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as makes an accident absolutely impossible. They alone have the power to do this. It is not necessary in case of an accident to prove the complicity of the Government in order to attach a liability. But the essential questions involved in the Maine explosion had to do with the facts of an external or an internal explosion-whether the damage was caused by a mine. -and second, if an external cause is found, the extent of damages. If the two questions cannot be settled by joint investigation and ordinary diplomatic procedure they are suitable subjects of arbitration. Today they would in all likelihood be referred to the Hague Tribunal. From the standpoint of international law it is greatly to be regretted that the Maine case was not settled apart from the Cuban question. In asking for a settlement by arbitration Spain had the better of the two positions.

Before the reports of the naval commissions engaged in the investigation of the Maine disaster were made the war party had gained considerable headway in spite of the pacific councils of President McKinley. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee gave offence to Spain by his vigorous representations of the suffering of the rural population. It was represented that the distress of the classes concentrated in camps was only partially relieved by the withdrawal of the more serious restrictions in the concentration system.30 Relying on his statements, the Government of the United States had decided early in March to increase the succour for Cubans and to employ two ships of war, the cruisers Montgomery and Nashville, in its transmission. Spain protested and the United States yielded, substi

80

30 Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 673; Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896–1900, p. 66.

tuting transports for the service.31 A few days later, however, the Montgomery was sent into Havana to take the place of the Maine. With the same purpose of preparing for any emergency President McKinley, after consultation with the Secretary of the Navy, the leader of the majority in the House, and the four chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on the Navy and Appropriations, decided to ask Congress for an appropriation of fifty million dollars for national defense. The money was immediately voted and placed at the disposal of the President without any restrictions and with a unanimity which astonished all Americans. The unmistakable indications of a full treasury and of national confidence in the Executive was no less a revelation to the Spanish court.3 Other events of the time indicated a conviction in American political circles that preparedness for war was the necessity of the hour.33 Ships were assembled at Key West. On March 14 two cruisers just built in England were purchased from Brazil, and auxiliary vessels were added as rapidly as possible. On March 21 Congress, still having an approaching war in view, exempted all war material from customs duties.84 Such events make it very evident that the war party in Congress had won the contest, and that President McKinley with his small circle of advisers of peace had begun a change in policy.

31

32

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896– 1900, p. 89; Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 677.

82

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 90; Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 684.

33

Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 93.

34

See London Times, March 17, 1898; Message and Documents, 1898-1899, Abridgment, Vol. II, pp. 902-3.

CHAPTER IV

INTERVENTION

The American commission inquiring into the Maine disaster placed its report in the President's hands on March 25. Several days earlier, on March 22 and again on March 23, Spain had been notified that unless some satisfactory agreement securing immediate and honorable peace in Cuba could be reached within a few days the Maine report would immediately on its receipt be transmitted to Congress, where the decision would rest. The statement in the temper of the moment was almost tantamount to a threat of breaking off diplomatic relations.1 A few days later, on March 27, the demands of the United States were again transmitted to Spain in a more specific form. They included an armistice in Cuba until October 1, during which time negotiations looking toward a permanent peace should be undertaken; the immediate and total revocation of the order of concentration, and relief measures for those in the camps; and, as a secondary suggestion for the American Minister, an effort to gain Spanish consent to the appointment of the President of the United States as final arbitrator in case the terms of peace were not settled by October 1.2 No mention was made of the Maine affair, but it was apparent all through that Spanish concessions alone

1

1 Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 18961900, p. 95; Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 696–713.

'Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 712.

would prevent the use of the adverse report of the Naval Commission as a means of influencing Congress. Three days later, March 30, the second demand of the United States was conceded when General Blanco published a bando revoking the concentration orders throughout Cuba. It contained at the same time valuable instructions regarding relief methods to be employed for those without immediate means of support, either through lack of means, resources, or farming implements.*

3

3

Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 725.

466 As, notwithstanding this ample authorization, there will necessarily remain in the old centers of reconcentration a remnant of country people and their families, who for lack of means, resources, or farming implements may not be able to make a living by agricultural labor, the cabinet council will submit to me, with the urgency which the case demands, means of initiating and establishing a system of public works which, while seconding the aid afforded by the magistrates and protective juntas and by the establishment of economical kitchens, shall acccomplish the double purpose of bringing reconcentration to an end and remedying its effects and consequences, thus restoring the normal condition of rural labor and relieving the misery of the masses, as well as making reproductive and of use to the country the expenses which the fulfilment of these arrangements may occasion.

"With which purpose and in virtue of the extraordinary powers which are conferred upon me as Governor and CaptainGeneral and general-in-chief of the army, I have proclaimed in force the following:

66

Article 1. From the publication of the present order in the Gaceta de la Habana, reconcentration of the inhabitants of the rural districts is abolished throughout the entire island, such country people and their families being permitted to return freely to the places which they may deem convenient and to engage in all kinds of agricultural work.

“Article 2. The protective juntas and all the civil and military authorities shall facilitate by all the means in their reach the return of the rural inhabitants to their former places of residence or to those which they may newly elect, extending to them all the assistance which they can respectively command.

On March 31 the Government of Spain replied to the United States with a body of counterpropositions, offering arbitration on the Maine catastrophe, announcing the revocation of concentration, and promising to give government aid to the suffering classes and to leave the matter of peace to the proposed Cuban parliament, which had been convoked for May 4. An armistice was assured, if the insurgents would ask for it. As the suggestion to leave the ultimate terms of peace to the President of the United States was not in the form of a demand at first, and as the substitute in the Spanish reply to leave them to the Cuban parliament came at the suggestion of Minister Woodford and apparently with the consent of President McKinley, that part could not have been a serious ground of difference. In short, the reply was a satisfactory concession in every particular save an immediate and unconditional armistice. Arbitration for the Maine

66 Article 3. Under direction of the cabinet council and through the secretary of public works shall proceed the preparation and immediate establishment of all public works necessary or useful to give employment and subsistence to the country people and their families who, for lack of resources, opportunities for work or farming implements, are not able to return immediately to the country; as also for the establishment of economical kitchens, which may make normal and cheapen these labors.

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Article 4. The expenses resulting from the execution of the regulations of the present order, so far as they may exceed the resources at the command of the protective juntas, may be charged to the extraordinary war credit.

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Article 5. All the orders heretofore published upon the reconcentration of the rural population, and all those which are opposed to the execution of this order, are hereby abolished." Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 738.

'Foreign Relations, 1898, p. 762; Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896-1900, p. 107.

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