the name of one of the parties to it is forged, he is liable to the vendees.

The defendants in that case were bill brokers, who received the bill to be discounted, and took it to the plaintiffs, who were money lenders, with whom the defendants, as bill brokers, had previously had similar dealings; the defendants did not disclose their principal, and were regarded as principals; and it was held by the court, all the judges concurring, that they were liable, and the plaintiffs should recover back the amount paid by them for the forged bill. Lord Campbell, at page 259 of vol. 28 of English Law and Equity Reports, says: "Here that which purported to be the acceptance of one of the parties to the bill, and upon which the plaintiffs gave credit and relied, was a forgery, and of no value whatever; in fact the instrument altogether became of no value, for Anderson was a bankrupt; there was, therefore, clearly a failure of consideration, entitling the plaintiffs to recover."

The case at bar is like the case decided by Lord Campbell, and the same rule should apply, in my opinion, to its determination.

No decision in England, before or since, is in conflict with that decision; and I will now refer to one or two American cases, read at the bar, from which it will be seen that, except the case of Baxter vs. Duren, in 29 Maine Reports, (chiefly relied on by the defendant here,) no authority can be found to impair or conflict with the judgment of Lord Campbell. In the case of the Canal Bank vs. The Bank of Albany, 1st Hill Sup. Court Reports of New York, page 290, Judge Cowen, in substance, affirms the doctrine established by Lord Campbell, and says, "no doubt the parties are equally innocent in a moral point of view; it was the duty, or more properly a measure of prudence in each to have inquired into the genuineness of the note; they (the defendants) have obtained the plaintiffs' money without consideration, and the plaintiffs have a right to recover (though there was ignorance on both sides of any forgery;) that was a case of forged bank notes passed by the defendants to the plaintiffs. Other decisions in Massachusetts and New York sustain the same view. But the case of Baxter vs. Duren, 29 Maine, p, 440, is invoked to establish a different rule

from that laid down by Lord Campbell, and confirmed by many American authorities. (See cases referred to in Story on Bills.) With entire respect for the court, it will be found, on examining the authorities upon which it rests its decision in Baxter vs. Duren, at page 441, that they do not sustain the doctrine of the learned Judge: viz. "that where no debt is due or created at the time, and the paper is sold as other goods and effects are, the purchaser cannot recover from the seller the purchase money. There is in such case no implied warranty of the genuineness of the paper; the law respecting the sale of goods is applicable; the only implied warranty is, that the seller owns or is lawfully entitled to dispose of the paper or goods." If this be the true rule, which I respectfully submit cannot be sustained by authority or on principles of public policy, then in no event could a bill broker be liable, either as principal or agent, if no implied warranty attaches, unless where the note is paid away for a previous debt or in payment of goods, etc. A public broker, like the defendant in this case, must be regarded as the principal in all his business transactions, unless he discloses his agency at the time.

How is he otherwise an agent, and whose agent is he? To illustrate the force and justice of this doctrine, as sanctioned by the Court of Queen's Bench, and by Justice Story, suppose a bill broker sells a coupon bond, for instance, which is transferred by delivery only without an endorsement or formal transfer, and it turns out to be a forgery, can it be maintained that he is not responsible for the genuineness of the bonds; and can the fact of his being known to be a general agent relieve him, if at the time of the sale he did not disclose the principal or party for whom he was agent in this particular transaction? The answer is conclusive and his liability certain. To relieve himself, therefore, in a case like this, from responsibility, he should have disclosed his principal. This can be the only safe rule, which, it will be found, is sanctioned by Judge Story in his learned work on Promissory Notes and Agency. A contrary doctrine carried to the extent of the case in Baxter vs. Duren, in 29 Maine Reports, would open the door to fraud, gross injustice and commercial inconvenience.

Judge Story, in his admirable Treatise on Promissory Notes and Bills of Exchange, at page 132, forcibly states the doctrine as it now stands supported by the highest authority in England and this country, and by principles of sound reason and public policy. He says: unless it be expressly otherwise agreed, the holder transferring a note is not exempt from all obligations and responsibilities, but he incurs some, although they are of a limited nature. In the first place he warrants by implication (unless otherwise agreed) that he is a lawful holder and has a just and valid title to the instrument, and a right to transfer it by delivery, for this is implied as an obligation of good faith.

In the next place, he warrants in like manner that the instrument is genuine, and not forged or fictitious. (It will be found stated, not as a part of the learned author's text, but inserted by the editor in brackets, that the case of Baxter vs. Duren, in Maine Reports, was decided otherwise.) But Judge Story does not adopt or sanction the decision; on the contrary, refers in the notes to his work to authorities directly in conflict with it.

