strating, that matter does exist without it; motion must be, therefore, either a mode or an accident of matter, or a superadded quality; but, in admitting it to be either of these, we destroy its eternity. If motion be not eternal, how came it to exist? Was it produced by matter, or by itself? It could not be produced by matter; for this implies motion prior to motion nor could it be produced by itself; for this would be to suppose in motion, an action prior to its own existence. If, then, matter has received motion from some power distinct from, and independent of itself,---which it necessarily must,---matter itself must be dependant; and, consequently, it is not eternal; and that Power, on which it depends, must be God. As matter could not, any more than motion, create itself, or be eternal, for reasons already assigned, it must be created; and that, which created it, must be God. The God who created it, must, also, be something more than a philosophical abstraction; and, if more, he must possess intelligence; and include, in his nature, those perfections which we call his attributes.

What these attributes are,-where they extend,or how they operate, we know only in part; nevertheless, we know enough to attain to some knowledge of the Divine nature. In the human mind, we discern his intelligence; in the supply of all our wants,

we behold his goodness; in contemplating the structure of the universe, we discover his wisdom in arranging, as well as his power in creating and sustaining; and, in contemplating the order, harmony, and disposal of all above, and all below, we behold his justice. But what justice is, in all the relations it bears to God, we cannot fully comprehend; nor is it possible, that any faculty of the human mind, can grasp an attribute of the Infinite God, any more than a part can comprehend or contain a whole, of which itself is but a part. In fine, what we conceive of God, is an assemblage of all possible perfections, abstracted from all possible moral evil. It is to this God we now turn our thoughts, and ask, Of what nature and essential properties did he create man?

It is certain, that the beings whom he created, must have partaken of his perfections, so far as their natures, in their respective spheres, were capable of partaking them. On the human mind, he must necessarily have stamped in miniature, his wisdom, justice, goodness, rectitude, and love; nor could there be, in the nature of man, any degree of moral evil.

The importance of the question now arises, How came man possessed of moral evil? To say, that God created him morally evil, is to charge God with the turpitude of every bad action, and to destroy

those attributes, which are essential to his nature But, as moral evil cannot be attriit must have been derived from some

and existence. buted to God, other source.

As the existence of the fact cannot be denied, the only question remaining is, What cause brought it into being? If man were created in a state of moral rectitude,---which must be admitted, ---there could exist in him, no propensity to wickedness; and, if no propensity, it must follow, that man must, at least, be equally indifferent to moral good and evil. It would, therefore, follow, if evil and goodness were but accidents of the mind, that we might rationally expect to find as many morally good, as morally bad; but facts will repel this conclusion, Now, as the human mind tends universally to evil, and as there are none untainted, there cannot be a stronger proof, that some evil principle predominates. But how could it be introduced?-how could it begin? Bad example may influence the present generation of men; but it could not influence where it was not, nor act before it had a beginning; and there was a time when bad example was not. As moral evil, therefore, must have been introduced, and have existed prior to bad example, bad example could not be the primary cause of moral evil. How can you fairly account for its introduction? I appeal to your ingenuity,—I appeal to your reason, to give a more rational account than is given in that Book, which you so unphilosophically despise.

In the great chain of being, man, who was to be a distinguished link, was endowed with rationality, which rationality implied a capacity for happiness. This, together with the freedom of the human intellect, arises necessarily from the nature of man, and the attributes of God; and, as happiness was the result of these principles, so happiness depended upon the retention of them. In this state, human nature must have had a law, as a test of obedience,-as a proof of dependance,-and as an incitement to gratitude; otherwise, the sovereign of this world must have been consigned over to lawless anarchy, while all the inferior orders of animated beings would have had their respective laws, pointed out by instincts, implanted in their natures; but, as this would have. militated against the order of things, it is not reasonable to admit it. If, on the other hand, man had a law, it must have been prescribed either by himself, or God; but, certainly, God, as creator, had an exclusive right to prescribe the law, and to define its terms. This law was given; and it was easily to be obeyed, because it was plainly to be understood The greater the injunction, the more severity would have appeared, and the more circumscribed must have been human liberty; but God, on the present occasion, reduced the discharge of moral obligation, to a single point; promising life on obedience, and threatening death on transgression.

But what were the conditions, on which these great events were suspended? They follow:-" Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."* And there can be little reason to doubt, that the command would have been equally forcible, if nothing more than the mere treading upon a tuft of grass, had been interdicted because criminality depended not on the simple action, but on the violation of that principle which was the test of homage.

I am ready to allow, that, if this account had been given, in the manner you represent it, and we had been told, that man fell from his primitive rectitude, without an adequate cause, you might, with some propriety, have objected to the narration. The sacred writers, however, trace this calamity to a higher source, than that of a mere serpent entering into a conversation with Eve. The serpent was but an instrument, through which an evil spirit exerted its agency, to bring on the melancholy catastrophe, to the truth of which, the depravity of mankind bears an awful testimony. Nor are we assured, that Eve heard the serpent speak, without any surprise. The silence of the historian furnishes no proof that

* Gen. ii, 17.