federalists as such, and to distribute offices among the good men of both parties, in a spirit of conciliation. This latter is very amusing in the light of history, and there is no question that Lewis, then as later, caused Jackson, for political effect, to subscribe a piece of arrant and deliberate hypoc risy. Drayton was not appointed. Monroe wrote Jackson acknowledging the abstract truth and justice of his propositions, but urging political necessity as an excuse for keeping the loaves and fishes for republican consumption. The letter fell into oblivion, from which it would probably never have emerged, had the Jackson propaganda not made artful use of it in later years, to secure the votes of federalists, and this was doubtless its scle raison d' etre. The following in an extract from the letter:

"Your happiness and the nation's welfare materially depend upon the selections which are to be made to fill the heads of departments. Everything depends on the selection of your ministry. In every selection party and party feelings should be avoided. Now is the time to exterminate that monster called party spirit. By selecting characters most conspicuous for their probity, virtue, capacity, and firmness, without regard to party, you will go far to, if not entirely, eradicate those feelings which, on former occasions, threw so many obstacles in the way of government; and perhaps have the pleasure and honor of uniting a people heretofore politically divided. The chief magistrate of a great and powerful nation should never indulge in party feelings. His conduct should be liberal and disinterested, always bearing in mind that he acts for the whole and not part of the community." How closely this advice was followed by Jackson himself, when he came to the presidential chair, future pages will illustrate.

CHAPTER III.

JACKSON IN FLORIDA-HIS PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION.

HE irritation of Jackson against Crawford has already been mentioned; it was no doubt reciprocal, and during the year 1817, led Jackson into a series of hasty and ill-considered acts, such as constantly re-appear in the story of his life. Crawford was secretary of war in Madison's cabinet and, although he had been a strong opponent of Monroe in caucus, was continued in that office until he received the treasury portfolio in the cabinet of the latter. During his administration of the war office, he on several occasions gave orders to general officers of the southern departments, without consulting Jackson, and, as a matter of course, this assumption of direct control often deranged the plans of the commander, and served to vex him. beyond the point of discretion. On the 17th of April, 1817, Jackson issued a general order, instructing his subordinates to disregard any orders of the war department, not promulgated through department headquarters. There was certainly every reason for Jackson's feeling upon the subject, but this public defiance of his superiors, without any previous effort to remedy the evil, was as certainly inderogation of discipline, and had Crawford not given place to Calhoun, it is quite likely that an effort might have been made for his punishment. Calhoun overlooked the offense and recognized the justice of the complaint by communicating concerning the affairs of the department, only with Jackson. General Scott, who was an advocate of the strictest military etiquette and discipline, learning of Jackson's order, expressed unreserved disapproval of it. Jackson, in some manner, heard that Scott had denounced his action as traitorous, and at once wrote a letter in the sharpest terms calling Scott to account. This Scott answered, admitting in substance the use of the words complained of, but urging that they were uttered in private conversation. Jackson replied, very abusively; the correspond ence became less decorous and, finally, Jackson came to his ultimatum in an argument, a challenge to fight. Scott replied that religious scruples and

patriotic motives united in preventing him from engaging in a duel; then the letters of both were published. Thus a matter of personal feeling and wounded pride led Jackson into a succession of wrong headed acts, which affected the war department, the reputation of the leading general officers of the army and his own private standing, when a little forbearance would have remedied the matter in the beginning. Such episodes as these cast much light upon Jackson's peculiar and contradictory character, especially necessary in studying his presidential career, as it enables one to judge what of his action was spontaneous, and what emanated from the basement statemanship of the "Kitchen cabinet. "

The Florida war was at hand, and in no event of our national history, save perhaps the later war with Mexico, is there so much to regret. The doctrine of manifest destiny, that cover for covetousness and excuse for theft, was effective to its precipitation, but as a means, not as a primary cause. The slave power was behind and above it all, and the greed of land speculation came next. Georgia had lost many slaves who found refuge in the everglades; these deep retreats in alien territory were as a city of refuge to fugitive bondmen. The whole south, the Carolinas and Georgia in particular, having gone far with the spoliation of the Creeks, Cherokees, and Chickasaws, were mad with the greed for further plunder. Some of the fugitives of the Creek war had escaped Jackson's fire and sword and, like the negroes, had found refuge in Florida. Both black and red men had been received by the peaceful Seminoles, and many intermarriages had done much to merge the tribes and races, and this very new community of interest concentrated the hatred and the determination of the Georgians to possess the land. The closing year of the war of 1812 gave a pretext, which, had it been used, would have given color of justice to the invasion. The British, as has been said, made use of Florida as a base of operations against Louisiana. Spain was not strongly enough represented in her province to prevent this breach of neutrality, had she so desired. The British officers were licentious and irresponsible, and their movements upon the frontiers of the United States gave ample excuse for the demand of indemnity or of Florida from Spain. This opportunity was not embraced, yet the grievance was still felt, and the people of the south felt that they had cause of quarrel with the negro population of Florida, that they were fugitives from their lawful owners; with the Creeks that they had escaped punishment; with the Seminoles that they had given the Creeks and negroes harbor; with the Spaniards, that they had not maintained neutrality during the war with England. These were the grounds upon which the war was sought to be justified. It was precipitated by a succession of outrages, small and great, committed by lawless people on either side of the border; there was wrong on each side, and to balance it was then difficult and is now impossible. The English, during their occupation of Florida, had constructed a fort about

fifteen miles from the mouth of the Appalachicola river; at the cessation of hostilities it had been taken possession of by a bodyof negroes and a few Creeks, who appropriated the arms and ammunition left by the Spaniards, and held the post as a garrison.

