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principle of action as reprehensible in every form, and wish to substitute in its place a pure and disinterested regard to the good of the whole human race. Such was the doctrine of the ancient Stoic schools, though inculcated in a form rather austere and uninviting; and such nearly was the doctrine of Plato, and of his more modern followers, who assumed to themselves the name of Eclectics.

According to the Stoical doctrine, the selfish desires and passions of the human mind ought never, on any account, to be yielded to by a wise man; for happiness, according to the tenets of this school, consists in a perfect exemption from that perturbation of mind, which is inseparable from passion; or in that state which they denominated arabia. Man, said the Stoics, ought not to be actuated by any regard to his own convenience, but ought to consider himself as a constituent part of a great whole, the good of which ought to be the object which he constantly keeps in view. "When," says Epictetus," we consider the foot, as a foot, and something disjoined from the rest of the body, it may be better for that foot always to be clean: but when we view it as a member of the body, it behoves it sometimes to tread in the mire, sometimes to trample upon thorns, and sometimes to be cut off, for the well-being of the rest of the body. What are you?— A man.-If we consider you as made only for yourself, it would be better for you always to be rich, to live to a good old age, and to enjoy health but when we view you as a constituent member of society, it will frequently behove you, for its advantage, to be poor, to be sick, to encounter danger, and perhaps to suffer premature death. Why then do you complain? only remember, that if, by refusing to suffer for the advantage of the body, the foot ceases to be a foot, so do you, by refusing to suffer for the good of society, cease to be a man."

The doctrine of the rejection of every selfish motive of conduct assumed a more amiable and inviting form, in the hands of the Eclectics, more especially as it has been taught by those modern philosophers who may be said to have revived and improved the Eclectic system. In the seventeenth century, many of the tenets of the Platonic philosophy were ably sustained by the learning and ingenuity of the celebrated Dr. Cudworth, the great opponent of Hobbes, and all the infidel writers. It was the doctrine of Cudworth, that the only praiseworthy motive of conduct in man is a pure benevolence, or steady regard to the interests and well-being of his fellowcreatures, and he rested the proofs of his doctrine upon the truths of natural religion, or the contemplation of the divine attributes. Benevolence, said he, appears to be the governing attribute of the Deity, since he has thereby been led to the formation of a universe of animated and rational beings, capable of enjoying happiness themselves, but of imparting none to their maker, whose happiness is perfect, and incapable of increase. It becomes us, therefore, as far as in our

"C'est la source des combats des philosophes, dont les uns ont pris à tâche d'élever l'homme en découvrant ses grandeurs, et les autres de l'abaisser en représentant ses misères." (Pascal.)

power, to imitate this divine attribute, and co-operate as much as may be with the beneficent views of our creator.

The system of benevolence has found two very able advocates in Lord Shaftesbury and Mr. Hutcheson, who have rested its foundation upon less abstract speculations, and have appealed to facts, and what we observe in the world of the moral estimates of mankind. There, say they, we find that a virtuous action is approved of in exact proportion to the degree of benevolence which has produced it; and when we discover any degree of self-love to have had a share in its motive, this we uniformly consider as an abatement of its merit. "In short," says Hutcheson, "we always see actions, which flow from public love, accompanied with generous boldness and openness ; and not only malicious, but even selfish ones, the matter of shame and confusion; and that men study to conceal them. The love of private pleasure is the ordinary occasion of vice; and when men have got any lively notions of virtue, they generally begin to be ashamed of every thing which betrays selfishness, even in instances where it is innocent. We are apt to imagine, that others, observing us in such pursuits, form mean opinions of us, as too much set on private pleasure; and hence we shall find such enjoyments in most polite nations, concealed from those who do not partake with us." (Inquiry concerning moral good and evil, sect. 5.) These authors have likewise exhibited in glowing colors the pleasure which arises from the performance of benevolent actions; a pleasure which they justly represent as far superior to the gratifications of sense; and in this way they have very meritoriously endeavoured to excite mankind to that line of conduct which promises most fairly to promote the welfare of the species.

