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of the agent; and, consequently, no more guilt can attach to a man for performing vicious actions, than for contracting ophthalmia or cholera morbus. On that supposition, the moral sense is a mere bias, predisposition, or feeling, as independent of reason or reflection as the sensation of hunger or of heat and cold. But we feel and believe that there exists a difference between human actions, one class of which we approve and another we condemn. Whence does this difference arise? The organic formation is independent of the volition of the sentient being. Is morality, then, wholly independent of volition? According to this system, it must be. The developement of the particular organ is no more an act of individual volition than it is an act of our will to be born; and where the organ is not developed, there can be no moral sense, no dis crimination of actions, no "knowledge of good and evil.” Will it still be maintained that a man is responsible for his actions? Is a man guilty of a crime in dying of inanition, when he lacks wherewithal to procure sustenance? Who ever thought of blaming a man struck with palsy for not feeling pain from the sharp instrument that lacerated his insensible flesh? No more is he criminal for committing or omitting certain actions, for the avoiding or performance of which Nature has accommodated him with no organic developement. What, then, is morality? Dr Spurzheim tells us that those actions are good which God has commanded, and those are of an opposite character which he has forbidden. Mr John Horne Tooke came to the very same conclusion from tracing the laws of Etymology! Let us assume that both are correct in this definition of morality, (a point, be it remembered, which we concede only for the sake of argument,) then what signifies the command of Heaven to those who want the particular developement which the command presupposes? To those who have been so fortunate as to be "constituted" with the requisite organ, the command is unnecessary: to those who want that organ, the command is useless, senseless, insulting. On either view, it is difficult to conceive of what possible use a positive command, or, in other words, a direct revelation from heaven, can be to a human creature so situated.

"Thou shalt do no murder," says the law. But a man has the organ of "Destructiveness:" what, then, be comes of the command if this organ predominate? It must inevitably be violated. But the same Being who utters the command created the organ; that is to say, God calls on a human and responsible creature to do that which it is physically impossible he should ever be able to perform! But if it be alleged, in opposition to this tremendous conclusion, that there exists in the mind a controlling, regulating, and balancing power, by which the tendency of a particular organ may be counteracted at the will of the agent, there is, in that case, an end to the system which Dr Spurzheim advocates, for we are merely conducted back to a tenet which, though incompatible with his organic developements, has formed part of the received creed of mankind in all times and nations. If, again, it be denied that one organ can exert any control over another, the eye over the ear, or the organ of morality over that, for example, of " Philoprogenitiveness ;"what, let us inquire, is the meaning which the Phrenologist attaches to the term GUILT? A command supposes a power, or capacity, of obedience, Where is that power lodged? Is there a special organ developed on purpose? How is that organ connected with others, and what is the particular link that binds them together? If there be no organ, there can be no such power; if there be a power, there must, according to the principles of Phrenology, be an organ: the Phrenologist cannot assume the existence of any power till he has discovered its organ. No more can he assume, without proof, that one organ can influence or control another. What is the result of all this? It is this, that the moral sentiments of men depend on the pre-existence of a particular organic configuration. If this be not Fatalism, we shall be happy to be favoured with a new and more correct definition of that term.

But farther. In opposition to the doctrine of Spurzheim, we hold that all our moral determinations, so far from being the result of organization, are nothing more or less than the inferences deduced from a process of reasoning. Sometimes that process is rapid and almost intuitive; at other

