nor Clinton keeping abreast of it on one side and Putnam on the other. Then it put about, having heard of Burgoyne's surrender, destroyed the captured forts and returned to New York, having done little real harm to the Americans-less than the brutal burning and pillaging had done to their own cause, in inflaming their enemies and alienating their friends.

The account of this campaign has been given thus at length with the object of making clear the basis of the conspiracy which was meant to overthrow Washington and make Gates the commander of the army. Its intrinsic importance makes it one of the most interesting in the history of the Revolution, as it was followed by the permanent retirement of the British from the northern posts to St. Johns, and as it upset the plan of bisecting the colonies, by a line of posts from New York to Canada. It renewed the confidence of the people, well nigh silenced the tories of the North, frightened the Indians into good behavior, and laid a solid foundation for the formation of future armies. No campaign of the war exhibited such revulsion of fortune, was more bravely fought or more honorably concluded by either party, yet all this would not justify so prolonged a discussion of the subject in this place, had it not an ulterior significance, germane to the principal purpose of the author's work.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE WINTER AT VALLEY FORGE.-CONWAY'S CABAL.

HE story of that terrible winter at Valley Forge does not need

TH in The very name of the spot has passed into

recording this place.

history as the synonym of privation and suffering. Probably no army engaged in a civilized warfare and in a rigorous climate, ever went into winter quarters so ill equipped, so ill fed, so utterly unprepared and unprotected as did they. Had one desired to follow their march, he might have done so by the bloody footprints of two thousand shoeless men in the cruel snow; there were days when they had no bread, many days when they had no meat, and the times were neither few nor far between when they had neither bread nor meat, and starvation literally stared them in the face. Cold, hungry, naked, sick-no memory of victory in the campaign passed; no reason for hoping better things for the future-what wonder that many murmured-yet those who murmured were fewer than those who suffered in silence; what wonder that some threatened mutiny and disobedience,— yet these were but a handful to the hundreds who died in mute and heroic endurance. Through it all Washington stood with his men, cheering and encouraging them by his words, fortifying them by his example. His heart bled for them as they suffered, and burned with indignation at the sloth and carelessness that made such suffering for the time unavoidable. Whatever of repute the most brilliant achievement in the field may have earned for Washington, none of all his noble works was more truly great than the bravery, cheerfulness, and devotion which bridged over the winter of 1778, and kept to its close an army so sorely needed. Others might and did win battles. He only could have done this thing. Yet there was so little of justice and sympathy in the people whose cause he had espoused! At the very outset, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted a memorial to Congress, protesting against the placing of the army in winter quarters and urging that it be kept in the field. Then, for once, Washington seemed.

to lose his usual patience, and wrote a letter to the president of Congress which tells more of the actual condition of affairs than could pages of description, and at the same time gives some idea of his own perplexities and troubles. He wrote:

"Though I have been tender, heretofore, of giving any opinion or lodging complaints, as the change in that department* took place contrary to my judgment, and the consequences thereof were predicted; yet, finding that the inactivity of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or other essentials, is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar, but by those in power, it is time to speak plainly in exculpation of myself. In truth, then, I can declare that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department of the army. Since the month of July we have had no assistance from the quartermaster-general; and, to want of assistance from this department, the commissary-general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add that notwithstanding it is a standing order and often repeated, that the troops shall always have two days provisions by them, that they might be ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever offered of taking an advantage of the enemy, that it has not been either totally obstructed or greatly impeded on this account. As a proof of the little benefit received from

a clothier-general, and as a further proof of the inability of an army under the circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of soldiers (besides a number of men confined to hospitals, for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account) we have, by a field return this day made, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in camp, unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise naked. By the same return it appears that our whole strength in Continental troops, including the Eastern brigades which have joined us since the surrender of Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp, fit for duty; notwithstanding which, and that, since the 4th instant, our numbers fit for duty from the hardships and exposure they have undergone-particularly on account of blankets, numbers having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by the fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and common way-have decreased near two thousand men. We find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter quar. ters or not, (for I am sure no resolution of mine could warrant the remonstrance,) reprobating the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and, moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be in-which are by no

* The Quartermaster's.