mr. Frederick Brown correctly represented that Millar was not to be regarded as indebted in any sum of money that had become payable and ought to have been paid. But, attribute a meaning to the plt. in the question which I on the other hand, I have no reason or any right to. believe him to have put different from the meaning which the words according to their ordinary and prima facie signification bear. Millar in the ordinary dealing was indebted at that Therefore, it being true that time to the defts., though probably according to the course of dealing that sum of money could not be regarded as an erroneous statement, though not an untruthful a debt in arrear, I must hold that statement, that is, not a wilful false statement, was the substance of the answer made by Brown to the plt. Now that would not be a satisfactory conclusion upon which to rest my judgment but for the other grounds, but I think the most valid, and if I may use the expression the most satisfactory, ground is, that which is derived from the language of the bond and the admitted undisputed fact of what was done by the defts. The language of the bond must be taken as the representation made by the cornfactors to the pit. in their request to him to become a surety, and the language of the bond states (I treat it as what is the representation made to the plt. Blest by the cornfactors Brown and Moore) that Millar, the baker, had applied to them to supply him with flour to enable him to carry out his Government contract, which Brownand Moore had agreed to do. plainly translated, are these: "Mr. Millar has a GovernNow those words, when ment contract requiring certain flour. gaged to supply him with that flour." The very reWe have enpresentation involves an admission by Brown and Moore that they knew the nature of the contract and that they had engaged to supply Millar with the flour which that contract required. Then I have got in the affidavit of Brown and Moore a clear and definite admission that they did not supply Millar with the flour which that contract required. They state a reason, which is a justification, we may say, in morality or in fact, but which is no justification in the legal point of view in which I am considering this case. They say, not know the particular stipulations of that contract. We "We did supplied the flour that Millar required, and in that sense we used the words." I have already observed in the course of the argument that, as between them and Millar, that was correct enough; but that, when they a surety, they were bound to know what was the come with a representation to a third person to become subject about which they undertook to make a representation; and it is impossible that I can listen to the statement that they were ignorant of the terms of this, contract. I must, therefore, in this court, hold them to have known what the Government had required; and I must hold them, at the same time, to have been conscious that their engagement with Millar was not in conformity with the stipulations of that Government contract. Now, it must always be recollected in what manner a surety is bound. You bind him to the letter of his engagement. Beyond the proper interpretation of that engagement you have no hold upon him. He receives no benefit and no consideration. He is bound, therefore, merely according to the proper meaning and effect of the written engagement that he has entered into. If that written engagement is altered in a single line, no matter whether it be altered for his benefit, no matter whether the alteration be innocently made, he has a right to say, "The contract is no longer that for which I engaged to be the surety. You have put an end to the contract that I guaranteed, and my obligation therefore is at an end." Now, I construe this engagement to be an engagement to be answerable for flour supplied in conformity with the requisitions of this contract. Then I ask, de facto, was any flour supplied to Millar in conformity with the requisitions of the contract? The answer of the defts. themselves is an admission that none such was supplied. The conclusion is plain, therefore, that no legal obligation, as far as the surety is concerned, arises upon what has been done under this contract so construed, as I must necessary hold it proper to be construed, as involving the representation that I have stated. Now, it is a lamentable thing that there was no mode of deciding this case upon that point, where there would have been no controversy and no discussion of fact without the parties leing involved in such a number of contra lictions upon matters of fact which I find arising upon this record. I regret extremely to hear of the nanner in which the examination, have been conducted. I regret extremely to find that when this bill was amended one thing was done, and one thing was not done. That one thing that was done was, without the smallest justification at all, to insert in this record a most scandalous libel upon the defts., for without the smallest warrant they are here charged with having conspired with Millar to cheat the Government, and not only having conspired to do so by