times it is the result of a more lengthened train of induction. But the highest truths in Geometry, elaborat ed by the most intense and profound cogitations, are no less firmly believed than the most elementary propositions. The infinite approximation of the hy perbola to its assymptotes, or the description of equal areas in equal times by the radius vector of a planet revolving in an elliptical orbit, may be rendered as palpable to the understand ing as the equality of the radii of a circle. It is just so in Morals. Some of the truths lie on the surface, as it were, and solicit the inspection of all men, and impress themselves on the minds of all. Others, again, are the result of lengthened processes of reasoning. In every action, or series of actions, in which men engage, there is a right and a wrong-there is a moral fitness and an unfitness-there is, in short, always an alternative left open for the choice of the agent. But how are the right and the wrong to be discovered, but by abstracting, comparing, weighing, and selecting-in a word, by reasoning? If morality consisted merely in feeling, this could never be the case, nor could our moral sense any more than our sense of vision be affected by the dictates of the understanding. It is no objection to this that we feel approbation and blame according as our attention is directed to virtuous or vicious conduct. Is it possible to apprehend what is right, without being conscious of this feeling? The latter is, we conceive, a necessary consequence of the former. Morality, as we have already said, does not consist in the feeling, but the feeling is the natural, not to Bay necessary, consequence of the antecedent morality or immorality of a particular action. It is impossible to know, a priori, that a good action will afford pleasure: in the order of time, the action must have been first performed; therefore it is impossible, that the character of goodness or virtue can consist in the feeling of approbation, which is the consequence of the prior performance of a good action. To give an illustration; when Pythagoras discovered that the square described on the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle was equal to the sum of the squares described on the sides containing the right angle, he ran into the streets in an ecstasy

of wild delight, vociferating, "I have found it, I have found it!" Now, the pleasure which this beautiful discovery afforded the Patriarch of taciturn philosophers, was surely very different from the truth discovered. So it is in morals. The qualities of an action do not depend on human sentiment, though they influence it. Human sentiments vary. Child-murder is no crime in China: prostitution is not only tolerated, but applauded, in Otaheite: in France and Italy people laugh at cicisbeism and adultery. But are infanticide, prostitution, and adultery, less criminal on that account? In whatever the essence of virtue may consist, there can be no doubt that it implies more than a simple feeling, or, as Dr Darwin would say, "a result of sensible configuration." The feeling is a mere adjunct, exerting as little influence on the abstract morality of the action, as the ecstasy of Pythagoras on the truth of the proposition in elementary geometry, which he was so fortunate as to discover. The great characteristic of virtue, indeed, has been long ago specified by Tully. "Etiamsi a nullo laudetur naturâ est laudabile." For more ample information on this interesting subject, we beg leave to refer the reader to Dr Price's Review of the most important questions in Morals, a book which may fail indeed to produce conviction, but which yet remains unanswered.

A system of education which involves the doctrine of Fatalism must, in our apprehension, be inconsistent with itself. It is true, that Dr S. admits the improveability of the moral, as well as the intellectual faculties; but the cultivation which he admits as possible, is that which results from habit alone, in the same manner as the sight of an Indian is rendered more acute, and the sense of feeling in blind people more delicate, from the constant habit of attending to the distinct intimations of these respective senses. Upon this principle, therefore, education can do nothing in the way of reclaiming those under an evil influence; these must remain in a state of hopeless exclusion and reprobation; susceptible of being usefully impressed by no ameliorating principle; and capable of being delivered from guilt only by annihilation. Now, although we believe with Dr S. that there is a great original difference (in degree)

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between men, we cannot possibly admit that there is the same original diversity in the capacity of moral judgment. All men are nearly upon a level in their primitive perceptions of right and wrong. Their understandings may, indeed, be confined, and their fancy obtuse and dull, but benevolent nature has provided, that they shall be more on a level in appreciating the rule of conduct. For this, we apprehend, there is a very sufficient reason. It is not necessary that all men should be great philosophers or great poets; but it is necessary that they should all, if possible, be good men. Hence the equality in moral perception for which we are contending. On any other supposition, it is impossible that punishment could either be just in itself, or corrective in its operation. It implies that men have erred knowingly, and wilfully, with a full anticipation of all the consequences of their actions, and an adequate power to eschew them. It is chiefly on this principle, too, that, to use a strong word, we assert the omnipotence of education. Dr S. has admitted, that

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misconceived the drift of that system, which, we will candidly confess, appears to us, at present, so repulsive. Our readers will perceive, that we have studiously avoided all reference to the religious tendency of Craniology, a forbearance which we think amply justified by the sincere religious, and moral feeling, under the full influence and ascendancy of which the book before us appears to have been composed.

As a specimen of the author's style, we select the following observations on the unprofitableness of commencing a course of polite education with the study of the classics.