This view of the principal duties of human nature is doubtless far more pleasing than that contained in the selfish system, and much more calculated to produce conviction on the unperverted mind. Yet pleasing and amiable as it is, it cannot be considered as unexceptionable, and is indeed fraught with consequences by no means favorable to true virtue. By representing actions as meritorious solely in proportion to the good which they confer upon our fellow-creatures, it authorises the dangerous doctrine, that the means are sanctioned by the end. On such a principle, theft, robbery, and every kind of violence, might be justified, as they may be made the means of benefiting certain individuals; and to take away the superfluities of the rich and bestow them on the poor, would certainly be a benevolent action, even though accomplished by unlawful means. According to this system, too, there would neither be merit nor demerit in those actions which did not directly affect the interests of our neighbours; so that we might tell the truth or not, as it suited us, if the lie did no harm to any one; or in conferring a favor, we might bestow it on an indifferent person, as well as upon one who had obliged us, since the good produced, in both cases, would be precisely the same. Thus it appears that the system of benevolence makes no provision for such virtues as veracity, honesty, or gratitude. The same inordinate love of simplicity, which we perceive in the selfish theory of duty, is also manifest in the system of benevolence; like the selfish system, it exhi

bits a partial and incomplete, though doubtless a far more amiable and attractive, view of human nature.

Many writers upon morality, who have evinced the strongest interest in the welfare of the human race, have been inclined to deduce man's perception of duty, or of that line of conduct which he ought to pursue, from the principle of piety, or an obedience to the will of God; such is the foundation on which a late eminent writer on morals, Archdeacon Paley, chooses to rest the obligations of moral sanction: but though it be granted that the divine will is paramount to every other consideration, it is difficult to conceive how unassisted reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine will, unless we suppose certain principles of moral discrimination to be inherent in man, by means of which he is enabled to infer what may be the will of the Divinity in particular cases of conduct.

All of these systems of duty seem alike to err from an undue regard to simplicity, and a desire to reduce to some one principle the various motives by which men are prompted to act, when they duly perform their part in the great drama of life. The truth appears to be, that the motives of human conduct are of a nature by far too complicated to admit of being reduced to any one generally pervading principle, and the relations in which man is placed are such as to subject him to the obligation of more than one general class of duties. His duties, however, or leading principles of action, may be reduced to a few general classes, without much difficulty; and if these classes seem to be essentially distinct from each other, or not included the one within the other, this is certainly a much safer way of treating of many duties, or active principles, than the attempt to derive them all from

one source.

Under one or other of the three following heads, the active principles of man seem naturally to arrange themselves-1st. Those active principles which are selfish, or which tend chiefly to promote the advantage of the individual. 2d. Those which are social, or which have other men for their object. 3d. Those which are moral, or which seem to have a higher sanction than either our own advantage, or the interest of society. On each of these classes of active principles, I shall make a few observations.

The Scholiast on Hephastion, and an Ode of Anacreon mutually illustrated.

THE Scholiast, in chapter 7. Tig To 'Avaxesoriou, (see Gaisford's Hephæstion, p. 172.) describes the ancient Anacreontic verse, as composed of an iambic dimeter acatalectic.

In this metre we have a fragment, preserved in Hephaestion,

Ἐρῶ τε δῆτα κ ̓ οὐκ ἐρῶ,

Καὶ μαίνομαι κ' οὐ μαίνομαι.

But Hephæstion informs us also, (p. 29. Gaisford's Heph.) that Anacreon composed whole Odes in it.

The Scholiast then proceeds as follows:

Οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι διαιροῦσιν αὐτὸ εἴς τε κῶλα ἓξ, καὶ εἰς δύο. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἓξ κῶλά φασιν οἴκους, τὰ δὲ δύο κουκούλιον· καὶ ἐπιδέχονται οἱ μὲν οἴκοι ἀνάπαισ τον, καὶ δύο ἰάμβους, καὶ περιττὴν συλλαβὴν, οἷον,

ἀπὸ τοῦ λίθου τὸ ῥεῖθρον.

Τὸ δὲ τούτουν κουκούλιον σύγκειται ἔκ τε τοῦ ἐλάσσονος τῶν δισυλλάβων ποδῶν,
τουτέστι τοῦ πυρῇιχίου, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος, ἤτοι τοῦ σπονδείου. καὶ ἔχει ἐν μὲν
ταῖς περιτταῖς χώραις τὸν ἐλάσσονα, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρτίοις τὸν μείζονα, οἷον,
ἀρετῆς εὐστεφάνου άνθεα δρέψας.

