96 should be so construed as to give a sensible and intelligent meaning to every part, to avoid absurd and unjust consequences" and, if possible, so as to make it valid and effective.98 "It is familiar that if the words employed are susceptible of two meanings, that will be adopted which comports with the general public policy of the state, as manifested by its legislation rather than that which runs counter to such policy." 99 When a general intention is expressed in a statute and also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception and both are to have effect in their respective spheres.1 An act provided State v. McGowan, 138 Mo. 187, 39 96 Mechanics' & Traders' L. & B. Ass'n v. People, 72 Ill. App. 160; Hermanek v. Guthman, 72 Ill. App. 370; S. C. affirmed, 179 Ill. 563, 53 N. E. 966; Westfield Cem. Ass'n v. Danielson, 62 Conn. 319, 26 Atl. 345; Brook v. Blue Mound, 61 Kan. 184, 59 Pac. 273; State v. Barge, 82 Minn. 256, 84 N. W. 911, 1116, 53 L. R. A. 428; Curtis v. Stovin, L. R. 22 Q. B. D. 513. 97 In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661, 17 S. C. Rep. 677, 41 L. Ed. 1154; Tsoi Sim v. United States, 116 Fed. 920, 54 C. C. A. 154. 98 Dobson v. State, 69 Ark. 376, 63 S. W. 796; Nugent v. Jackson, 72 Miss. 1040, 18 So. 493; Slocum v. Neptune, 68 N. J. L. 595, 53 Atl. 301; Territory v. Ashenfelter, 4 N. M. 93, 12 Pac. 879; Madden v. Hardy, 92 Tex. 613, 50 S. W. 926. 99 Wheeler v. Wheeler, 134 Ill. 522, 530, 25 N. E. 588, 10 L. R. A. 613. sioners, 126 Cal. 404, 58 Pac. 932; Davis v. Dougherty County, 116 Ga. 491, 42 S. E. 764; Dahnke v. People, 168 Ill. 102, 48 N. E. 137, 39 L. R. A. 197; People v. Hutchinson, 172 Ill. 486, 50 N. E. 599; Dodge v. Chicago, 201 Ill. 68, 66 N. E. 367; Boyd v. Brazil Block Coal Co., 25 Ind. App. 157, 57 N. E. 732; Arnold v. Council Bluffs, 85 Iowa, 441, 52 N. W. 347; Poor v. Watson, 92 Mo. App. 89; State v. District Court, 14 Mont. 452, 37 Pac. 9; Home B. & L. Ass'n v. Nolan, 21 Mont. 205, 53 Pac. 738; Cate v. Martin, 70 N. H. 135, 46 Atl. 54, 48 L. R. A. 613; McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427, 65 N. W. 46, 50 Am. St. Rep. 617, 30 L. R. A. 450; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556, 74 N. W. 59, 68 Am. St. Rep. 629; Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132, 29 N. E. 85; Wormser v. Brown, 149 N. Y. 163, 43 N. E. 524; Portland v. Gaston, 38 Ore. 533, 63 Pac. 1051; McAskie's Appeal, 154 Pa. St. 24, 26 Atl. 60; Kolb v. Reformed Episcopal Church, 18 Pa. Supr. Ct. 477; Hayes v. Arrington, 108 Tenn. 494, 68 S. W. 44; Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 76 Tex. 1 Martin v. Election Commis- 630, 13 S. W. 665; People v. Utah that no holder of a tax certificate should be entitled to a deed, unless he should give a certain notice of his application for a deed. A prior law provided that a tax deed should be conclusive evidence of the regularity of all proceedings "from the assessment by the assessor inclusive up to the execution of the deed." It was held that such a deed was not evidence of the giving of the notice required by the subsequent act.2 A statute which imposed a penalty upon whoever should transact business without a license, where a license is required by law, was held to embrace cases where the license was required by a subsequent law." In the case referred to it is held that the language of a statute is generally extended to new things which the language of the act is sufficient to comprehend, although such things were not known and could not have been contemplated by the legislature when the act was passed. An Illinois statute passed before the creation of the appellate courts of that state provided that no judgment should be reversed in the supreme court for mere error in form, if the judgment was for the true amount of debt or damages. The statute was held to apply to the appellate courts thereafter created. The court says: "There is no doubt that this enactment of the legislature, made before the organization of the appellate Commissioners, 7 Utah, 279, 26 Pac. 577; Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484; American Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 12 S. C. Rep. 55, 35 L. Ed. 821. See Ex parte Ah Hoy, 23 Ore. 89, 31 Pac. 220. 450, 10 Am. St. Rep. 76; State v. Buskirk, 18 Ind. App. 629, 48 N. E. 872; United States v. Nichols, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,880; United States v. Bonton, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,534; State v. Hays, 78 Mo. 600; Campbell v. People, 8 Wend. 636; State v. 2 Herrick v. Niesz, 16 Wash. 74, Becton, 7 Baxter, 138; Graves v. 47 Pac. 414. Daniels v. State, 150 Ind. 348, 50 N. E. 74. See also Nations v. State, 64 Ark. 467, 43 S. W. 396; State v. Dohney, 72 Vt. 260, 47 Atl. 785. 