118 RUTLEDGE, J., concurring. when squarely faced, within its authority. To say therefore that the trial court's function in this case is the same as was that of the admitting court is to ignore the vast difference between overturning a judgment, with its adjudicated facts, and deciding initially upon facts which have not been adjudged. The argument made from the deportation statutes likewise ignores this difference. It is no answer to say that Congress provided for the redetermination as a part of the statute conferring the right to admission and therefore as a condition of it. For that too ignores the question whether Congress can so condition the judgment and is but another way of saying that a determination, made by an exercise of judicial power under Article III, can be conditioned by legislative mandate so as not to determine finally any ultimate fact in issue. The effect of cancellation is to nullify the judgment of admission. If it is a judgment, and no one disputes that it is, that quality in itself requires the burden of proof the court has held that Congress intended in order to overturn it. That it is a judgment, and one of at least a coördinate court, which the cancellation proceeding attacks and seeks to overthrow, requires this much at least, that solemn decrees may not be lightly overturned and that citizens may not be deprived of their status merely because one judge views their political and other beliefs with a more critical eye or a different slant, however honestly and sincerely, than another. Beyond this we need not go now in decision. But we do not go beyond our function or usurp another tribunal's when we go this far. 7 Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40; Gordon v. United States, 2 Wall. 561; Id., 117 U. S. 697; United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477; Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cls. 447; 76 Ct. Cls. 334; Ex parte Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co., 285 U. S. 526. STONE, C. J., dissenting. 320 U.S. The danger, implicit in finding too easily the purpose of Congress to denaturalize Communists, is that by doing so the status of all or many other naturalized citizens may be put in jeopardy. The other and underlying questions need not be determined unless or until necessity compels it. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, dissenting: The two courts below have found that petitioner, at the time he was naturalized, belonged to Communist Party organizations which were opposed to the principles of the Constitution, and which advised, advocated and taught the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. They have found that petitioner believed in and supported the principles of those organizations. They have found also that petitioner "was not, at the time of his naturalization . . ., and during the period of five years immediately preceding the filing of his petition for naturalization had not behaved as, a person attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same." I think these findings are abundantly supported by the evidence, and hence that it is not within our judicial competence to set them aside-even though, sitting as trial judges, we might have made some other finding. The judgment below, cancelling petitioner's citizenship on the ground that it was illegally obtained, should therefore be affirmed. The finality which attaches to the trial court's determinations of fact from evidence heard in open court, and which ordinarily saves them from an appellate court's intermeddling, should not be remembered in every case save this one alone. It is important to emphasize that the question for decision is much simpler than it has been made to appear. It is whether petitioner, in securing his citizenship by naturalization, has fulfilled a condition which Congress 118 STONE, C. J., dissenting. 1 has imposed on every applicant for naturalization—that during the five years preceding his application "he has behaved as a man . attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same." Decision whether he was lawfully entitled to the citizenship which he procured, and consequently whether he is now entitled to retain it, must turn on the existence of his attachment to the principles of the Constitution when he applied for citizenship, and that must be inferred by the trier of fact from his conduct during the five-year period. We must decide not whether the district court was compelled to find want of attachment, but whether the record warrants such a finding. The question then is not of petitioner's opinions or beliefs-save as they may have influenced or may explain his conduct showing attachment, or want of it, to the principles of the Constitution. It is not a question of freedom of thought, of speech or of opinion, or of present imminent danger to the United States from our acceptance as citizens of those who are not attached to the principles of our form of government. The case obviously has nothing to do with our relations with Russia, where petitioner 1 1 By § 4 of the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 598, it is provided: "Fourth. It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to citizenship that immediately preceding the date of his application he has resided continuously within the United States. five years at least, and within the State or Territory where such court is at the time held one year at least, and that during that time he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. In addition to the oath of the applicant, the testimony of at least two witnesses, citizens of the United States, as to the facts of residence, moral character, and attachment to the principles of the Constitution shall be required, and the name, place of residence, and occupation of each witness shall be set forth in the record." STONE, C. J., dissenting. 320 U.S. was born, or with our past or present views of the Russian political or social system. The United States has the same interest as other nations in demanding of those who seek its citizenship some measure of attachment to its institutions. Our concern is only that the declared will of Congress shall prevail-that no man shall become a citizen or retain his citizenship whose behavior for five years before his application does not show attachment to the principles of the Constitution. The Constitution has conferred on Congress the exclusive authority to prescribe uniform rules governing naturalization. Article I, § 8, cl. 4. Congress has exercised that power by prescribing the conditions, in conformity to which aliens may obtain the privilege of citizenship. Under the laws and Constitution of the United States, no person is given any right to demand citizenship, save upon compliance with those conditions. "An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare." United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472, 474. And whenever a person's right to citizenship is drawn in question, it is the judge's duty loyally to see to it that those conditions have not been disregarded. The present suit by the United States, to cancel petitioner's previously granted certificate of citizenship, was brought pursuant to an Act of Congress (§ 15 of the Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 601), enacted long prior to petitioner's naturalization. Section 15 authorizes any court by a suit instituted by the United States Attorney to set aside a certificate of naturalization "on the ground of fraud or on the ground that such certificate of citizenship was illegally procured." Until now this Court, with 118 STONE, C. J., dissenting. out a dissenting voice, has many times held that in a suit under this statute it is the duty of the court to render a judgment cancelling the certificate of naturalization if the court finds upon evidence that the applicant did not satisfy the conditions which Congress had made prerequisite to the award of citizenship. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227; Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. 9; Maibaum v. United States, 232 U. S. 714; United States v. Ginsberg, 243 U. S. 472; United States v. Ness, 245 U. S. 319; Maney v. United States, 278 U. S. 17, 23; Schwinn v. United States, 311 U. S. 616. Provision for such a review of the judgment awarding citizenship is within the legislative power of Congress and plainly is subject to no constitutional infirmity, Johannessen v. United States, supra, 236-40, especially where, as here, the statute antedated petitioner's citizenship and the review was thus a condition of its award. Luria v. United States, supra, 24. Our decisions have uniformly recognized that Congress, which has power to deny citizenship to aliens altogether, may safeguard the grant of this privilege, precious to the individual and vital to the country's welfare, by such procedure for determining the existence of indispensable requisites to citizenship as has been established in § 15. "No alien has the slightest right to naturalization unless all statutory requirements are complied with; and every certificate of citizenship must be treated as granted upon condition that the Government may challenge it as provided in § 15 and demand its cancellation unless issued in accordance with such requirements. If procured when prescribed qualifications have no existence in fact it is illegally procured; a manifest mistake by the judge cannot supply these nor render their existence non-essential." United States v. Ginsberg, supra, 475. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis thus stated what was, until today, the settled law: "If a certificate is procured when the pre |