NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Note (A.) page 4.

I AM happy in being able to quote the following passage, in illustration of a doctrine, against which I do not conceive it possible to urge any thing, but the authority of some illustrious

names.

Puisque l'existence des corps n'est pour nous que la permanence d'etres dont les propriétés répondent à un certain ordre ❝ de nos sensations, il en résulte qu'elle n'a rien de plus certain que celle d'autres etres qui se manifestent également par 'leurs effets sur nous; et puisque nos observations sur nos 16 propres facultés, confirmées par celles que nous faisons sur "les etres pensants qui animent aussi des corps, ne nous montrent aucune analogie entre l'etre qui sent ou qui pense et l'etre qui "nous offre le phénomene de l'étendue ou de l'impénétrabilité, "il n'y a aucune raison de croire ces etres de la même nature. "Ainsi la spiritualité de l'ame n'est pas une opinion qui ait be"soin de preuves, mais le résultat simple et naturel l'une analyse "exacte de nos idées, et de nos facultés."-Vie de M. Turgot par M. Condorcet.

Des Cartes was the first philosopher who stated, in a clear and satisfactory manner, the distinction between mind and matter, and who pointed out the proper plan for studying the intellectual phenomena. It is chiefly in consequence of his precise ideas with respect to this distinction, that we may remark, in all his metaphysical writings, a perspicuity which is not observable in those of any of his predecessors.

Dr. Reid has remarked, that although Des Cartes infers the existence of mind, from the operations of which we are conscious, yet he could not reconcile himself to the notion of an unknown substance, or substratum, to which these operations belonged. And it was on this account, he conjectures, that he made the essence of the soul to consist in thought; as, for a similar reason, he had made the essence of matter to consist in extension. But I am afraid, that this supposition is not perfectly reconcilable with Des Cartes' writings; for he repeatedly speaks with the utmost confidence of the existence of substances of which we have only a relative idea; and, even in attempting to shew that thought is the essential attribute of mind, and extension of matter, he considers them as nothing more than attributes or qualities belonging to these substances.

"Per substantiam nihil aliud intelligere possumus, quam rem “quæ ita existit, ut nulla alia re indigeat ad existendum. Et qui"dem substantia quæ nulla plane re indigeat, unica tantum potest "intelligi, nempe Deus. Alias vero omnes, non nisi ope concursus Dei existere posse percipimus. Atque ideo nomen sub❝stantiæ non convenit Deo et illis univoce ut dici solet in scholis; "hoc est, nulla ejus'nominis significatio, potest distincte intelligi, ، quæ Deo, et creaturis sit communis.

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"Possunt autem substantia corporea, et mens, sive substantia cogitans, creata, sub hoc communi conceptu intelligi; quod sint res, quæ solo Dei concursu agent ad existendum. Verumtamen non potest substantia primum animadverti ex hoc solo, quod sit res existens, quia hoc solum per se nos non afficit: sed facile. « ipsam agnoscimus ex quolibet ejus attributo, per communem "illam notionem, quod nihili nulla sunt attributa, nullæve propri"etates aut qualitates. Ex hoc enim, quod aliquod attributum "adesse percipiamus, concludimus aliquam rem existentem, sive << substantiam cui illud tribui possit, necessario etiam adesse.

"Et quidem ex quolibet attributo substantia cognoscitur: sed "una tamen est cujusque substantiæ præcipua proprietas, quæ "ipsius naturam essentiamque constituit, et ad quam aliæ omnes "referuntur. Nempe extensio in longum, latum et profundum "substantiæ corporeæ naturam constituit; et cogitatio constituit

naturam substantiæ cogitantis."-Princip. Philosoph. pars i. cap. 51, 52, 53.

In stating the relative notions, which we have of mind and of body, I have avoided the use of the word substance, as I am unwilling to funish the slightest occasion for controversy; and have contented myself with defining mind to be that which feels, thinks, wills, hopes, fears, desires, &c. That my consciousness of these and other operations is necessarily accompanied with a conviction of my own existence, and with a conviction that all of them belong to one and the same being, is not an hypothesis, but a fact; of which it is no more possible for me to doubt, than of the reality of my own sensations or volitions.

Note (B.) p. 59.

Doctor Reid remarks, that Des Cartes rejected a part only of the ancient theory of perception, and adopted the other part. "That theory," says he, “ may be divided into two parts: the "first, that images, species, or forms of external objects, come from "the object, and enter by the avenues of the senses to the mind: "the second part is, that the external object itself is not perceiv"ed, but only the species or image of it in the mind. The "first part, Des Cartes and his followers rejected and refuted by "solid arguments; but the second part, neither he nor his followers have thought of calling in question; being persuaded "that it is only a representative image in the mind of the external object that we perceive, and not the object itself. And this image, which the peripatetics called a species, he calls an idea, 'changing the name only, while he admits the thing."

The account which this passage contains of Des Cartes' doctrine concerning perception, is, I believe, agreeable to his prevailing opinion, as it may be collected from the general tenor of his writings; and the observation with which it concludes is undoubtedly true, that neither he, nor any of his followers ever called in question the existence of ideas, as the immediate objects of our perception. With respect, however, to the first part of the ancient theory, as here stated, it may be proper to remark,

that Des Cartes, although evidently by no means satisfied with it, sometimes expresses himself as if he rather doubted of it, than expressly denied it; and at other times, when pressed with objections to his own particular system, he admits, at least in part, the truth of it. The following passage is one of the most explicit I recollect, in opposition to the ancient doctrine.

"Observandum præterea, animam, nullis imaginibus ab objectis "ad cerebrum missis egere ut sentiat, (contra quam communiter "philosophi nostri statuunt,) aut ad minimum longe aliter illarum imaginum naturam concipiendam esse quam vulgo fit. Quum "enim circa eas nil considerent, præter similitudinem earum 66 cum objectis quæ repræsentant, non possunt explicare, qua ra" tione ab objectis formari queant, et recipi ab organis sensuum "exteriorum, et demum nervis ad cerebrum transvehi. Nec alia "causa imagines istas fingere eos impulit, nisi quod viderent " mentem nostram efficaciter pictura excitari ad apprehendendum "objectum illud, quod exhibet: ex hoc enim judicarunt, illam "eodem modo excitandam, ad apprehendenda ea quæ sensus movent, per exiguas quasdam imagines, in capite nostro deline"atas. Sed nobis contra est advertendum, multa præter imagines "esse, quæ cogitationes excitant, ut exempli gratia, verba et signa, nullo modo similia iis quæ significant."Dioptric.. cap. 4. § 6.

In his third meditation (which contains his celebrated argument for the existence of a Deity) the following passage occurs.

"Sed hic præcipue de iis est quærendum quas tanquam a rebus "extra me existentibus desumptas considero, quænam me moveat "ratio ut illas istis rebus similes esse existimem; nempe ita vi"deor doctus a natura, et præterea experior illas non a mea vo"luntate nec proinde a me ipso pendere, sæpe enim vel invito "obversantur, ut jam, sive velim sive nolim, sentio calorem, et ❝ideo puto sensum illum, sive ideam coloris a re a me diversa, nempe ab ignis, cui assideo calore mihi advenire, nihilque ma"gis obvium est, quam ut judicem istam rem suam similitudinem "potius, quam aliud quid in me immittere; quæ rationes an satis "firmæ sint, jam videbo. Cum hic dico me ita doctum esse a "natura, intelligo tantum spontaneo quodam impetu me ferri að