During 1816, the United States received permission from the Spanish governor to convey in boats, up the Appalachicola, materials for the construction of a fort in Georgia. Some state that, in passing the negro fort, one of these boats was fired upon by those within, others that the first shot came from the boat; at all events, some one fired, the fort was bombarded; a hot shot exploded the magazine, and, of the three hundred inmates,men, women, and children,—two hundred and seventy were killed outright, while the few who escaped from the ruins were massacred by the Indian allies of the Americans. This occurrence was rather a relief to the Spanish governor, who had not been too well pleased at having so formidable a work within his jurisdiction, and in the hands of negroes.

Spain was at that time at war with her revolted American colonies, and the occasion was taken by pirates and freebooters to ply their trade against the vessels of whatever nation came in their way, under cover of a pretended service in the cause of the provinces. Amelia island, upon the coast of Florida, was the headquarters of such a band of filibusters, pirates, smugglers, ready for anything and everything that promised a profit, and it was deemed necessary to the protection of the commerce of the United States to put a stop to it; hence the island was occupied by the United States, and the band scattered. All these occurrences united to bring on the war. Spain had not the force, with all other demands upon her, to preserve order in Forida, yet she was jealous of the United States, and resented any trespass or intervention, however slight. Word of the successive events thus hastily sketched was sent to Washington, and disseminated through the press of the north, by interested persons, always exaggerated and distorted to make it appear that every aggression came from the Spanish side of the line; that the Georgians were weak and abused victims of the outrages of a powerful and barbarous enemy, and that the very existence of the southern border states depended upon the intervention of the strong arm of the federal government.

This was the condition of affairs at the beginning of 1817; during that year the border outrages increased, responsibility for them being still very equally divided. On the 20th of November, General Gaines, commanding, under Jackson, upon the frontier, sent a force of one hundred and fifty men to Fowltown, the principal village of the hostile Creeks. As the detachment approached, it was fired upon, and in retaliation captured and burned the town after a protracted fight. There seems to have been no better reason for this expedition than the refusal of the Creek chief to comply with a summons of Gaines to come to his headquarters and tell whether or no

he was less hostile than before. With the fight at Fowltown began the Seminole war; the Indians and negroes arose, attacked boats ascending the Appalachicola, and cut off straggling Americans wherever they could encounter them.

When news reached the war department of this affair, Jackson was instructed to take personal command in Georgia. Immediately upon receiving this order he hastened to comply, and dispatched a letter to Monroe: "Let it be signified to me through any channel, (say Mr. J. Rhea), that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished." This letter afterwards played an important part in Jackson's career; Monroe was ill and absent from Washington. He always disavowed knowledge of the Rhea letter, and it is highly improbable that he ever received it. Jackson claimed to have received from Rhea a letter in which the writer stated that the President approved of the suggestion conveyed; but he never produced the letter during the controversy of after years. He construed Calhoun's orders, however, upon an assumption that the secretary of war knew of his letter and was agreed with the President in approving it. It will be seen that Jackson had as few constitutional scruples" in 1817, as when he first took command of the Tennessee militía, previous to the Creek war, and when he moved from Mobile against Pensacola.

In the meantime Jackson was busy in constructing a contingent army from the militia of Tennessee and Georgia, which he gathered with his accustomed vigor, then made a forced march to the frontier, arriving there in March, 1818. A portion of his provisions he dispatched to Fort Scott, by the Appalachicola, sending word to the Spanish governor that if any of these boats were molested or hindered, he should regard it as an act of hostility to the United States. He then advanced and captured St. Marks. Sumner says: "Jackson's proceedings were based upon two positive but arbitrary assumptions: (1) That the Indians got aid and encouragement from St. Marks and Pensacola. (This the Spaniards always denied, but perhaps a third assumption of Jackson might be mentioned; that the word of a Spanish official was of no value.) (2) That Great Britain kept paid emissaries stationed in Florida, to stir up trouble in the United States." There is not, in fact, an atom of evidence tending to show that England was ever guilty of the contemptible acts charged, and, in the absence of such evidence, the fact that the entire fighting force of the Creeks and Seminoles did not number two thousand men, reduces the assumption to an absurdity. Nicholas, who commanded the British force at Pensacola, in 1815, was certainly guilty of a breach of neutrality, but his offense was rather against Spain than America; he as certainly encouraged the Indians, and led them to believe that they might hope for support from England, but his object was probably to obtain their immediate assistance. Certain