is eliminated, so far as is possible in human affairs. The column showing rates (per annum) upon sixty-day paper represents money loaned by commercial banks to merchants, the money being mainly the balances of depositors, and so subject to check at sight. When business is lively, interest upon such loans tends to rise by reason of increased demand, and in times of panic, it tends to rise still more, by reason of distrust of security offered, and the unwillingness of banks to lend money whose owners are likely to call for it at any moment. This accounts for the raise of interest rates in the panic years of 1857 1873, and 1893.

On the other hand, the columns showing current rates of interest upon giltedged bonds represents money intended to be permanently invested, and, as will be noted, the interest rate is not affected by business conditions.

While these figures are doubtless reliable as to interest rates received by capitalists for large sums, when security is believed to be perfect, every farmer knows that they bear no relation to the rates which he has to pay upon mortgage loans. I can find no evidence of any reduction in the rate of interest upon small loans upon such security as the farmer can offer. The "retail" price of money has not fallen according to my observation, but I know of no data establishing the fact.

It is said that one day when the Emperor Nero was out of sorts, he expressed the wish that all the Roman people had but one neck, so that he could the more easily cut it off. Capital seems to be trying to put itself in a position where it can be similarly dealt with. When one army is greatly inferior to another, its best course is ordinarily to take to the bush and carry on a guerrilla warfare. The power of capital is vastly inferior to that of the people, and if it deliberately proposed to make war upon the public, its most prudent course would be to conceal itself, and fight under cover. There is no such intention. Capital is not organized as a whole, and competes with itself as vigorously as farmers or commission merchants compete with each other. Each capitalist, however, is striving to make the most possible for himself, and at the present time there appears to be a craze among owners of industrial plants to unload their possessions, at high prices, upon the investing public. They are, therefore, rapidly organizing Trusts by the methods described on page 411, and endeavoring to sell out. Investors are allured by the promise that as the result of the consolidations for which they are asked to supply the capital, prices can be raised to a point which will enable the concerns to pay dividends upon the enormously inflated stock. In this they will usually fail, and the investors will lose their money. In its present shape, therefore, the campaign for the formation of Trusts is a campaign against investors. The people can rest perfectly easy. No harm can come to them, for the consolidation of interests will render them vastly easier to deal with. The logical outcome of a Trust formed in the normal manner, as the result of unbearable competition, and with plants put in at bedrock prices, and in the absence of excitement, is profit to those concerned in it, and a raise in prices to just below the point at which new competition will be invited. This will do no harm. It is desirable that all business be done at a reasonable profit. On the contrary, it may do good, as tending to counter organization among farmers, working men, and other classes. The logical result of such a campaign as is now going on is a financial panic when investors shall have discovered the true value of the properties which they have purchased. It is to be hoped that it will not advance to that point. The most of the Trusts now torming will probably not succeed. They are competing with each other for the money of investors, and the crop of fools, although large, is after all, limited. Some of the proposed combinations appear to be really consolidations of enormous capital, with the intent, and possibly, for the present, the power to oppress. These may have to be dealt with, possibly by constitutional amendment. It is easy enough to tax out of existence combinations of capital which are dangerous to society. The wild laws which some legislatures are now passing can do no good, and are most of them not only unconstitutional, but more injurious to business than the evils at which they are aimed. What the public, and especially the farmers, most need, in order to deal successfully with combinations of capital, is perfectly clear minds and perfectly cool heads.

The following list of Trusts is compiled from the San Francisco Chronicle Almanac for 1899, and a late number of the San Francisco Argonaut. It

appears to have been largely made up of items from press despatches, and is as good as any other list. There is no authentic list of Trusts, and if there were, it would not be correct for a week. I might have added largely to the list, in the way that I presume this was made up, but it is not worth while. The best way is for all to assume that every thing which they buy is sought to be controlled by a Trust, and that in some cases the attempt has been successful, but in many other cases not.

To the foregoing should be added the California Raisin Association-the pioneer farmer's Trust of America. Its capital stock" is small, but it is practically, so long as it lasts, a consolidation of the product of the capital of its members. In 1898 these numbered 2,064. The average capital of those engaged in the production of raisins was certainly not less than $3,000, which would make the capital of the farmers' raisin Trust $6,192,000.

The Wine-makers' Corporation of California is a Trust whose members are, for the most part, both producers and buyers, but as their interests as producers are probably in nearly every case greater than their interests as buyers, it should perhaps be called a farmers' Trust.