supplying him with corn to be mixed with another ingredient for the purpose of cheating the Government, but the wickedness of the allegation is carried even to this-that in order to ascertain how they could best and most effectually cheat the Government, they previously sent to Millar a certain quantity of material to enable Millar to try experiments with a view to such evasion of the printed terms of the contract. There is not the smallest justification, nor any attempt at justification, of those allegations. I wish I could manifest in a stronger sense what I hold it my judicial duty to express, the bounden obligation on all parties concerned with pleadings to abstain from imputations of this nature, unless they are manifestly required by the case, and most fully, not only legally, but morally, justified by the evidence which they have in their. power to produce. I shall therefore, upon this part of the case, order the plt. to pay every portion of costs incurred by the defts. by reason of that charge. But it does not rest here. Independently of the two allegations upon which my judgment in favour of the plt. is rested, there is another allegation contained in the seventh paragraph which also fails in point of fact. That is, in itself, not an allegation open to any observation as to its impropriety, and I mark it only as an allegation not sustained by the evidence. There is also another allegation in the ninth and another in the tenth, which are of the same character with the allegations in the seventh. Now I am extremely desirous to mitigate as far as I can the evil which results from [CHAN the present unfortunate mode of taking evidence a this court. I do not know how it can be mitigatel until we can agree upon an altered mode of procedure, except by every judge strictly examining the evidence and making the party pay the consequence of an 2founded and unsupported litigation. I shall thereft direct that all the costs occasioned by the evid taken under the seventh, ninth and tenth par graphs shall be paid by the plts., all the costs in point of evidence and otherwise. Upon the rest of the cast I affirm the judgment of the V.C., and I m therefore give the plt. the costs of suit, subject to the deduction of those costs which I have directed tat he shall pay. The order, therefore, that I make wi be this:-Upon the appeal, having regard to the alteration that I have made, and above all to the reasons fr that alteration in the remarks I have been obliged to make upon the twelfth paragraph. I shall give o costs. The app. will take back his deposit. I vary the decree by directing, as I have already said, that all the costs of and occasioned by the seveda paragraph, the ninth paragraph, the tenth paragrapė, and the twelfth paragraph, and of and occasioned by the evidence taken thereunder, shall be paid to the defts. Brown and Moore by the plt. The decree of the V. C. will be affirmed, which will give the pit as against Brown and Moore the costs of the rest of the suit. Nothing was, I think, said or done with regard to the costs of Millar. He must, of course, bear his own costs of the suit. Solicitors for the pit., Perry, agent for Richard Pidcock, Woolwich; for the defts. Brown: nd Moore, Atkins, Andrew, Atkins, and Irvine; for the deft, Millar, Joseph Perry. Monday, March 17. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) HUME v. RICHARDSON. Trustees-Direction to sell and invest—Investment— Bank and East India Stock-22 & 23 Viet c 35, s. 32-23 of 24 l'ict. c. 38, ss. 11 and 12. The testator gave his real and personal estate to trustees upon trust to convert into money and to invest in the Funds, and to hold the same upes trust to lay out the same in the purchase of lank as occasion might offer, and to hold the lands to the use of his sister C. A., for her life, and after her decease to her first and other sons successively end their sons in tail male; and he directed that sud such purchase of lands could be effected the trus ees should pay all the annual proceeds of his residuary estale to the person or persons who would be entit el to the possession or enjoyment of the real estates to be purchased. The testator died in 1858, possessed of very large property, amongst which were cus siderable sums of English and Irish Bank Stock, and of East India Stock, almost the whole of which comtinued upon the same investments when the stat. 22 § 23 Vict. passed. By the 32nd section of that Ach, trustees not expressly forbidden to do so mey invest their trust funds upon English Irish Bunk Stock or East India Stock; and at the request of the two first tenants for life the trustees forbore to convert more than they had then already converted The Act 23 & 24 Vid. c. 38, then passed, making it lawful for trusties to invest trust-funds upon any of the securites which might be approved in any general order of the court, and the 32nd section of the former statute was made retrospective. General crders were made in England and Ireland, under which cash under the control of the court might be invested (inter alia) in Bank and East India Stock. The trustees had allowed to the first tenant for life