Ἔστι δὲ ὅτε καὶ ἀπὸ χοριάμβου ἄρχεται ὁ τοιοῦτος στίχος, κ. τ. λ. οἷον,
Χριστιανῶν μακάρων ἔλθετε παῖδες.

As the learned Editor of Hephaestion has left the word κουκούλιον unexplained, I will hazard a conjecture as to its meaning. I believe it to be a Greek, or rather Romaic, word, formed from the barbarous Latin cuculium, a diminutive from cucullus. It is then the cowl or cupola to the house, or stanza of six lines.

The Anacreontic Ode, which is composed after the preceding rule, is 62 in Barnes's edition. I will transcribe the whole by way of illustration.

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Barnes, with sagacity enough to suspect that the preceding Ode is not genuine, nevertheless wastes his time in reducing each line to some supposed metre, and does not seem to have perceived, that the whole is to be measured not by the quantity of time, but by the mere number of syllables. I have observed in my essay on the Lyric Metres of Anacreon, that, as the language declined, rhythm became neglected, and was superseded by syllabic versification, without the smallest regard to rhythm, or musical proportion, or what is more commonly called quantity.

The Ode just cited is not a rhythmical, but a syllabic versification, conformable to the preceding rule of the Scholiast, and consists of a house of six lines, resembling in number of syllables, Μεσονυκτίαις ποθ' ώραις, and of a cowl or cap of two lines, with a hepthemimeral cæsure, resembling in number and division of syllables,

Meruentes patruz | verbera linguz.

This is the key to the measure of this Ode, and whoever reads it according to this manner, and gives himself no concern about the quantity, will best fulfil the intention of the composer. If we stop at the cæsure of the cap, and prefix to it the last line of the house, we have exactly that sort of verse, consisting of fifteen syllables, which is called popular, woλivinos or dauórinos. See Gaisford's Hephæstion, p. 250. For instance the verse,

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μερον, γάμον, Παφίην, | δέρκεο την νεῆνιν,

is similar to the popular verse,

8

7

Πολιτική διδήξω σε | συντόμως στιχουργία.

These verses, it is evident, correspond only in the number and order of syllables, but do not agree in rhythm, and still less in metre ; and therefore do not antistrophise. Such popular verses had no existence among the ancient Greeks, and would have been deemed barbarous. Eustathius, however, speaks of them as existing in his time, and characterises them very justly in these words: si μèv METÀ συμφώνων λαλοῦνται, γέλωνται, ὡς ἄῤῥυθμοι, καὶ σκώπτονται, ὡς πολύποδες. (Gaisford's Hephæstion, p. 250.) that is, if they are pronounced with consonants, they become ridiculous, as being destitute of rhythm, and are reviled, as exceeding the just measure of quantity. Thus if we read the Sotadean verse,

Αμφότερα μενεῖν οὐκ οἶδεν, ἕστηκεν γὰρ οὔδεν,

as an hexameter, and make oděv σтev yap two syllabic dactyls, we shall perceive plainly (not by our ears indeed, but technically and by science,) the violence done to rhythm by this incumbrance of consonants, and acquiesce in the censure of Eustathius.

This verse of fifteen syllables, with a close after the eighth syllable, is still the favorite measure in modern Greek or Romaic, and is enriched frequently with the further grace of rhyme. This grace the modern Greeks have borrowed probably from their Italian neighbours, and Venetian masters.

The following couplet, taken from Lord Byron's Childe Harold, p. 275. may serve as an example :

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It is well known, that the Monkish writers in Latin fell into a like mode of versification, in relation to quantity, and the theological hexameters of Robert Maxwood, such as

Stratam ne repete, dicit vox divina Prophetæ,

might as well pass for those of Virgil, as several whole Odes in Greek, composed by some neoteric Poetaster, have hitherto passed current for those of Anacreon.

Upon the whole, the versification of the Greek language may be divided into three æras, the ancient, the middle, and the modern; and the characteristic of the first is rhythm, of the second syllabic concordance, and of the last rhyme.

June, 1812.

M. K.

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