[Brown v. Anderson.] the holders or other owners. The rule taken by plaintiff on Lobdell, suggesting that he was in possession of a note of one M'Donough, the property of defendant and others, and requiring him to show cause why it should not be surrendered by him to the sheriff to be sold on plaintiff's execution, was discharged. Hernandez v. Garetage. IV, N. S. 419. THIRD District. New trial will not be granted for the discovery of evidence, which by due diligence might have been had before. The validity of a donation made in the state of Mississippi will be tested by our laws, if those of that state are not proved. Lawrence v. Foster. IV, N. S. 423. EIGHTH District. Amendments should not be allowed unless to promote the justice of the cause, and never to indulge indolence of a party. Chapelle v. Wells et al.: IV, N. S. 426. It is no violation of an exclusive right to keep a ferry, to cross persons without demanding toll, EIGHTH District. PORTER, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This action is brought to recover damages, which the plaintiff alleges he has sustained by the defendants disturbing him in the use and enjoyment of a ferry, to which he has an exclusive right, by virtue of an act of the legislature. The acts of disturbance are alleged to be the establishment of another ferry within the limits conceded to the petitioners, by the aforesaid act. The general issue was pleaded; the case submitted to a jury, and by them found for the defendants, and in our opinion correctly. The evidence shows the defendants had a boat on the river, near to the ferry of the plaintiff, and that they were in the habit of crossing there themselves and permitting others to cross; but there is no proof that they made any charge for doing so, or that they received compensation therefor. The third section of the act under which this suit is brought, prohibits any person from establishing a ferry, within the limits conferred on the plaintiff. Now to the establishment of a ferry, the taking of toll is essential. A ferry is defined to be, a liberty, by prescription or grant, to have a boat for passage upon a river, for carriage of horses and men, for reasonable toll. We have no doubt it was in that sense the word was used by the legislature; it never could have been their intention to prevent men from using their own boats to cross the river, nor to prevent them from lending these boats to their neighbors, so they did it gratuitously... It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the district court be affirmed, with costs. Ripley and Conrad, for the plaintiff. Hepp et al. v. Lafonta's Executors. IV, N. S. 428. FIRST District. If a specific legacy is made of a note, and afterwards, but before the death of the testator, a payment is made on it, the legatee cannot claim that the amount of the note should be paid by the executors. In this case, the testator himself received the part payment. This legacy was not of a sum of money, but of a contract or debt; it was not perfect until the moment the testator died, and then it took place as to what was then due; for the rest, it was adeemed. The executors having transferred the testator's claims on the debtor, to the legatee, as it stood at the time of testator's death, have nothing further to do in the business. Schlatter et al. v. Broaddus et al. IV, N. S. 430. FIRST District. "Persons, out of this state, can only be made amenable to our tribunals by having their property attached. A writ of attachment duly executed, stands in the place of a citation, The credits, goods and effects of the defendants, represent his person. If they be not levied on, he is not legally before the tribunal, any more than in an ordinary case where the citation is not served." Garidel v. Fogliardi. IV, N. S. 432. FIRST District. Held, creditors who sign a concordate, do not waive the right of contesting, thereafter, the claims of each other, on the syndic filing a tableau of distribution. See 10 Martin, 690. Brown & Sons v. Saul et al. IV, N. S. 434. A creditor has no right to interfere in a suit between his debtor and a third party. Dilatory and declinatory pleas should precede answering on the merits; but when there is a total want of right disclosed by the petition, it may be taken advantage of at any stage of the proceeding. PARISH Court of New Orleans. MATHEWS, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This suit was brought to recover from the defendant 9000 dollars, money alleged to have been lent him by the plaintiffs. In their petition they claim a privilege, as resulting from a pawn or pledge of four hundred shares of bank stock, in the Bank of Orleans. Before judgment was rendered between the original parties to the action, the Bank of Orleans and the Bank of Louisiana each filed separate petitions of intervention and opposition to the privilege or preference claimed by the plaintiffs, as above stated, alleging the embarrassed state of affairs or insolvency of the defendant, and imperfections in the act of pledge, as grounds of their opposition. They were permitted to intervene in the court below, and no objection seems to have been there made to their right of thus interfering with the interest and claims of the original parties. Judgment was finally rendered, supporting the opposition of the intervening parties, from which the plaintiffs appealed. In the course of the argument before this court, it occurred to us, [Brown & Sons v. Saul et al.] that the banks, as individual creditors of the defendant, had no right thus to interfere with the administration of justice between him and other individual creditors who were pursuing their claims in the ordinary mode of legal procedure, as the plaintiffs had attempted in the present case. On further reflection and examination of the cause, we are fully convinced of the correctness of the opinion then suggested to the counsel. The soundness of this opinion is however denied by the advocates of the banks, on two grounds; one of substance, the other rather of form. In support of the substantial and legal right of the present intervention, they refer the court to the 389th and 390th articles of the Code of Practice. The first of those articles does not in any manner support the pretensions of the parties intervening; for it contemplates an interest which such parties may have, connected with that of one or other of the original parties to a suit, either plaintiff or defendant. In the case now under consideration there is no union of interest in relation to the subject matter in dispute, between the interpleaders and either of the original parties. They claim rights adverse to the pretensions of the plaintiffs, and not in unison with any real interest of the defendant. The expressions of the 390th article convey ideas on the subject of intervention, general and indefinite, and give that right in all cases where third persons have an interest in the success of either of the original parties. But the interest here intended, we are of opinion, must be direct and closely connected with the object in dispute, founded on some right, claim, or lien, either conventional or legal. It surely will not be contended, that under this law, in every case where a creditor sues his debtor, all separately, or any one of the other creditors of the same debtor, may intervene on a bare suggestion of insolvency. The interpretation, as above expressed, of these articles of the Code of Practice, is in conformity with the principles established in the Louisiana Code, particularly by the 1967th article. Admitting the want of legal authority of individual creditors to intervene, for the purpose of invalidating contracts made by their debtors, unless the claims be liquidated by judgment; it is contended, that this court cannot notice any objection founded on such want of authority, because it was not made or pleaded in defence of the intervention in the present case, before trial in the parish court. It is, perhaps, a rule, almost without exception, that all objections to the personal capacity of a suitor to appear in justice, should be made in limine litis. All dilatory and declinatory pleas ought to precede the contestatio litis; and even peremptory exceptious should be regularly pleaded; but a total want of legal right in a suitor, in relation to the matters in litigation, ought to be taken into consideration and acted on by courts of justice, at any stage of a cause. They should not remain silent spectators of infringements of the true principles of laws, which they are appointed to administer. Being of opinion that the intervening parties in the present case had no legal right thus to come in, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the judgment of the parish court be avoided, reversed and |