C. A. only so much income as would have bes produced if the Bank and East India Stock had P Bultfeley &. Hephens 10 £5.ns 226. VG.S. CHAN.] HUME v. RICHARDSON. [CHAN been converted into Consols a year after testator's | ceased, for the term of her natural life, without death, and they had therefore considerable accumu-impeachment of waste; and after her decease to the lations; these were claimed by C. A., and also adversely to her by the remaindermen. She also claimed the full income in future. C. A. and the next in succession also insisted that the trustees should treat the Bank and East India Stock as proper interim investments, and should continue that investment till lands could be bought. The trustees declined to act except with the sanction of the court, and a special case was filed and now argued : Held, that the Bank and East India Stock ought to be continued as invested until lands could be found: That any moneys arising from existing investments or otherwise, as part of the residuary estate, might be invested in Bank or East India Stock, as interim investments: That C. A. was entitled to the whole income, since the passing of the Act 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38; and that she and the successive tenants for life will be entitled to the whole of such income in future: That, for the period between the testator's death and the passing of the Act, C. A. was entitled only to so much income as the Bank and East India Stock, if converted into Consols on the former day, would hare produced. This was a special case for the opinion of the court, which, at the request of all parties, their Lordships consented to hear, in the first instance, as an original matter. The following are the circumstances: use of my nephew William Wentworth Fitzwilliam Hame, the eldest son of the said William and Charlotte Anna Hume, for his life, without impeachment of waste; and after his decease to the use of his sons successively; according to their respective seniorities, in tail male; and for default of such issue to the use of my nephew Quintin Dick Hume, the second son of the said William and Charlotte Anna Hume, for his life, without impeachment of waste, and after his decease to the use of his sons successively, according to their respective seniorities in tail male;" with divers remainders, in default of such issue, to the other sons of the said William and Charlotte Aana Hume, and their sons, with divers remainders over as in the will appears. And he then proceeded thus: "And I hereby order and direct, and it is my will and meaning, that until such time as my said residuary estate shall be so laid out in the purchase of freehold estates of inheritance as hereinbefore is directed, they, the trustees for the time being of this my will, do and shall pay, apply and dispose of all interest, dividends and annual produce arising from my said residuary estate, or from such parts thereof as shall not be so laid out in such purchase as aforesaid, to and for the use of such person and persons as shall from time to time be entitled according to the limitations aforesaid to the possession or enjoyment of such real estates as are so directed to be purchased, it being my intention and meaning that my said trustees shall hold my said residuary estate until the same shall be so invested in such purchase as aforesaid; and after any such purchase that they shall invested in trust for, and to and for the use and benefit of such person and persons, and for such and the like estates and interests as he or they would be entitled to in the hereditaments hereby directed to be purchased, or as near thereto as the law in that case will allow and permit; and that they my said trustees shall in the meantime pay over and apply the interest, dividends and annual proceeds of my said residuary estate according to the said limitations." Mr. Quintin Dick afterwards made a codicil to his will, which was dated the 20th July 1854, whereby he substituted Acheson Thompson, Sir Richard Rollinson Vipyan, Bart., William Jones Westby and Richard Penruddocke Long, as executors and trustees, in the place of Mr. William Needham Thompson and Mr. George Carr, who were then dead. The codicil did not affect the foregoing limitations of the will. The testator died on the 26th March 1858; Sir R. R. Vipyan and Mr. Tickell renounced probate, and the will and codicil were proved by the other persons appointed by him, who were the five first-named defts. in the special case. The late Mr. Quintin Dick, of Curzon-street, Mayfair, duly made his will, which bore date the 30th Aug. 1844; and thereby he appointed William Need-hold the residue thereof (if any) which shall not be so ham Thompson, of Newry, in the County of Down, Esq., Edward Tickell, one of her Majesty's Counsel, George Carr, of Dublin, Esq., Thomas Richardson, also of Dublin, merchant, and William Matthew Coulthurst, executors and trustees thereof. He then gave, devised and bequeathed all his estate and effects, real and personal, whatsoever and wheresoever, unto his said executors and trustees, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, according to