Hard as in the present case the rule may operate, yet it is the only one which can determine with safety the duties and obligations of parties to a transaction like this.

If the plaintiff and defendant acted as is conceded, in good faith and in ignorance of the forgery, then the loss must fall on the vendor; he is nearest the inception of the transaction, and if acting as principal, must be clearly liable, if he disposes or sells an invalid bill or forged note; or if acting as agent, he must be presumed to know the party who employed him, and the circumstances of the case; at all events, as principal or agent, he comes under an implied guarantee or warranty to the vendee of the genuineness of the paper sold, unless he discloses at the time his principal, if he acts as an agent.

Entertaining these views, I am of opinion that the defendant is liable in this action, and that a verdict ought to be entered for the plaintiffs here. I give the jury the following instruction:

That if they find from the evidence that the defendant sold to the plaintiffs the paper offered in evidence by the plaintiffs, purporting to be the promissory note of Edward Dunn, in favor and

endorsed by J. P. Kridler, and also purporting to be endorsed by Henry Shirk; and if they further find that the names of Edward Dunn and Henry Shirk, as drawer and endorser of said note, were forgeries, that then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such sum as they may find was paid by them to the defendant for said paper, notwithstanding they may find that the defendant acted as an agent in said sale, unless they also find that the defendant at the time of such sale disclosed the name of the person or persons for whom he acted as agent in such transaction.

A verdict was rendered for the plaintiffs.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, January, 1856.

Amendment Judgment on Warrant.—Where a judgment on bond and warrant is, by mistake, entered for less than the sum specified in the latter, it may be amended according thereto, on application of the plaintiff, at any time, even after execution issued and the amount collected, saving, however, the rights of third persons. Smith vs. Hood & Co. From Greene Co.

Criminal Law-Accessory.-Though an accessory cannot be tried, he may be indicted before the conviction or outlawry of the principal; and, unless it affirmatively appear upon the record of the conviction of an accessory, that the principal has never been convicted or outlawed, the judgment will not be reversed, as it must be presumed on error, that legal proof of the fact was made before the jury. Andrew H. Holmes vs. The Comm. From Fayette Co.

Courts Criminal Law.-A Court of Quarter Sessions has jurisdiction under the Act of 1836, of indictments for all crimes, &c., except those which are enumerated in the Fifteenth Section of the Act, as within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Oyer and Terminer and general gaol delivery; and hence of an indictment for being accessory to a burglary, and receiving the stolen goods. Ibid.

Criminal Law-Error.-In felonies not capital, it is to be presumed on error that everything was rightly done at the trial, until the contrary

appears. Hence, in such cases, a judgment will not be reversed, because it does not affirmatively appear on the record that the defendant was present at the rendition of the verdict. Ibid.

Ejectment-Trespass.-Trespass will not lie against a stranger who removes personal property from land recovered in ejectment, after judgment, but before entry or execution of a hab. fac., under a purchase from the defendant. After A had recovered in action of ejectment against B, but before actual possession taken, C, under a license from B, cut a quantity of timber on the land, which A subsequently converted to his own use, B recovered in two subsequent ejectments. Held, that C could maintain trespass against A, for the timber. King & Shoenberger vs. Baker. From Cambria Co.

Evidence, Parol, to Vary Written Contract.-The plaintiff, in an action of trespass, had released to the defendant, a Plank Road Co., the right of passage over the locus in quo, for the construction and use of the road. The release was in writing, and in the usual form: Held, that parol evidence was not admissible on his part, to show that the release was signed by him, on the express condition that it was to be binding only in case the road should be located on a particular route, and that it was not so located. Kennedy vs. The Erie and Wattsburgh P. R. Co. From Erie Co.

Execution-Exemption.-A defendant, in an execution levied on the whole of a lot owned by him, gave notice of an intention to claim the benefit of the exemption law. No sale was made on this writ. Afterwards another execution was issued on another judgment, and a part only of the lot was levied on. No notice was given in the latter case: Held, on distribution of the proceeds, that the defendant had waived his right, and that even if the same person were plaintiff in both levies, it would make no difference. Dodson's Appeal. From Westmoreland Co.

Execution-Lien of Mortgage-When Discharged.-Where a mortgage (other than one for purchase money,) and a judgment are entered up on the same day, the mortgage is not a prior lien under the Act of 1830, but will be discharged by a sale on a subsequent judgment. Magaw vs. Gavitt. From Mercer Co.

A purchaser at Sheriff's sale is not affected by anything which does not appear on the record, and of which he has not notice. Hence, where a mortgage and judgment were entered on the same day, and the latter