4 Daniels v. State, 150 Ind. 348, 50 N. E. 74, citing State v. Kirk, 74 Ind. 554; Mercer v. Corbin, 117 Ind. Ashford, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; Gam- court, is sufficiently broad in its scope, and elastic in its terms, to include any courts thereafter to be created, and given part of the functions which were exercised by the supreme court when the enactment went into operation."5 A pure drug law forbid the sale of adulterated drugs and declared that an article should be deemed to be adulterated, if below the standard of quality, strength or purity laid down in the United States Pharmacopoeia. The statute was held to refer to the edition of the Pharmacopoeia in use at the time of its passage, and that drugs were not adulterated if up to the standard of that edition, though they might be below the requirements of a later edition. 5 Coats v. Barrett, 49 Ill. App. 275, 277. State v. Emery, 55 Ohio St. 364, 45 N. E. 319. CHAPTER XIV. STRICT CONSTRUCTION. § 517 (346). Literal and strict construction compared. Statutes are seldom written in such precise and categorical terms as to point out inclusively and exclusively all their intended applications. General and more or less flexible language is used. It is construed with reference to the subject of the act, its purpose; and popular words are read and understood according to their common acceptation.1 And if technical words are used they are construed according to their technical sense. There are many statutes of divers kinds which are strictly construed. And there is a great variety of other statutes which are remedial in their nature and are liberally construed. The statutes which are thus classified for strict or liberal construction include a large part of the legislation of every state. The same language may have a broader scope and effect for remedial purposes than under the restraining influence of considerations which induce strict construction. In the case of Bones v. Booth construction was given to the phrase “a single sitting" of a loser at play. The statute gave him a right for a limited time to recover his losses above 107. at "a single sitting;" and gave an informer, afterwards, the right to recover them and treble value besides. As to the loser the statute was held remedial, and the losses those of a single sitting, though suspended for dinner; but as to the inform 3 1 De Veaux v. De Veaux, 1 Strob. Bank, 5 Ark. 536, 41 Am. Dec. 105; Eq. 283; ante, SS 394-401. 2 Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111; Opinion of Justices, 7 Mass. 523; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459, 17 L. Ed. 218; Buckner v. Real Estate Merchants' Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 405; United States v. Breed, 1 Sumn. 159, Fed. Cas. No. 14.638; Elliott v. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137, 9 L. Ed. 373. 32 W. Black. 1226. er's right, the statute was penal, and the suspension for dinner broke the continuity of the sitting. § 518 (347). Strict construction is not a precise but a relative expression; it varies in degree of strictness according to the character of the law under construction. The construction will be more or less strict according to the gravity of the consequences flowing from the operation of the statute or its infraction; if penal, the severity of the penalty; if in derogation of common right, or capable of being employed oppressively, the extent and nature of the innovation and the consequences; and in any case, according to the combined effect and the reciprocal influence of all relevant principles of interpretation. A remedial statute, not clear as to any proposed application, admits of resort to many rules of construction to determine what the courts are authorized to assume is the meaning and intention of the law-maker. But a statute which must, on account of its subject or nature, be construed strictly, as the phrase is, must be read without expansion beyond its letter, without recourse to any such rules; it is to be confined to such subjects or applications as are obviously within its terms and purpose. In other words, a strict construction is a close and conservative adherence to the literal or textual interpretation." In speaking of the rule of strict construction the supreme court of the United States, in a recent case, says: "We recognize the force and salutary character of the rule, but it must not be misunderstood. It is not a substitute for all other rules. It does not mean that when a controversy is 4 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 17 Mass. 46, 49: Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197, 210, 11 L. Ed. 559. 5 See Chapin v. Persse & Brooks Paper Works, 30 Conn. 461, 79 Am. Dec. 263. 6 Post, § 595–621. 7 Austin v. State, 71 Ga. 595; Bettis v. Taylor, 8 Port. 564; Jordt v. State, 31 Tex. 571; Andrews V. United States, 2 Story, 203, Fed. Cas. No. 381; United States v. Bassett, 2 Story, 389, Fed. Cas. No. 14,539; State v. Graham, 38 Ark. 519; Watervliet T. Co. v. McKean, 6 Hill, 616; Melody v. Reab, 4 Mass. 473; Schooner Enterprise, 1 Paine, 32, Fed. Cas. No. 4499. |