and directed at a man so secure in the sense of his own integrity, that he was not to be in any manner intimidated. It drew from him a manly, full, and convincing statement of the condition of affairs in America, upon which was predicated the statement that his countrymen would scarcely forgive a failure to embrace any opportunity for an honorable peace, consistent with treaty obligations. Vergennes found, to his surprise, that he had encountered a man who would not be subservient, even to the representative of the crown of France. France was, at that time, more than inclined to favor a long truce, rather than the recognition of independence, as the basis of negotiation between England and America. Franklin had countenanced the idea, and the French alliance for a time bade fair to defeat, rather than to forward, its original purpose.

Having at last obtained a modification of Vergennes' orders, Mr. Adams, on the 27th of July, left Paris for the Hague. His prime object in this journey was to obtain materials which should permit of his forming a judgment as to the probability of obtaining an American loan from the Dutch. His first impression was very favorable. The principal obstacle seemed to lie in the perverted ideas regarding America, which the friends of England had instilled into the minds of the Dutch. To counteract this, Mr. Adams made his usual free use of the journals of the day, and also took every occasion to disseminate in private, such facts as would tend to forward his wishes. As the result of his representations, he was formally empowered by Congress to effect a loan in Holland.

Mr. Laurens had been appointed, by Congress, minister to Holland, and had set sail for Amsterdam. At this critical moment of Mr. Adams' negotiation, when the bankers seemed favorably interested in America, came news that Laurens had been captured by a British cruiser, and with him a draft of a proposed treaty between the United States and Holland, which seriously compromised the latter with Great Britain. A panic at once seized the merchants and bankers, and negotiations were, for the time, brought to a stand-still.

On the 1st day of January, 1781, came a commission to Adams, as plenipotentiary to Holland. No sooner was this received than he began to labor for recognition. The arrogant action of England toward Holland, had left only the choice between resistance and abject surrender. The Dutch were not prepared for the latter, and the eagerness of England to find cause for quarrel, indirectly served the ends of America. The stadtholder and the court were known to be inclined to the English view of the subject, but the people were strongly tinctured with the spirit of liberty, and among them Mr. Adams found his best friends. In the midst of this negotiation, and before it had been prosecuted to a result, there came to Adams a message from the Count de Vergennes, requesting his presence in France, in his capacity of commissioner for the negotiation of a peace.

This was accompanied by no explanation of the attitude of affairs, and the American envoy had been studiously kept ignorant of the progress of the negotiation. Nevertheless he set out, and arrived in Paris on the 6th day of July, 1781.

The immediate reason for summoning Adams to Paris, was the necessity of considering a proposal of accommodation, made by Russia and Austria, and forwarded to the respective ministers of those powers at Paris, London, and Madrid. The proposal provided for a wholly separate negotiation between Great Britain and the United States, without the intervention of France, or of mediators, unless such should be requested; no treaty was, however, to be executed or signed, except simultaneously with a peace between the belligerents for whom the mediation was proposed. The fourth article provided, in the event of the acceptance of this proposal by all parties, the belligerents should call upon the mediating powers to open the congress, and should at once commission representatives to attend it. This fourth and last article, which involved the standing of the United States in the negotiation, was kept secret from Mr. Adams, -the Count de Vergennes fearing that the American envoy might demand so much for his country, and for himself in his representative capacity, as to defeat his own plan of reducing America to the ignominious position of holding a seat in the congress, without a vote, thus juggling with her interests and leaving her powerless to act.

It is not necessary to go into particulars regarding this effort at mediation, for the reason that it failed-principally because of the obstinacy of England's doting old king, who could not brook an interference of France between Great Britain and her colonies. Even had this stubborn resistance failed of wrecking the project, it would have been gravely imperiled by the fact that America, in spite of Franklin's leaning, would assuredly have insisted upon independence, absolute and unqualified, as its ultimatum, refusing to accept the prolonged truce proposed by Spain, and would have withdrawn unconditionally from the negotiation, unless regarded as a belligerent power, rather than an insurgent praying succor from Europe. While the proposals of Russia and Austria were pending, Adams wrote Vergennes in no uncertain tone, foreshadowing this policy, and evoked an angry answer from that minister, in which it was stated that preliminaries were to be arranged before the United States could be fully recognized, and which closed with something very like a threat that Adams should lose his place, did he insist upon making such demands. The letter was addressed and franked by Vergennes, in his own hand, to Adams, as agent of the United States of North America. In spite of this pointed rebuff, Adams supplemented his letter to Vergennes with two others, in which he respectfully and clearly reiterated his arguments for the recognition of America in the congress, and to such effect that the minister, without previously consulting

him, intimated to the mediating powers, that the recognition of the United States in the negotiation would be a necessary condition precedent to the acceptance by France of the proposal for intervention. The negotiation lingered through January, 1782, when it died by the act of England.