"The most tedious study for children, is certainly that of the dead languages. I am convinced, that thereby many children are disgusted from learning things to which they would have attended with pleasure, had they been taught them in their own language in a practical way. Many others are drilled by indefatigable pains to become classical scholars, and nevertheless fail to distinguish themselves. Some good Latin and Greek scholars, when they come to practical business, are left behind by fellow students, who at school were undervalued. The quantity of Latin words crammed into the heads of the students, does not give them the primitive power of reflection, nor does it serve to cultivate attention. On the contrary, that constrained and yawning study, renders their conceptions slow and indolent.

people, when tempted, easily yield.” Hence it happens, that the greatest violations of the laws are generally committed by persons of this class. Amongst the higher orders of every country, we never almost find instances of robbery, burglary, swindling, The spirit of the ancient languages, forgery, pickpocketing, &c.; and to however, is declared to be superior to that what is this to be ascribed, but the in- of the modern. I allow this to be the fluence of education? Nature has crea- case, but I do not find that the English ted no aristocracy of virtue. Were style is improved by learning the Greek. we to illustrate still farther the ef- It is known, that literal translations are fects of self-denial and education, we miserably bad, and yet young scholars are should quote the story of Socrates and taught to translate, word for word, faiththe physiognomist, and refer to the ful to their dictionaries. Hence those who do not make a peculiar study of their own ancient Stoics, as a proof to what a language will not improve in it by learnpitch of moral grandeur human na-ing, in this manner, Greek and Latin. ture may be raised, even when disciplined according to a system far short of perfection. Upon the Phrenological System of institution, no such a consummation, however devoutly to be wished, is practicable. According to the "New Philosophy," that which is good already may be made somewhat better, but that which is evil is irreclaimable, and to attempt its renovation would argue both folly and ignorance. This, we believe, is a fair inference from what has been already stated; but it will certainly afford us real pleasure, to find that we have

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it not, then, a pity to hear, what I have been told by the managers of one of the first institutions of Ireland, that it was eas

ier to find ten teachers for Latin and Greek than one for the English language, though they proposed double the salary to the lat

ter? Who can assure us that the Greek orators acquired their superiority by their is it not obvious, on the other hand, that acquaintance with foreign languages? or they learned ideas and expressed them in their mother tongue?

"It is farther said, that it is interesting to know Latin and Greek, in order to understand the etymology of modern languages. This is true; but, with this view,

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the English ought to study also the German, Dutch, French, and Danish, since their language is composed of words borrowed from all these nations.

"After all, I am persuaded that the ad. vantage does not repay the trouble of prosecuting such studies, and that they occasion an enormous waste of time and labour. I had rather learn ten ideas in a given time, than ten different signs which express one and the same idea. We should never sacrifice positive knowledge and reflection to the acquisition of a variety of signs. We should begin to acquire notions and that language which is the most necessary for us to converse in. When I was examined, in order to my becoming a licentiate of the college of physicians of London, would have been more suitable to have enquired whether I spoke the Eng lish language sufficiently, than whether I understood the Latin, the English being indispensable to the practice of medicine in and about London, because no physician examines his patients in Latin, any more than a barrister defends his clients, or a preacher exhorts his congregation, in that language.

"It is said, that a man who knows Latin, has received a liberal education; yet it is a lamentable thing that we should pretend to judge of a person's useful attainments by his knowledge of ancient languages. I wish that the medical profession may be cultivated by men of superior talents, but I hope that a knowledge of Latin and Greek will not continue to be the touchstone of deciding who is, or is not, fit for practising this difficult and important art. Few surgeons and physicians, who are good classical scholars, will, from that circumstance, equal JOHN HUNTER in useful knowledge, and in improving the healing art; and yet he was not prepared by the study of ancient languages for the

excellence he attained.

"We seldom learn to speak Latin and Greek, or we soon lose the habit of doing so. Thus, we learn these languages in order to understand the contents of ancient books. This is well, but then we ought, for the same reason, to study all modern languages; at least, to act fully up to this principle, medical men ought to take that trouble, since, beyond doubt, all branches of natural history, anatomy, physiology, and pathology, are more advanced now than they were at the time of the Greeks and Romans; and, of course, more knowledge is to be obtained on those subjects from publications in the modern languages of Europe, than in the languages of Greece and Rome. Formerly, when scientific books of all nations were published in Latin, a knowledge of it was necessary; but since the works of every nation appear in the mother tongue, the same degree of im