the respective natures thereof, upon the trusts thus expressed: "Upon trust to cause a schedule or inventory to be made of all my plate, books, pictures and jewels, and permit such articles to be used and enjoyed by the person or persons for the time being entitled to the dividends, interest, or annual produce of my residuary estate under the limitations thereinafter contained. And I direct my said executors and trustees, and the trustees for the time being of this my will, to convert such remaining part of my residuary real and personal estate as should not consist of money, or securities for money in Government securities, into money, and to invest the same in the public stocks or funds of Great Britain in their names, and to stand possessed of the same and The plts. were the two first tenants for life under of all other my residuary estate, upon trust, by and the limitations of the will, viz., Mrs. Charlotte Anna with the consent, approbation and concurrence in Hume and William Wentworth Fitzwilliam Hume, of writing of such person or persons as shall from time to whom the latter has never had any male issue. The time be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the in-third tenant for life, Quintin Dick Hume, one of the terest, dividends and annual produce of my said residuary estate, according to the limitations thereinafter mentioned, to lay out and invest the same residuary estate, or such part or parts thereof as they may deem eligible or convenient, in the purchase of freehold lands of inheritance situated in Ireland, to be made either wholly in one purchase, or at several times in several purchases, as occasion may offer, the said estate and lands to be vested in my said executors and trustees, or in the trustees for the time being of this my will, and their heirs and assigns, upon the trusts, intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned, expressed and declared of and concerning the same, that is to say; to the use of my only sister, Charlotte Anna Hume, the widow of William Hume, Esq., de defts., has had three sons only, all still under age and unmarried, and all born in the lifetime of the testator. George Ponsonby Hume, the fourth tenant for life, was made a deft., and the other persons entitled in remainder were also represented before the court. The special case then stated that at the time of the testator's death a part of his personal estate consisted of the following particulars, viz. :— Stock of the Bank of England...... £50,000 Ditto New Three per Cents...................... 100,000; That the trustees were advised that, having regard | to the terms of the will, it was their duty to proceed with reasonable dispatch to sell the English and Irish Bank Stock and the East India Stock, and by way of interim investment, and until they could purchase land according to the scheme of the will, to invest the proceeds in some of the securities pointed out by the will, and that in the meantime they ought not to pay to the said Charlotte Anna Hume, in respect of the three first-mentioned investments, a greater amount of income than she could have received if the stocks in question had been sold within a year after the testator's death, and the proceeds invested in the purchase of Three per Cent. Bank Annuities. That the trustees had acted on such advice so far as regards the payments made by them to Charlotte Anna Hume, but they were obliged to use great caution in bringing into the market the large amounts of English and Irish Bank Stock and East India Stock belonging to the testator's estate, and they had, in fact, sold no part of the Bank Stock, and only 20007. of the East India Stock, when the statute 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, was passed. The special case then stated the 32nd section of that statute to the following effect:-"Where a trustee, executor, or administrator shall not by some instrument creating his trusts be expressly forbidden to invest any trust-fund on real securities in any part of the United Kingdom, or on the stock of the Bank of England or Ireland, or on East India Stock, it shall be lawful for such trustee, executor, or administrator to invest such trust-funds on such securities or stock, and he shall not be liable on that account as for a breach of trust, provided that such investment shall in other respects be reasonable and proper." That on the passing of this statute the plts. requested the trustees to refrain from making any further sales of the three stocks in question, and the trustees have not made any further sales. CHAX income received by them from the English and I Bank Stock and the East India Stock in excess of the income allowed by them to Charlotte Anna He upon the principle herein before stated, and that the plts. had requested the trustees to treat the Ecgill and Irish Bank Stock and the remaining East Inda Stock as proper interim investments of the testator's estate, and to relinquish all attempts to convert the same until the opportunity arrived for effecting the purchase of land, and the plt. Charlotte Anna Ha had requested the trustees to pay over to her the sil accumulations