Long before this final closing of the negotiation, Adams, despairing of its effect, had returned to Holland, and resumed his independent labors for recognition. He had scarcely reached Amsterdam, when he learned that the representations of Vergennes had resulted in the revocation of his commission to negotiate a treaty of commerce with England, but he had so long regarded that matter as practically ended, that the revocation gave him little uneasiness. He also received word that the peace commission had been enlarged by the addition of Dr. Franklin, Mr. Jay, Mr. Laurens, and Mr. Jefferson. The association with himself of so many able and representative men, gave him great satisfaction. The Congress, which was much lowered in tone and spirit, had, however, done other acts in connection with the commission, which, had he then known, would have caused him serious anxiety and annoyance. The first of these was the retreat from every condition precedent to the peace, save that of independence; the second-and this is the most ignominious act in the history of America-to direct its commissioners, "ultimately to govern themselves by the advice and opinion of the French minister."

In the meantime, Adams' distrust of Vergennes was increased by discovering that his own negotiations in Holland, those of Jay at Madrid, and of Dana at St. Petersburg, not only did not receive the assistance of France, but were covertly opposed. Hence he concluded to wait no longer upon the action of Vergennes, but to throw his whole personal reputation, and the success of his effort, upon a single cast. Several circumstances united to favor his effort. He first received a commission from the United States, authorizing him to negotiate a tripartite alliance of France, Holland, and the United States; next came news, conveyed directly by Washington, of the capitulation of Cornwallis, and, most potent of all, England adopted so arbitrary a course toward Holland, in declaring war when negotiation might so easily have settled the differences, that the old popular party of the commercial cities was aroused, and fairly overbalanced the stadtholder, who was the creature of a corrupt favorite, and the friend of England. Mention has been made of a memorial, addressed by Adams, to the States General, announcing his accrediting to Holland, and demanding recognition. In January, 1782, he began a round of formal visits to the representatives of the various states, requesting a categorical answer to this memorial. was received with varying cordiality, according to the inclination of the several officers. The assent of seven of the states was necessary to the granting of his request, and, in every instance, the persons to whom he appealed, pleaded lack of authority, and promised to refer the matter. Soon

He

came news that one state had decided favorably to the request; then that another had done so, and, finally, on the 19th of April, 1782, the council having received a sufficient number of favorable votes, recognized John Adams as minister plenipotentiary of the United States. He did not allow matters to rest with this recognition, but on the same day presented a proposal for a treaty of amity and commerce, and, pending the slow course of Dutch diplomacy, pressed the negotiation of a much needed loan. His success with council and capitalists was complete The treaty was signed on the 17th of October, 1782, and, before that time, a loan of five million guilders, only the first of several large investments, was closed. Thus his second mission to Holland came to an end.

Mr. Adams was wont to regard his success in Holland as the greatest accomplishment of his life, and it may with much reason be so considered. He went to that country, under the disapproval of the French minister, unacquainted with the language, customs, and sentiments of the people. He found them ignorant to the last degree as to American affairs, or, worse still, intentionally misled by friends of England. He overcame all obstacles; used the press and obtained the ears of prominent men in private. He conquered the secret discountenance of France, the opposition of the stadtholder and the aristocracy; created a public sentiment in favor of America, and won recognition, alliance, and, hardest of all, money. All this he accomplished quite alone, and it was, in truth, a great achievement.

W

CHAPTER IX.

THE NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE.

HEN came the call to Paris, Adams was none too eager to go. He

had sufficient knowledge of Vergennes to doubt his good faith, and to be certain that the coming negotiation would be extremely vexatious. He did not, therefore, at once desert his mission in Holland, which had then reached a very critical point, but waited to secure the signature of his treaty, -then took his departure, arriving in Paris October 6, 1782.

The condition of the negotiation was most peculiar. Already, so early as the month of March, 1782, Lord North, whose administration had received its death blow, had sent a certain private agent named Digges to sound Mr. Adams, as to the terms upon which negotiation might be established, evidently desiring to conduct an independent and private conference with him. As a condition precedent to granting Digges an interview, Adams required that a third person be present, and that he himself should be at liberty to disclose anything that might pass to the Count de Vergennes. These requirements in effect announced the failure of Digges' mission. After an unimportant conversation he returned to England and later made a communication to Adams, which confirmed his suspicion that Lord North was simply sounding him with the hope of betraying him into some unwise communication, and was never sincere in his expressed desire to treat. Later came the crisis which upset North, to give place to a cabinet headed by the Marquis of Rockingham, with Charles Fox in the foreign, and Lord Shelburne in the colonial office. Of course the subject of American affairs, upon which the cabinet of North had been wrecked, was the rock in the course of the new ministry as well. At the very outset arose a complication between Fox and Shelburne, each of whom claimed that the American negotiation belonged in his province, which ultimately wrecked the ministry. Out of this grew a remarkable series of secret manœuvres, in which each of the ministers carried on his own preliminary