STONE, C. J., dissenting. 320 U.S. scribed qualifications have no existence in fact, it may be cancelled by suit." Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568, 578. Congress has not seen fit to interpose any statute of limitations. And there is no suggestion that the Government was derelict in not bringing the suit earlier or that petitioner has been prejudiced by delay. Hence the issue before us is whether petitioner, when naturalized, satisfied the statutory requirements. It is the same issue as would be presented by an appeal from a judgment granting or denying naturalization upon the evidence here presented, although it may be assumed that in this proceeding the burden of proof rests on the Government, which has brought the suit, to establish petitioner's want of qualifications. We need not stop to consider whether petitioner's failure, in his naturalization proceeding, to disclose facts which could have resulted in a denial of his application, constituted fraud within the meaning of the statute. For present purposes it is enough that the evidence supports the conclusion of the courts below as to petitioner's want of attachment to the principles of the Constitution, and, that § 15 has, ever since its enactment in 1906, been construed by this Court as requiring certificates of citizenship to be cancelled as illegally procured whenever the court finds on evidence that at the time of naturalization the applicant did not in fact satisfy the statutory prerequisites. To meet the exigencies of this case, it is now for the first time proposed by the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas that a new construction be given to the statute which would preclude any inquiry concerning the fact of petitioner's attachment to the Constitution. It is said that in a § 15 proceeding the only inquiry permitted, apart from fraud, is as to the regularity of the naturalization proceedings on their face; that--however 118 STONE, C. J., dissenting. much petitioner fell short of meeting the statutory requirements for citizenship-if he filed, as he did, pro forma affidavits of two persons, barely stating that he met the statutory requirements of residence, moral character and attachment to the Constitution, and if the court on the basis of the affidavits made the requisite findings and order, then all further inquiry is foreclosed. To this easy proposal for the emasculation of the statute there are several plain and obvious answers. Section 15 authorizes and directs the Government to institute the suit to cancel the certificate of naturalization on the ground of fraud or on the ground that the certificate was illegally procured. Until now it has never been thought that a certificate of citizenship procured by one who has not satisfied the statutory conditions for citizenship, is nevertheless lawfully procured. But the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas suggests that, for purposes of § 15, "attachment to the principles of the Constitution" is not a condition of becoming a citizen. It suggests that the statute is satisfied, even though the applicant was never in fact attached to the principles of the Constitution, so long as such attachment was made to appear, from pro forma affidavits, to the satisfaction of the naturalization court. This is said to be the case regardless of whether in fact the affidavits, and the certificate of citizenship based on them, are wholly mistaken, and despite the fact that the naturalization proceeding, as apparently it was here, is an ex parte proceeding in which the Government is not represented. It would seem passing strange that Congress-which authorized cancellation of citizenship under § 15 for failure to hold the naturalization hearing in open court instead of in the judge's chambers (United States v. Ginsberg, supra), or for failure to present the requisite certificate of arrival in this country (Maney v. United States, 552826-44--16 STONE, C. J., dissenting. 320 U.S. supra)—should be thought less concerned with the applicant's attachment to the principles of the Constitution and that he be well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. For what could be more important in the selection of citizens of the United States than that the prospective citizen be attached to the principles of the Constitution? Moreover, if in the absence of fraud the finding of the naturalization court in this case is final and hence beyond the reach of a § 15 proceeding, it would be equally final in the case of a finding, contrary to the actual fact, that the applicant had been for five years a continuous resident in the United States, since that requirement too is set forth in the sentence of § 4 which provides that "it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court." Yet it is settled that a certificate of citizenship based on a mistaken finding of five years residence is subject to revocation. United States v. Ginsberg, supra. And in Schwinn v. United States, supra, it appeared, from extrinsic evidence first offered in a § 15 proceeding, that the witnesses at the naturalization hearing had been mistaken as to the length of time they had known the applicant, and that for a part of the five-year period no witness had been produced with actual knowledge of the applicant's residence or qualifications. We held, without dissent, 311 U. S. 616, "that the certificate of citizenship was illegally procured," and for that reason we affirmed a judgment cancelling it. If we are to give effect to the language and purpose of Congress, it would seem that we must reach the same result in the case of the naturalization court's mistaken or unwarranted finding of attachment to the principles of the Constitution, even though 2 The district court's decision was based on both fraud and illegality. The circuit court of appeals relied upon fraud alone, 112 F. 2d 74, but our affirmance was rested "on the sole ground" of illegality. 118 STONE, C. J., dissenting. the conduct of the applicant and his witnesses at the naturalization hearing fell short of perjury. The purpose of § 15-like that of § 11, which authorizes the Government to appear in a naturalization proceeding to contest the application-is not merely to insure the formal regularity of the proceeding, but to protect the United States from the injury which would result from the acceptance as citizens of any who are not lawfully entitled to become citizens. Congress left the naturalization proceeding simple and inexpensive, by permitting it ordinarily to be conducted ex parte. Thus approximately 200,000 certificates of naturalization were issued during the year in which petitioner became a citizen. Annual Report of the Secretary of Labor, 1940, p. 115. But by § 15 Congress afforded the Government an independent opportunity to inquire into any naturalization if upon later scrutiny it appeared that the certificate of citizenship had not been lawfully procured. As the Court declared in United States v. Ness, supra, 327, "§ 11 and § 15 were designed to afford cumulative protection against fraudulent or illegal naturalization." All this was made abundantly clear by decisions of this Court more than twenty-five years ago. See Johannessen v. United States, supra; Luria v. United States, supra; United States v. Ginsberg, supra; United States v. Ness, supra, 325–27. In the intervening years Congress has often revised the naturalization laws, but it has not thought it appropriate to modify this Court's interpretation of the function of § 15 in the naturalization procedure. This is persuasive that the interpretation of § 15 now proposed defies the purpose and will of Congress. It is inconceivable that Congress should have intended that a naturalized citizen's attachment to the principles of the Constitution-the most fundamental requirement for citizenship—should be the one issue which, in the absence STONE, C. J., dissenting. 320 U.S. of fraud, the Government is foreclosed from examining. To limit the Government to proof of fraud in such cases is to read "illegality" out of the statute in every instance where an alien demonstrably not attached to the principles of the Constitution has procured a certificate of citizenship. Even if we were to recast an Act of Congress in accordance with our own notions of policy, it would be difficult to discover any considerations warranting the adoption of a device whose only effect would be to make certain that persons never entitled to the benefits of citizenship could secure and retain them. That could not have been the object of Congress in enacting § 15. As we are not here considering whether petitioner's certificate of naturalization was procured by fraud, there is no occasion, and indeed no justification, for importing into this case the rule, derived from land fraud cases, that fraud, which involves personal moral obliquity, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The issue is not whether petitioner committed a crime but whether he should be permitted to enjoy citizenship when he has never satisfied the basic conditions which Congress required for the grant of that privilege. We are concerned only with the question whether petitioner's qualifications were so lacking that he was not lawfully entitled to the privilege of citizenship which he has procured. There is nothing in § 15, nor in any of our numerous decisions under it, to suggest that such an issue is to be tried as fraud is tried, or that it is not to be resolved, as are other cases, by the weight of evidence. No plausible reason has been advanced why it should not be. But the point need not be labored, for no matter how it is determined it can give no aid or comfort to petitioner. The evidence in this case to which I shall refer and on which the courts below were entitled to rely is clear, not speculative; and since petitioner himself has not challenged it, the trial court was |