of income now in their hands, and fær the future to allow her to receive the full income of the English and Irish Bank Stock and the East Indi Stock. The trustees are willing so to act if advised by the court that such a course was lawful. The questions put by the special case were these:1. Under the circumstances above stated in this case are the trustees justified in retaining the are said sums of English and Irish Bank Stock and Eat India Stock, or any and which of them, by way interim investment of the personal estate of Quat Dick until proper purchases of land can be effectes, or how else ought those stocks to be dealt with? 2. If the stocks in question or any of them t retained, should the whole of the future income be paid to the successive tenants for life, or how ele should such future income be dealt with? 3. Is the plt. Charlotte Anna Hume entitled to the accumulations of income now in the hands of the trustees, or how else are such accumulations to be dealt with? 4. Will the trustees be justified in investing in English or Irish Bank Stock, or in East India Stock, any sums of cash that may come to their hands by tia sale of existing investments, and which may require interim investment until proper purchases of land can be found? 5. Ought the costs of and incident to the decisin of this case to come out of the capital of the testater's estate, or how else ought such costs to be provided far. Rolt, Q.C. and H. F. Bristowe for the plts. Sir H. Cairns, Q.C. and Hobhouse for the trustees. G. Lake Russell for the remaindermen. Rolt, Q.C. was heard in reply. That by the statute 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38, after empowering the Lord Chancellors of England and Ireland to make general orders respecting the investment of cash under the control of their respective courts, it was enacted by sect. 11 that when any such general order as aforesaid shall have been made, The following cases were cited:-Under the 1st it shall be lawful for trustees, executors, or adminis- Act, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 (Royal assent 13th Ang trators having power to invest their trust-funds upon 1859), Re Miles' Will, 27 Beav. 579; s. c. 1 L. T. Government securities or upon parliamentary stock, Rep. N. S. 122; Re Fromow's Estate, 8 W. R. 272; funds, or securities, or any of them, to invest such Dodson v. Sammell, 8 W. R. 252; s. c. 1 L. T. Rep. trust-funds or any part of them on any of the N. S. 429; Re Simpson's Trusts, 1 John. & Hem. 89 ; stocks, funds, or securities in and upon which by such | Re Colne Valley and Halstead Railway, 1 John. 528, general order, cash under the control of the court may from time to time be invested. That by sect. 12 of the same statute it is provided that the said enactment of the preceding session of Parliament shall operate retrospectively. That by a general order of the High Court of Ch. of England, which was promulgated on the 1st day of Feb. 1861, it was ordered as follows: "Cash under the control of the court may be invested in Bank Stock, East India Stock, Exchequer-bills, and Two-and-a-Half per Cent. Annuities, and upon mortgage of freehold and copyhold estates respectively in England and Wales, as well as in Consolidated Three per Cent. Annuities, Reduced Three per Cent. Annuities, and New Three per Cent. Annuities." And by a general order of the Court of Ch. of Ireland, which was promulgated on the 24th May 1861, it was ordered that cash under the control of the said court might be invested in Bank of Ireland Stock, and upon mortgage of freehold and copyhold estates in Ireland respectively, as well as in Government New Three per Cent. Stock and Consolidated Three per Cent. Stock. s. c. on app. I De G. Fis. & Jon. 53; 1 L. T. Rep. N. S. 20 under the 2nd Act, 23 & 24 Vict. c. 38 (Royal assent 23rd July 1860), Equitable Reversion ary Interest Society v. Fuller, 1 John. & Hem. 379; s. c. 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 50; Bishop v. Bishop, 9 W. R. 549; s. c. 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 350; Cohen T. Waley, 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 436; Cockburn Y Peel, 9 W. R. 725; s. c. 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 571. As to the amount of income to be paid to the tenant for life:-Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195; Gibson Bott, 7 Ves. 89; Angerstein v. Martin, Turn. & Russ. 232; Hewitt v. Morris, Turn. & Russ. 241; Douglas v. Congreve, 1 Keen, 410; Taylor v. Clarke, 1 Hare, 161; Caldecott v. Caldecott, 1 You. & Col 312; Mills v. Mills, 7 Sim. 501. Lord Justice TURNER said:-I cannot entertain much doubt on any of these questions. The first, second and fourth questions seem to me to depend on precisely the same point, whether the trustees are jus tified in retaining these sums in English and Irish Bank Stock and East India Stock; how the dividends are to be applied; and how they may invest any other part of the estate? siderable sums of money accumulated in respect of the plain, on the last statute (23 & 24 Vict.), that the It seems to me to be perfectly That the trustees have now in their hands con |