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able according actions answer appear argument arises become belief betwixt body cause circumstance colour common conceive concerning conclusion connexion consequently consider continued contrary custom depends derived desire determined difficulty discover distinct distinguish easy effect entirely equal examine existence experience explain extension fancy feel figure force friends give human Hume idea identity imagination immediately impossible impression inference influence instances judgment kind least less letter lively manner matter means memory mind motion nature necessary never objects observe operation opinion original ourselves particular pass passions past perceive perceptions perfectly person philosophers points possible present principle probability proceed produce prove qualities question reason received reflection regard relation resemblance Rousseau SECT senses sensible separable side simple substance succession suppose thing thought tion tis evident true understanding vivacity whole
第 317 頁 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
第 337 頁 - Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium...
第 33 頁 - If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either a colour, or sound, or a taste.
第 225 頁 - A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.
第 26 頁 - Nor yet are we to conclude, that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force, which commonly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to every one those simple ideas, which are most proper to be united into a complex one.
第 109 頁 - ... twill be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or productive principle.
第 21 頁 - ... it had never been conveyed to him by his senses ? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can ; and this may serve as a proof, that the simple ideas are not always, in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions, though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit, that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.
第 317 頁 - If any one upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued, which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me.
第 15 頁 - By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion.