[Cucullu v. Louisiana Insurance Company.] ties of some articles, and the sailing of a vessel from a port which was under the domination of Spain." The junta, or court, on this report gave a final sentence; in which, after reciting the previous proceedings, they declare, that "having read and taken into consideration the antecedent opinion of the assessor, and discussed all the points, with which we unanimously agree, conformably to what is there exposed, confirming, as we do confirm, the condemnation of the schooner Felix and her cargo, as good prize, excepting from said penalty ten hampers of empty bottles, a still, a billiard table, and a box containing five bibles and four new testaments." It has been contended, that these sentences do not embrace the whole of the cargo; that only a part of it is condemned. But on this branch of the subject, the court has no doubt. The original sentence condemns the wine, and wax, and such other articles as might be found liable to condemnation. The report of the assessor confirms this sentence, except in relation to a still a billiard table, some empty bottles, &c. If it had been the opinion of the assessors that nothing more had been condemned than the wine and the wax, and that nothing more should be, the exceptions were unnecessary; for a confirmation of the original sentence, supposing it limited to the wine and the wax, would not have embraced them. The final sentence, however, places this matter beyond argument. It condemns the schooner and her cargo, with the exception of certain articles there mentioned. Consequently, every article, of which the cargo was made up, and which is not excluded by the exceptions, is condemned. The report of the assessor already referred to, which is adopted by the court as the basis of its last decision, after stating that certain goods were acquitted because they were neither articles of contraband, nor proved to be brought from the port of Havana, nor Spanish property, nor the productions or manufactures of Spain, proceeds to state, that in these qualities and prohibitions, are comprehended the other effects condemned. It was argued, that as the wax and the wine were condemned in the first sentence, for a breach of municipal law, and as new ground, that of being enemy's property, is inserted in the second, as a cause of condemnation, that the fair construction to be given to these decrees is, that all the goods embraced by the last judgment, which were not included in the first, must be considered as seized and forfeited for the additional reason given in the sentence; and that, for this portion of goods the insurers are responsible, as the warranty does not exclude war risks. But the second sentence is in the conjunctive. It condemns the whole, for all the causes therein mentioned. Consequently, it condemns them for each of these causes, and one of them is a breach of municipal law. If there were any inconsistency in the two decrees; or if the different reasons assigned in the last one, could not be reconciled with each other, then, perhaps, it would be true to say, that the [Cucullu v. Louisiana Insurance Company.] several causes of condemnation must be referred to the different portions of which the cargo was made up. But there is no such contradiction; they may well stand together. The goods might be enemy's property, and also come from the Havana. It is not impossible, that between the first and second sentence, proof was obtained, which brought the whole cargo within the reason given in the last decree. We at least are bound to presume so; for so the sentence has said, and we cannot contest its verity. But, admitting this proof was not obtained, and that the wine and wax must be considered as condemned for the causes mentioned in the first decree, and no other; that does not weaken the position, that the rest of the goods were not only enemy's property, but brought from an enemy's port.-The decree condemns all the cargo, for all the reasons for which it could be condemned; proving that part of it came within one of these reasons, does not establish, that the remainder was condemned for a single cause, when the words of the sentence say, they are within all. It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the district court he affirmed, with costs. Mazureau and Strawbridge, for the plaintiff. Cucullu v. Orleans Insurance Company. FIRST District. V, N. S. 492. A precisely similar case. Duncan's Executors v. Poydras's Executors. The shipper of goods is not responsible for the cost of defending the ship and other property on board, which is seized and prosecuted for illegal trade. FOURTH District. PORTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This action was commenced in the lifetime of both the parties, in the district court. On the death of the defendant it was transferred to that of probates; where judgment being rendered in favor of the plaintiff, an appeal was taken to the district court. That court confirmed the judgment of that of the first instance; and the defendants have again appealed to this. The whole claim of the petitioner grows out of a seizure made by the collector of the port of Orleans, of a quantity of slaves shipped from one of the northern states to this, on an allegation, that the regulations contained in the act of Congress, in relation to the transportation of slaves from one state to another, by sea, had been violated. Three libels, it appears, were filed against the vessel, in the district court of the United States; and two actions were brought in the court of the state, against the collector: one to obtain a sequestration of the slaves, and the other for damages consequent on the illegal seizure. The services and the value of them are proved in those actions in which Poydras was directly concerned, where he was plaintiff and defendant; but we can see no foundation for the claim to make him pay what is called, in the account, his proportion of the fees due for defending the captain and sloop. A man who ships goods on board a vessel which is illegally seized, suffers enough in the detention attending his own property, and the expense he may incur in getting it released, without being obliged to defend the ship and master for a misfortune by which all suffered. The plea of prescription is not supported. Some of the suits were continued up to the year 1821; and between that time and the commencement of the action, the period required by law to bar claims of this description had not elapsed. When the services are continuous and uninterrupted, prescription runs from the time they are finished, not from their cominencement. It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the district court be avoided, reversed and annulled; and it is fur [Duncan's Exeoutors v. Poydras' Executors.] ther ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the plaintiff do recover of the defendants, the sum of fifteen hundred dollars, with costs in the court below, the appellee paying those of appeal. Conrad, for the plaintiff. Seghers, for the defendants. Thatcher v. Walden. V, N. S. 495. A verbal power of attorney if given in a state where slaves pass by parol, is legal proof of the authority under which a written sale was made in this state. FIRST District. PORTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action to recover a slave in possession of the defendant, which the plaintiff alleges to be his property. The cause was submitted to a jury, who found for the defendant: and the plaintiff appealed. Two of the questions presented for discussion, arise out of a bill of exceptions taken on the trial. The defendant offered one Crawford as a witness, to prove that the plaintiff had given a verbal power to the person under whose sale the defendant holds the slave, to sell him. He was objected to on two grounds: First, that he was interested; and Secondly, that parol proof could not be given of such a power; that it must be in writing. It appears the witness was part owner and captain of the steamboat Steubenville, on board of which the negro was hired. The sale took place in New Orleans, to relieve the boat from some embarrassments she was under. Two of the brothers of the plaintiff were also owners of the boat, and one of them was on board at the time of the sale. It is alleged by one party that the sale was made by this brother, under a power of attorney from the petitioner: by the other, that the sale was made by Samuel Thatcher, without authority; and that the witness had promised to make good the price to the plaintiff. The testimony on this head is contradictory. The jury, by their verdict, seemed to have believed the former was the fact. In either point of view, the witness was competent. In the first most clearly so, as he was not responsible for Thatcher's act. In the [Thatcher v. Walden.] second still more clearly; for if the petitioner recovered, he became liable to him for the price. So that his interest, if any, was favorable to the party objecting. The power to sell was given by the plaintiff in the state of Alabama; and it is proved that, by the laws of that state, a verbal authority to dispose of a slave is there legal, and binds the owner. It is a general rule, that contracts must be construed in relation to the laws of the country in which they are made; and that the proof offered of these contracts must be such as those laws require. The last position is a necessary corollary of the first; for if, to the validity of a contract in the country where it is made, certain forms are required, or certain evidence made necessary; to receive less, or require more proof in another country, would either be making a contract binding on the parties which the law of the place where they stipulated did not, or would be virtually impairing the obligation of the contract by refusing to enforce it, unless the party seeking to do so, furnished proof which it was impossible he could give. There is no difference between the right of a stranger to have the aid of the laws of the country where his debtor resides, to compel him to do justice in relation to a contract made under another government, and that of one citizen of a state, to enforce his claim against another. This principle which is founded on the comity of nations, and makes a part of international law, would be a mere illusion if other evidence was required for the validity of the agreement, than that of the laws of the country where it was made. The application of this doctrine to the case before us, will readily show that the court below committed no error in admitting the witness to testify to the authority given to sell the slave. The contract of mandate was complete in Alabama, and binding there on the plaintiff. It consequently bound him. wherever the attorney in fact might carry it into execution, as the authority given affixed no limitation as to place. We cannot distinguish between the right to sell, as derived from a verbal power, and that acquired by a purchase made by parol; and it has never been doubted, that in the latter case such evidence was good, where the slave was bought in a country when writing was not necessary to give validity to the contract. Toullier, vol. 9, cap. 6, sect. 2, no. 44 in note: Repertoire de Juris, vol. 9. verbo Preuve, sect. 2, 3. art. 1. no. 3; Kames on Equity, 565, 7 Term, 241. The objection in respect to the agent having sold for less than the price directed to be obtained by the principal, is removed by the offer made by the former to make up the deficiency. Potheir, Contrat du Mandat, No. 94. On the merits, we see nothing which would authorise us to set aside the verdict. It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the district court be affirmed, with costs. M' Caleb and Byrnes, for the plaintiff. |