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Long as this article has already become, we cannot allow this quotation to pass without a few words by way of answer. And, 1. The study of the learned languages is universally admitted to be an admirable medium for leading the youthful mind to the knowledge of the syntactical mechanism and structure of our mother tongue. 2. The minds of youth are chiefly devoted to this study, when memory is the predominating faculty of the mind, which is thereby happily and effectually exercised, at the same time that the judgment, imagination, and taste, are gradually expanded. 3. The analysis of words, and of the laws of thought that regulate mirable mental training preparatheir manifold changes, is an adtory to entering on the study of the more abstruse departments of human knowledge. 4. The taste is refined while the understanding is improved: habits of attention and close observation are acquired; and the treasures of antiquity, uncounterfeited and undisguised, are opened to mind is not merely expanded by the our curiosity and delight. 5. The mental training and exercise, but enlarged also by contemplating the great and imperishable models of virtue and patriotism, with which the classics abound. 6. Had the study of the learned languages been found a mere waste of time and labour, it would long ago have been abandoned for something more profitable. And, 7. In England, where so much attention is paid to Greek and Roman learning, from being neglected, that we are other branches of education are so far literature, and even in science, by no convinced she is surpassed in general country in the world. In fact, the most profound mathematical and legal learning have been frequently found united with the most distinguished classical attainments. Dr Barrow is an example of the former,

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We are eager to persuade ourselves that we live in a free and enlightened age, and are apt enough to bless our stars that we were born under a system, the refinements of which, as we suppose, may justly entitle us to exult over the delusions which misled the judgments of our forefathers. Every period of the world has, no doubt, had its own peculiar notions of right and wrong; and by these notions, whether ill or well founded, mankind have ruled both their actions and opinions. It has, however, been left to the present age to be visited with a plague, which has strangely affected the understandings of men and which has imparted its own tinge to the native springs of mind,-and this to an extent, perhaps, hitherto unparalleled.

What I allude to is PARTY SPIRIT, whose essence we may conceive embodied in a prowling Cerberus, having three heads, WHIG, TORY, and DEMOCRAT, one or other of which barks and howls incessantly at every traveller on his voyage to preferment. Like Satan of old, walking to and fro over the earth, this Cerberus seems now permitted to roam free and unrestrained over our island. Yet we would fain address to it the words of Hamlet, Rest, rest, perturbed spi

rit."

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The intrusions of party spirit are become almost universal, and its howlings are heard everywhere. In former times they were chiefly confined to the important movements of the helm in state affairs; but now its influence extends throughout,

VOL. IX.

and pervades all classes and descriptions of society. Let us take a desultory view of the effects arising from its ill-starred agency.

When, in time of war, a general is to be appointed to the command of an army, if the candidate's notions of political wisdom chime not in strictest unison with those of the party in power, he has no chance of success, although, to the most consummate knowledge of military tactics, he united the intrepid perseverance of the first general of antiquity.

If, either in war or peace, a Chancellor of Exchequer is wanted, the qualifications for office are magnified, or underrated, according to the prevalence in the cabinet of Whig or Tory principles; and if a man's knowledge of all the intricacies of finance were drawn from demonstration, as palpable as the simplest problem in Euclid, he must succumb to a weaker candidate, if supported by the stronger party. The same all-trying question of Whig or Tory, that leveller of all other pretensions, determines, alike, the election of every member in the cabinet, and magistrate in the borough.

If a professor is to be elected to a university, or a teacher to an academy, his political creed, not his scholastic acquirements, must now become the passport to office. It is of no importance, that the lessons to be taught lead not to the remotest glance at politics. It may, and it does sometimes happen, that the humble candidate for office has interfered so very little with politics, that he has no distinct idea of the difference between Whig and Tory. But did his humble ambition aspire to no higher office than that of a ringer of bells in St Giles's steeple, his success will depend on his penchant for Whig or Jacobite airs, or upon the political tenets of those who back his pretensions.

But further, if even a newspaper is to be admitted into a family, the question is not asked, with what ability is it conducted? or, with what industry and judgment does its Editor cull his selections from all that is passing in the world? No, the most important criterion for its choice, or rejection, is, whether do its columns support the Whigs or the Tories?

One might, indeed, imagine, that our sacred religion would exempt its

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